Interesting exposition of Kiekegaard's views, and gratifying to me to see
it characterize as uncommonly treated. I've just been swotting up K and
felt that his view (as stated here) was simply an argument for the primacy
of subjective time. To treat existential time as a series of "monads"
reconstructed through memory into other forms of time is consonant with
his individualism and notions of constructedness flowing from the
unmotivated choice. The reference to Deleuze is less happy. I am frankly
surprised at his willingness to accept transcendental time as an existent.
Am I not reading this correctly? Perhaps I don't know my Deleuze?
Incidentally, the congruence between the Kierkegaardian "monad" and the
individual frame of film is striking, as is the dependence of film on
memory even for it's basic illusion of motion to say nothing of the role
of memory in the extraction of story from narrative (that is, the
experience of one thing after another) just as Kierkegaard's individual is
to an important degree willed into being. I suppose someone has made
something out of this?
Charles
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