Andrew Cormack
On 07 January 2011 at 11:52 Andrew Cormack said:
> I
think we're in pretty close agreement :)
I am less optimistic about
the level of agreement. It seems to me that we are both perceiving the
same things from different perspectives and making inferences from
those perspectives.
> It shouldn't be. My views on how sysadmin powers
ought to be used are on the web...
We both acknowledge the necessity
of the correct ethical approaches and that the correct approach is
often diluted or abused by more human factors. (Your non-technical
issues comment resulted in me reaching the last part of that
conclusion.)
A difference seems to arise in how human factors should be
catered for.
> And I very much agree that the legal system sometimes
struggles to cope
The point to me is not that the legal system
struggles to cope; it seems to plan and manage itself quite adequately.
The point seems to be more one of the directions taken by conscious
choice.
We both seem to agree that the choices made within any
particular group are guided by the levels of knowledge and cultural
expectations which form their perspectives. That is a crux issue in
this matter and whilst I have no doubt that decisions are made with the
best intent at the time, they can and do often result in dysfunctional
consequences.
In any scientific method inferences made need to be
corroborated. Whilst that forms part of the difficulty for the legal
sector, in a privacy sense it is no more than another social facet that
results in privacy so often being seen as nothing more than a power
issue. Look to the many discussions on the DP and FOI list regarding
the rights and wrongs of disclosure to see that element in play. Many
scientific world views exist, as do many other world views.
Should
any particular world view completely override all others irrespective
of consequences? At one end of the spectrum that is the paradox (and
fundamental basis for the knowledge is power view of privacy) which
needs a clearly informed decision making and one in which we may have a
more fundamental disagreement than discussion room on this group would
allow notwithstanding the need for DP practitioners to clearly
understand the differences which arise in those contexts.
Ian W
-----Original Message-----
From: This list is for those interested in
Data Protection issues [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On
Behalf Of Andrew Cormack
Sent: 07 January 2011 11:52
To: data-
[log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: [data-protection] Passwords
question
Ian
I think we're in pretty close agreement :)
> -----
Original Message-----
> From: This list is for those interested in Data
Protection issues
> [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf
Of Ian Welton
> Sent: 07 January 2011 11:35
> To: data-
[log in to unmask]
> Subject: Re: Passwords question
>
> On 07
January 2011 at 07:21 Andrew Cormack said:
>
> > I can reassure you
>
there are at least two of us ;)
>
> There will undoubtedly be more,
which
> created the puzzlement.
>
> > If you're talking about
businesses
> encrypting the master copy of their data...
>
> It seems
we are confusing
> encryption with password management and access
control. I am speaking
> mainly of the later irrespective of
encryption use, but used the
> former for examples. I see the deletion
of data no longer required is
> nothing more than good data management
practice. Having secondary
> access to the passwords on the other hand
raises the issues you
> outline in your next paragraph
>
> > I very
much agree that all of those... If someone else
> has stored material
on my system that is likely to come to the
> attention of a RIPA Part
III request then I'd rather not be able to
> decrypt it, thanks!
>
>
My experience has shown that many system
> administrators only adopt
that stance in that type of personally
> threatening circumstance. The
nature of the role otherwise frequently
> indicates access is
gained/granted and occasionally misused.
It shouldn't be. My views on
how sysadmin powers ought to be used are on the web, and endorsed by
UCISA, the representative body for university and college IT directors.
See http://www.ja.net/development/legal-and-regulatory/regulated-activities/charter-for-system-administrators.html.
A number of universities now have something based on that in their
employment contracts for that type of post, and I understand the
document has also been promoted within SOCITM.
> > I agree
> the
scenario is a good one for thinking about the balance of security
>
threats...
>
> I myself was thinking of the many privacy issues which
are clearly
> illustrated by the case including the values and
perceptions which
> resulted in the manipulation of the media, (the
original press
> release.) Our own different perspectives presented
during this
> discussion illustrate some of the richness of the
content.
