Dear terry and list

I don't want to belabor the point but just to say that all interests in a
situation are legitimate. A situation is perceived from many points of view.
The designer must seek to satisfy as many points of view as possible or find
ways to explain what is being resolved to as many stakeholders as possible.
Wicked problems are simply those that are difficult to solve and the
concerns of major stakeholders offer a more appropriate approach than a
problem statement from a single stakeholder or designer however enlightened
they may be.

Best to all,
Chuck
-- 
Dr. Charles Burnette
234 South Third Street
Philadelphia, PA 19106

215 629 1387
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On 4/22/07 8:44 AM, "Terence Love" <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

> Hi Ken,
> 
> Thanks for your post and I can understand your frustration. We are not on
> the same wavelength and I've been expressing myself badly.
> 
> I've realised that I'm sketching (clumsily I'll admit) one part of three of
> an argument that design research and designers have a problem that has
> crystallised around the way that we try to distinguish between 'wicked' and
> 'other' design situations.
> 
> Chuck has pointed to one of the other dimensions - that the issues relating
> to wicked problems can be usefully conceptualised in other ways. In his post
> he pointed to conceptualising the wicked/other problem discourse in terms of
> internal human functioning and perceptions. He suggested that the
> distinction disappears if you conceptualise it as he does.
> 
> Down the path I'm sketching in previous posts there are three typologies of
> conceptualisation - A external (properties of objects, processes, etc); B
> internal (Chuck's proposition is one of these); and C
> epistemological/ontological frameworks (where you stand theoretically
> speaking affects how you perceive the idea of problems).
> 
> As would be expected from a habitual focus on object properties, most
> designers and design researchers see and define design and design problem
> characteristics such as wicked-ness in the A dimension. More specifically,
> they typically view it in a single topic of the range of potential
> discourses in the A dimension - seeing wicked problems as an object with
> properties. Commonly, the question asked is 'what are the differences
> between a 'wicked' design problem and other forms of design problem?'
> (similar to 'what are the differences in properties between an apple and an
> orange?'). Another different pathway in the same A dimension of the external
> is 'what are the properties of societies that define whether a design
> problem is wicked or not?' Same focus on external properties except the
> system boundary is drawn a little larger. Some of your explorations seem to
> follow this pathway. Another different again focus in the A dimension is on
> differences in design processes  for 'wicked' and other problems.
> 
> Focusing on concerns of power and force and the control and ownership of
> them (some of my posts) opens two other discourses. The first is in the A
> external dimension. It breaks many of the cosier interpretations of whose
> interests and which interests are included in design activity. An example of
> the  style and level of discourse and analysis that seems helpful to do this
> are those of your namesake Dr. George Friedman at Stratfor (see the free
> reports at www.stratfor.com) and Bruce Schneier's Cryptogram and essays
> (http://www.schneier.com/essays.html). Phil Agre follows much the same path
> as does Doris Lessing.
> The second is it opens up a critical pathway into the C discourse of theory
> foundations. It problematises the wicked discourse in theory terms and
> asks,' Sure we've defined things in this way and are comfortable with them
> to get some easy answers - but what if that picture is
> naïve/false/wrong/inappropriate/ incomplete etc etc?'
> 
> The wicked problem discourse has been going in in the same style for 35
> years. New paint (occasionally but rarely) on the same shutters. The wicked
> /other categorisation may be a false distinction (as Chuck suggests). It may
> be unhelpful to improving design. It may be that viewing it in a different
> way offers new territories for exploration in design research. We don't
> know. At the moment the  main purpose of discussing wicked problems seems to
> be to hammer in fence posts for disciplines that appear  nervous of their
> territory. I feel we could do better. Perhaps it needs a creative designer
> to think out a good alternative that is more useful?
> 
> Thoughts?
> 
> Terry
>  
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: PhD-Design - This list is for discussion of PhD studies and related
> research in Design [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Ken
> Friedman
> Sent: Sunday, 22 April 2007 7:57 PM
> To: [log in to unmask]
> Subject: Re: Legitimate Interests, Stakes, and Ethics -- Long Post
> 
> Dear Terry,
> 
> Come on, my friend. I understand the etymology and dictionary definition of
> the word. I've said that in three posts now. I have also stated clearly that
> I use the word in the same extended sense that such scholars and thinkers as
> Etienne Wenger and Jean Lave do, and many more.
> 
> As I wrote in my last note, if you can find a better word, please do.
> I have stated what I mean by the term: "any person with reasonable rights by
> virtue of being a human being involved in a situation where he or she has a
> stake."
> 
> Because the larger context of this conversation involves the issues of law
> and ethics, my earlier referred to such legal scholars as Ruth Buchanan,
> Rebecca Johnson, or Robert Cover.
> 
> If you've got something to say about the larger issues I raise, I'll welcome
> the comment. If you goal is to state that the word "legitimate" has a
> specific technical meaning and a specific etymology, I agree. You're right.
> 
> Some of us nevertheless use the word in an extended sense. That grandest of
> all dictionaries, the Oxford English Dictionary, notes that several of the
> earliest English usages do not derive from the usage in law. On this, the
> OED states, "Etymologically, the word expresses a status which has been
> conferred or ratified by some authority; = LEGITIMATED. In English, however,
> it has taken the place of the older LEGITIME, and even in the earliest
> examples shows no trace of the original participial sense."
> 
> I am using the word in a current usage that the OED defines as: "In extended
> use: valid or acceptable; justifiable, reasonable."
> 
> If you want to use another word, feel free. I have been using the term
> legitimate in its extended use. In the context of wicked problems, the idea
> is the important issue.
> 
> Yours,
> 
> Ken
> 
> 
> Terry Love wrote:
> 
> Legitimate is direct from 'legalis' L - law
> 
> Legitimation and law _always_ in the limit depends on force - the ability
> for one constituency to _enforce_ its choice of laws on others. Ethics
> provides a commentary.
> 
> ('Priviledge - 'private law'  - Agre's article on conservatism addresses
> this well.)
>