Hrvoje:

>I don't see why all this "demistification" fuss Ted is making about
>"definitions".


*I* am making a fuss about definitions ? !  (not "definitions"; no problem
with the word, though nobody has defined it :-) )

Michael Chanan cited Wittgenstein, suggesting that trying to define "film"
was less important than understanding the open nature of such concepts.
Jeff criticised this and in reply to me said:

> it is important not to be too hasty in
discounting the possibility of definitions, since if successful they can
serve important functions.  However, I *do* think that precision in terms
is necessary to do good philosophy (or good science, history, economics,
etc.), but that there are other ways to achieve this goal than essentialist
definitions.<

I do not, of course, deny the "*possibility* of definitions". I did
question the possibility  or value of precise defintions of things like
film.


>Definitions, of course, are not needed for recognition. They are part
>of (theoretical) communication mostly about the already commonly recognized
>occurences.

In fact definitions in theoretical communication are often misguided
attempts to make rigid and fixed, concepts which are essentially open and
flexible. There is often a sub-text of trying to gain spurious status
through impressive jargon - particularly where aspects of the sciences and
maths are dragged in (see "Intellectual Impostures" Sokal and Bricment).



>I also doubt that anyone mistakes a definition for a well developed
>theoretical piece. A theory commonly invest a lot of arguments in specifying
>and explaining its recognition of its subject, usually leaving many
>important aspects yet unanalyzed. Why assume that anyone assume a definition
>has more specification power then evolved theory, that it theoretically
>"exhaust" the subject, and then fight such "pretensions"?

Who assumed this ?

...

>Their triviallity is sanitary in all cases of possible communication
>confusion, and those are the moments when they are mostly needed, and mostly
>employed. E.g. when Kathleen is faced with uncommon talk about CNN news
>being "movies", she asks for definition, or redefinition of what the "film"
>is. And her question triggered all this discusion on "What is a film"? What
>will be forgrounded in particular definition is usually determined by the
>controversial point: if I point out the film
>as temporaly ordered discourse, it is not with the intention to "define"
>film exhaustivelly, but to clear up the point Jeff had raised. When there is
>no drastic confusion what we are talking about, there is no need for
>definitions.<

Quite. Most people on this list understand very well what was implied by
calling the CNN coverage of the bombing ot Iraq a "movie" (echoes of the
daft exaggerations of Baudrillard on the Gulf War). To anyone who doesn't
it can be easily explained without seeking a general definition (and
certainly not a precise one) for  "film" or "movie".


>Triviality of definitions is sanitary from another point of view too.
>Recognition bussiness (experiencing films) is something complitely different
>from theoreticall bussiness, and not easilly accessible to it. It is easy to
>be disoriented when one approaches theoretically to film (to one's
>experiences with films: I have enough my own expiriences with such momentary
>disorientations, and I am facing such disorientations in my students
>regularly), and it is very likely that some of the most common feats of
>recognition, of experience, would be missed by theoretical elaboration, not
>seen at all, or seen out of relation. It is incomparably easier for a theory
>to concentrate on un-common occurences and features because they are usually
>easily noticable. That's a reason why so much of a classical esthetic theory
>was acctually a rethorical figure theory, theory of stylizations, of
>stylistically marked features, not of film basics. So, it is sanitary to
>point out the most common features times and again, and to remind a
>theoretical camp what is the range of film phenomena against which our
>theoretical generalisations have to be checked. <

To remind people of some of the more ordinary features of films, often
overlooked in theoretical discussions which focus on unusual features, is
not the same as  engaging in trying to provide a general definition of
"film". The latter inevitably ends up in banal generalisations - often
rapidly outmoded by technological devlopments.


>
>Now, of course, definitions may not be just landmarks, proviso instruments,
>but become essential component of a theory. Namely, they may become a
>strategic "catalist" of an argument, as it is common in analitical
>philosophy. One starts with a definition, then questions its plausability by
>facing it with counterexamples, then tries reformulation, questions the
>reformulation again etc. Such procedure may seem like a chase for "precise"
>definition, but it is actually a substantial theoretical elaboration of
>different relevant aspects of researched subject, where definitions serve
>just as argument trigers.

Yes, I did a degree in  philosophy in a department in which this approach
was the dominant one and passed many  hours in such (usually harmless) word
games. Wittgenstein was trying to cure us of some of the misconceptions
which lead to many linguistic pseudo-problems, and hoped his students might
take up something of more obvious use such as medicine.


>What counts as explanation of its subject in
>speculative analysis of this kind is the whole theoretical discourse, not
>just its definition parts.

Yes - the definition of parts  does not count :-)



>And, I think, that is what Jeff and I have been
>doing: not trying to fix an impeachable definition of film, but to bring out
>some important points and arguments by questioning particular definition
>formulations, and by dealing with question-begging examples.

I seem to have missed the "important points" which emerged.


You seemed to think it worth repeating this:

>Let me repeat: film is basically a temporaly ordered sequential
representation (let me speak about "temporal representations" - what Lessing
named "temporal arts"). One of the important capabilities of temporal
representations is the representation of evolving movements and complex
events. <

Why repeat this banality ? It's verbose and has redundancies - if something
is "temporally ordered" then one needn't add that it is "sequential".

One might more simply say: Films represent events. Events (like films
themselves) necessarily take place in time (as does the viewing of a
photograph).

>It is not necessary to have an illusory movement (apparent
movement) in order to have a movement representation in film. <

Obviously - movement has been represented in paintings for thousands of years.

>And there is my contribution, an actual example of the same kind of problem: a
protagonist of "anti-film" movement in Zagreb (Ivo Lukas) projected just the
projector's light on the screen at the experimental film festival
in Zagreb (GEFF) in 1965. The only thing that moved was an unobservable
intermittent darkness on the screen produced by the working of Maltese
cross. But for all relevant accounts, nothing movable or changing was
represented. <

Nor is any intelligence displayed by such puerile  "experiments".

I await some enlightenment about film from such theoretical discussion.



Ted Welch Lecturer in history and theory of the media and webmaster
School of Communication, Design and Media
University of Westminster, London, UK
http://www.wmin.ac.uk/media
web designer of http://www.frontlinetv.com

"Truth Matters" Noam Chomsky




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