>
> I disagree
> that they all come down to the issue of key
management. A complex set
> of issues prior to and separate from that
have created this situation
> and associated continuing developments
surrounding the wider areas of
> accountability/responsibility and
proof/prove. Unfortunately this is
> something which in my opinion the
legal system currently finds itself
> bound to continue progressing
and that is of interest to me in some
> social contexts of my privacy
research, hence this email thread which
> from some perspectives has
been answered more by silence than
> contributions.
Sorry, my fault
for phrasing my point badly. What I meant to say was that I think the
great majority of these issues are non-technical.
And I very much
agree that the legal system sometimes struggles to cope. Hardly
surprising as I, despite past jobs as both sysadmin and head of a
security team, often have to think carefully what can be inferred from
given evidence, and what can't! (Incidentally all the specific issues
around RIPA Part III were rehearsed exhaustively both when the Act was
passed and when that part was enabled, so it wasn't for lack of trying
that the law didn't end up better than it is). Good to hear that there
are people trying to help make things better.
Cheers
Andrew
>
> Ian
W
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: This list is
> for
those interested in Data Protection issues [mailto:data-
>
[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Andrew Cormack
> Sent: 07
January
> 2011 07:21
> To: [log in to unmask]
> Subject:
Re: [data-
> protection] Passwords question
>
>
>
> > -----Original
Message-----
> > From:
> This list is for those interested in Data
Protection issues
> > [mailto:
> [log in to unmask]] On
Behalf Of Ian Welton
> > Sent: 06
> January 2011 12:21
> > To: data-
[log in to unmask]
> > Subject: Re:
> Passwords question
> >
> >
Yes RIPA does. The discussions on the legal
> blogs focused on the
> >
viability of presenting any 'forgotten'
> defence. (Notwithstanding
> >
medical evidence of a memory disorder).
> Those discussions questioned
> > any ability to be able to maintain an
> effective 'sorry I have
> >
forgotten' defence. They should be available
> via a search using
> >
factors contained in the link provided. (Having
> been focusing on
> >
financial and academic worlds over the last year I
> did not myself
save
> > all the
> > links.)
> >
> > One has to accept the
> juries
findings could probably be based upon
> > softer information
>
available within the courtroom. One of the odd
> > things is that I
>
myself deliberately do put in a password intending
> > not to remember
> it when occasionally finally closing electronic
> > accounts down,
and I
> also forgot some passwords when first obtaining
> > and
learning how to
> use PGP and utilising long passwords. (I found
> >
memory management
> differs between long and short passwords) So it is
> > difficult to
> believe I am the only person who follows such a
practice
> > or has
> experienced that type of forgetfulness.
>
> I
can reassure you there are
> at least two of us ;)
>
> > Any other
responses from the
> > list will be
> interesting as the questions
remain valid.
>
> If you're talking about
> businesses encrypting the
master copy of their data and relying on a
> single person remembering
the key then I'd have thought that business
> continuity was a bigger
risk than a RIPA Part III challenge. But the
> right solutions to that
include enterprise encryption systems that do
> key management
properly, providing multiple routes to decrypt the
> data, for example
by a two (or more) key emergency recovery process.
> If the concern is
staff using their own encryption tools on their own
> data then I'd
suggest either a policy that prohibits that, or else
> mandates
regular checks that they can decrypt it and, if not,
> immediate
deletion of the files (which are scrap anyway, since the
> person can
no longer decrypt them).
>
> > I do find it
> > interesting that
nobody has yet raised
> the issue of access to a
> > persons passwords
not being acceptable
> because of the levels of access
> > that
provides, or that other access
> mechanisms are generally
> >
available. (To enable legal procedures only
> requires read access.)
All
> > of which leaves open the interpretation
> that passwords,
whilst being a
> > part of security, are being perceived
> as more of
an accountability
> > mechanism than a security one. (I am
>
deliberately disregarding
> > situations where they may be widely
shared
> anyway.)
