Hi Doreen!
I wondered how long it would be before this one came up!
I'm currently working on security issues surrounding the use electronic
methods of voting and possible use of the Internet to transfer votes cast
from polling stations to a central counting centre. (These are very topical
subjects in most western election jurisdictions including in the UK and many
election authorities have run or are planning to run trials.)
In the UK although you mark the ballot paper in secret it is possible to
trace each voter's ballot paper. This is to help trace votes that may be
fraudulently cast. Fraud does occur in UK elections although it's
occurrence is unusual and generally is not much admitted.
When you went to the polling station you probably handed over your poll card
before you were given a ballot paper, but if you did not have your poll card
with you would still have been given a ballot paper without any formal
identity checks being made provided your name was on the electoral roll.
(Incidentally in some parts of the US you don't even have to appear on the
electoral roll to receive a ballot).
There have been a number of instances in the UK in recent national and local
government elections where an individual presenting themselves to vote was
not in possession of a poll card but gave a seemingly valid name and
address. After they had voted another individual arrived giving the same
name and address! What occurred was that the first individual wasn't who
they claimed to be and had fraudulently cast a vote. This is a criminal
offence but it is one that is difficult to control given that the electoral
roll is a public document. All that happens is that the illegally cast vote
is identified when the ballot box is opened at the counting centre and is
set aside. This is why the officials at your polling station crossed your
name off a list and added a number to your ballot slip. It provides the
audit trail. No attempt is made to see how you voted.
I have been researching national voting systems (including the >3000 US
jurisdictions!) for some months and have to say that all systems rely on a
large amount of trust and all show some element of fraud. The recent RPA
2000 which has made it possible in the UK to have a postal vote on demand
has made it easier to fraudulently cast a vote in British elections as the
BBC demonstrated in a recent 'Today' programme report.
You may be interested to know that in the Rep of Ireland where they
inherited the British electoral system the vote is entirely secret in that
there is no way of connecting votes cast to individuals. This has resulted
in the suggestion that the election agent of a prominent S.Irish politician
may have illegally cast more than one ballot by visiting the various polling
stations in a constituency and claiming a ballot slip at each of them! It
is now a crime to claim more than one ballot slip although how you prove
this has occurred and how you trace after the event is just as difficult.
As for the data protection implications you have identified well...........!
regards,
Kevin Broadfoot.
Principal Consultant, Baltimore Technologies plc, Innovation House, Mark
Road, Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire, HP2 7DN
Tel: +44 (0) 1442 342600 Fax: +44 (0) 1442 266438
-----Original Message-----
From: Broom, Doreen [mailto:[log in to unmask]]
Sent: 07 June 2001 14:19
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Voting
All
I have just been to my local polling station - gave my details - they
crossed me off the list and added a number to my ballot paper - Unique
Identifier!!! I thought my ballot was secret too - any comments?
Doreen Broom
Data Administrator
Scottish Borders Council
Council HQ
Newtown St.Boswells
Melrose
Borders TD6 0SA
Tel: 01835 824000
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