On 07 January 2011 at 07:21 Andrew Cormack said:

> I can reassure you 
there are at least two of us ;)

There will undoubtedly be more, which 
created the puzzlement.

> If you're talking about businesses 
encrypting the master copy of their data...

It seems we are confusing 
encryption with password management and access control.  I am speaking 
mainly of the later irrespective of encryption use, but used the former 
for examples. I see the deletion of data no longer required is nothing 
more than good data management practice. Having secondary access to the 
passwords on the other hand raises the issues you outline in your next 
paragraph

> I very much agree that all of those...  If someone else 
has stored material on my system that is likely to come to the 
attention of a RIPA Part III request then I'd rather not be able to 
decrypt it, thanks!

My experience has shown that many system 
administrators only adopt that stance in that type of personally 
threatening circumstance. The nature of the role otherwise frequently 
indicates access is gained/granted and occasionally misused.

> I agree 
the scenario is a good one for thinking about the balance of security 
threats...

I myself was thinking of the many privacy issues which are 
clearly illustrated by the case including the values and perceptions 
which resulted in the manipulation of the media, (the original press 
release.)  Our own different perspectives presented during this 
discussion illustrate some of the richness of the content.

I disagree 
that they all come down to the issue of key management.  A complex set 
of issues prior to and separate from that have created this situation 
and associated continuing developments surrounding the wider areas of 
accountability/responsibility and proof/prove. Unfortunately this is 
something which in my opinion the legal system currently finds itself 
bound to continue progressing and that is of interest to me in some 
social contexts of my privacy research, hence this email thread which 
from some perspectives has been answered more by silence than 
contributions.


Ian W



-----Original Message-----
From: This list is 
for those interested in Data Protection issues [mailto:data-
[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Andrew Cormack
Sent: 07 January 
2011 07:21
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: [data-
protection] Passwords question



> -----Original Message-----
> From: 
This list is for those interested in Data Protection issues 
> [mailto:
[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Ian Welton
> Sent: 06 
January 2011 12:21
> To: [log in to unmask]
> Subject: Re: 
Passwords question
> 
> Yes RIPA does. The discussions on the legal 
blogs focused on the 
> viability of presenting any 'forgotten' 
defence. (Notwithstanding 
> medical evidence of a memory disorder). 
Those discussions questioned 
> any ability to be able to maintain an 
effective 'sorry I have 
> forgotten' defence. They should be available 
via a search using 
> factors contained in the link provided. (Having 
been focusing on 
> financial and academic worlds over the last year I 
did not myself save 
> all the
> links.)
> 
> One has to accept the 
juries findings could probably be based upon 
> softer information 
available within the courtroom. One of the odd 
> things is that I 
myself deliberately do put in a password intending 
> not to remember 
it when occasionally finally closing electronic 
> accounts down, and I 
also forgot some passwords when first obtaining 
> and learning how to 
use PGP and utilising long passwords. (I found 
> memory management 
differs between long and short passwords) So it is 
> difficult to 
believe I am the only person who follows such a practice 
> or has 
experienced that type of forgetfulness.

I can reassure you there are 
at least two of us ;)

> Any other responses from the
> list will be 
interesting as the questions remain valid.

If you're talking about 
businesses encrypting the master copy of their data and relying on a 
single person remembering the key then I'd have thought that business 
continuity was a bigger risk than a RIPA Part III challenge. But the 
right solutions to that include enterprise encryption systems that do 
key management properly, providing multiple routes to decrypt the data, 
for example by a two (or more) key emergency recovery process. If the 
concern is staff using their own encryption tools on their own data 
then I'd suggest either a policy that prohibits that, or else mandates 
regular checks that they can decrypt it and, if not, immediate deletion 
of the files (which are scrap anyway, since the person can no longer 
decrypt them).

> I do find it
> interesting that nobody has yet raised 
the issue of access to a 
> persons passwords not being acceptable 
because of the levels of access 
> that provides, or that other access 
mechanisms are generally 
> available. (To enable legal procedures only 
requires read access.) All 
> of which leaves open the interpretation 
that passwords, whilst being a 
> part of security, are being perceived 
as more of an accountability 
> mechanism than a security one. (I am 
deliberately disregarding 
> situations where they may be widely shared 
anyway.)