>
> I very much agree that all of those (including
>
accountability) are problems with shared *login* passwords (though a
>
pragmatic approach will quickly spot that those with access to the
>
backup copy of the passwords may be sysadmins who can easily break
>
into users' accounts anyway). But for *encryption* passwords there is
> also the problem, if they are shared, that the unfortunate person
who
> might be able to access to the backup copy can easily be accused
of
> having
> *created* the encrypted file. If someone else has stored
material on my
> system that is likely to come to the attention of a
RIPA Part III
> request then I'd rather not be able to decrypt it,
thanks!
>
> > For info,
> if it is useful to
> > anybody, this case
does provide a particularly
> good case study
> > illustrating many
different facets of the privacy
> paradigm.
>
> I agree the scenario
is a good one for thinking about the balance of
> security threats (I
use it in my own courses!), though there are
> sufficient
peculiarities around the specific case that I'm not sure
> I'd cite it
directly. But questions of whether it is better to have
> material
destroyed than divulged (which is the assessment that should
> lead to
a decision to encrypt) and how to manage access thereafter,
> are well
worth exploring, and a lot more complex than the simple
> slogan of
"use encryption" might lead you to believe. They almost
> always come
down to key management, which is a human/policy issue,
> rather than a
technological one, though technology can help.
>
> Cheers
> Andrew
>
> > Ian W
>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Andrew
> Cormack [mailto:Andrew.
> > [log in to unmask]]
> >
Sent: 05 January 2011 17:43
>
> > To: Ian Welton; data-
> >
[log in to unmask]
> > Subject: RE:
> Passwords question
> >
> >
> > Ian
> > RIPA
> > part III definitely allows
> forgetfulness as a
defence (s53(3)).
> > However the blog suggests that
> the question in
this case was actually
> > whether it was plausible that
> someone
would use such an unmemorable
> > password (40-50 *random*
>
characters, the blog suggests) and not write
> > it down. The jury
>
appear to have concluded that it wasn’t plausible,
> > therefore there
> must be a written copy somewhere that the defendant
> > was refusing
to
> disclose. So the defendant failed to "adduce
> > sufficient
evidence to
> raise an issue" of whether he was still in
> > possession
of the
> (written) password.
> >
> > There are ways of generating
memorable
> passwords of that length that
> > don't need to be written
down (the
> passphrase for my digital signature
> > is of that order),
but using a
> random number generator doesn't seem to
> > be one of
them.
> >
> > Andrew
>
> >
> > --
> > Andrew Cormack,
> > Chief
Regulatory Adviser, JANET(UK)
> > Lumen
> House, Library Avenue,
> >
Harwell, Didcot. OX11 0SG UK
> > Phone: +44 (0)
> 1235 822302
> > Blog: http://webmedia.company.ja.net/edlabblogs/regulatory->>
developments/
> >
> > JANET, the UK's education and research network
>
>
> >
> JANET(UK) is a
> > trading name of The JNT Association, a
company limited
> by guarantee
> > which is registered in England under
No. 2881024 and
> whose Registered
> > Office is at Lumen House,
Library Avenue, Harwell
> Science and
> > Innovation Campus, Didcot,
Oxfordshire. OX11 0SG
> >
> >
> >
> > -----Original
> > Message-----
>
> > From: This list is for those
> interested in Data
> > Protection
issues
> > > [mailto:data-
> [log in to unmask]] On Behalf
> >
Of Ian Welton
> > > Sent: 05
> January 2011 17:11
> > > To: data-
> >
[log in to unmask]
> > >
> Subject: Re: Passwords question
> > >
> > > The
> > issue started as a
> discussion over ethical reporting
and the
> > > ethics
> > of
> organisational press releases, so most of
the
> > >
> >
> coverage/discussions pertained to those areas, with
legal blogs also
> >
> >
> > debating if forgetfulness could be an
acceptable defence.
> > >
> > >
> It was
> > conjectured that
> > >
some of the issue for the courts was the
> strength of
> > encryption.
> > >
> > > A
> > > reasonably full media write up
> was:-
> > > http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-staggers/2010/10/police->
drage-
> > > password-sex
> > >
> > > A Happy New Year to all.
> > >
>
> > Ian W
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