I very much agree that all of those (including 
accountability) are problems with shared *login* passwords (though a 
pragmatic approach will quickly spot that those with access to the 
backup copy of the passwords may be sysadmins who can easily break into 
users' accounts anyway). But for *encryption* passwords there is also 
the problem, if they are shared, that the unfortunate person who might 
be able to access to the backup copy can easily be accused of having 
*created* the encrypted file. If someone else has stored material on my 
system that is likely to come to the attention of a RIPA Part III 
request then I'd rather not be able to decrypt it, thanks!

> For info, 
if it is useful to
> anybody, this case does provide a particularly 
good case study 
> illustrating many different facets of the privacy 
paradigm.

I agree the scenario is a good one for thinking about the 
balance of security threats (I use it in my own courses!), though there 
are sufficient peculiarities around the specific case that I'm not sure 
I'd cite it directly. But questions of whether it is better to have 
material destroyed than divulged (which is the assessment that should 
lead to a decision to encrypt) and how to manage access thereafter, are 
well worth exploring, and a lot more complex than the simple slogan of 
"use encryption" might lead you to believe. They almost always come 
down to key management, which is a human/policy issue, rather than a 
technological one, though technology can help.

Cheers
Andrew

> Ian W

> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Andrew 
Cormack [mailto:Andrew.
> [log in to unmask]]
> Sent: 05 January 2011 17:43

> To: Ian Welton; data-
> [log in to unmask]
> Subject: RE: 
Passwords question
> 
> 
> Ian
> RIPA
> part III definitely allows 
forgetfulness as a defence (s53(3)). 
> However the blog suggests that 
the question in this case was actually 
> whether it was plausible that 
someone would use such an unmemorable 
> password (40-50 *random* 
characters, the blog suggests) and not write 
> it down. The jury 
appear to have concluded that it wasn’t plausible, 
> therefore there 
must be a written copy somewhere that the defendant 
> was refusing to 
disclose. So the defendant failed to "adduce 
> sufficient evidence to 
raise an issue" of whether he was still in 
> possession of the 
(written) password.
> 
> There are ways of generating memorable 
passwords of that length that 
> don't need to be written down (the 
passphrase for my digital signature 
> is of that order), but using a 
random number generator doesn't seem to 
> be one of them.
> 
> Andrew

> 
> --
> Andrew Cormack,
> Chief Regulatory Adviser, JANET(UK)
> Lumen 
House, Library Avenue,
> Harwell, Didcot. OX11 0SG UK
> Phone: +44 (0) 
1235 822302
> Blog: http://webmedia.company.ja.net/edlabblogs/regulatory-> 
developments/
> 
> JANET, the UK's education and research network
> 
> 
JANET(UK) is a
> trading name of The JNT Association, a company limited 
by guarantee 
> which is registered in England under No. 2881024 and 
whose Registered 
> Office is at Lumen House, Library Avenue, Harwell 
Science and 
> Innovation Campus, Didcot, Oxfordshire. OX11 0SG
> 
> 
> 
> -----Original
> Message-----
> > From: This list is for those 
interested in Data
> Protection issues
> > [mailto:data-
[log in to unmask]] On Behalf
> Of Ian Welton
> > Sent: 05 
January 2011 17:11
> > To: data-
> [log in to unmask]
> > 
Subject: Re: Passwords question
> >
> > The
> issue started as a 
discussion over ethical reporting and the
> > ethics
> of 
organisational press releases, so most of the
> >
> 
coverage/discussions pertained to those areas, with legal blogs also
> 
>
> debating if forgetfulness could be an acceptable defence.
> >
> > 
It was
> conjectured that
> > some of the issue for the courts was the 
strength of
> encryption.
> >
> > A
> > reasonably full media write up 
was:-
> > http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-staggers/2010/10/police-drage-
> > password-sex
> >
> > A Happy New Year to all.
> >
> > Ian W

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