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From: [log in to unmask] <[log in to unmask]>
To: [log in to unmask] <[log in to unmask]>
Date: 09. siječanj 1999. 02:09
Subject: Re: What is a film?
>
>Hrvoje:
>
>>I don't see why all this "demistification" fuss Ted is making about
>>"definitions".
>
>
>*I* am making a fuss about definitions ? ! (not "definitions"; no problem
>with the word, though nobody has defined it :-) )
>
>Michael Chanan cited Wittgenstein, suggesting that trying to define "film"
>was less important than understanding the open nature of such concepts.
>Jeff criticised this and in reply to me said:
>
>> it is important not to be too hasty in
>discounting the possibility of definitions, since if successful they can
>serve important functions. However, I *do* think that precision in terms
>is necessary to do good philosophy (or good science, history, economics,
>etc.), but that there are other ways to achieve this goal than essentialist
>definitions.<
>
>I do not, of course, deny the "*possibility* of definitions". I did
>question the possibility or value of precise defintions of things like
>film.
>
Hrvoje: Precision is a functional concept: precision for what, and in what
context. On both account there were some answers given originally by J.
Daigle, and by me in the above text you took to commet.
>
>>Definitions, of course, are not needed for recognition. They are part
>>of (theoretical) communication mostly about the already commonly
recognized
>>occurences.
>
>In fact definitions in theoretical communication are often misguided
>attempts to make rigid and fixed, concepts which are essentially open and
>flexible. There is often a sub-text of trying to gain spurious status
>through impressive jargon - particularly where aspects of the sciences and
>maths are dragged in (see "Intellectual Impostures" Sokal and Bricment).
>
Hrvoje: I agree. But misuse does not preclude the use.
>
>>I also doubt that anyone mistakes a definition for a well developed
>>theoretical piece. A theory commonly invest a lot of arguments in
specifying
>>and explaining its recognition of its subject, usually leaving many
>>important aspects yet unanalyzed. Why assume that anyone assume a
definition
>>has more specification power then evolved theory, that it theoretically
>>"exhaust" the subject, and then fight such "pretensions"?
>
>Who assumed this ?
>
Hrvoje: True, no one here. This paragraph is an echo of some other
"anti-definition" fights.
>
>>Their triviallity is sanitary in all cases of possible communication
>>confusion, and those are the moments when they are mostly needed, and
mostly
>>employed. E.g. when Kathleen is faced with uncommon talk about CNN news
>>being "movies", she asks for definition, or redefinition of what the
"film"
>>is. And her question triggered all this discusion on "What is a film"?
What
>>will be forgrounded in particular definition is usually determined by the
>>controversial point: if I point out the film
>>as temporaly ordered discourse, it is not with the intention to "define"
>>film exhaustivelly, but to clear up the point Jeff had raised. When there
is
>>no drastic confusion what we are talking about, there is no need for
>>definitions.<
>
>Quite. Most people on this list understand very well what was implied by
>calling the CNN coverage of the bombing ot Iraq a "movie" (echoes of the
>daft exaggerations of Baudrillard on the Gulf War). To anyone who doesn't
>it can be easily explained without seeking a general definition (and
>certainly not a precise one) for "film" or "movie".
>
Hrvoje: Yes, they do. But metaphors are dangerous bussines. Especially in
situation where they can be taken to be valid literally, stop being
metaphors. TV programs can be literally taken as members of "moving picture"
field, in broad sense. And deciding whether to acknowledge this broad sense
in theoretical work or decide for the more restricted sense was the question
Kathleen posed. And basically, we are dealing with concepts. Definitions are
just communication indicators of concepts. The real question is: what is
conceptual scope we will take into theoretical consideration, and not what
is a definition of film.
>>Triviality of definitions is sanitary from another point of view too.
>>Recognition bussiness (experiencing films) is something complitely
different
>>from theoreticall bussiness, and not easilly accessible to it. It is easy
to
>>be disoriented when one approaches theoretically to film (to one's
>>experiences with films: I have enough my own expiriences with such
momentary
>>disorientations, and I am facing such disorientations in my students
>>regularly), and it is very likely that some of the most common feats of
>>recognition, of experience, would be missed by theoretical elaboration,
not
>>seen at all, or seen out of relation. It is incomparably easier for a
theory
>>to concentrate on un-common occurences and features because they are
usually
>>easily noticable. That's a reason why so much of a classical esthetic
theory
>>was acctually a rethorical figure theory, theory of stylizations, of
>>stylistically marked features, not of film basics. So, it is sanitary to
>>point out the most common features times and again, and to remind a
>>theoretical camp what is the range of film phenomena against which our
>>theoretical generalisations have to be checked. <
>
>To remind people of some of the more ordinary features of films, often
>overlooked in theoretical discussions which focus on unusual features, is
>not the same as engaging in trying to provide a general definition of
>"film". The latter inevitably ends up in banal generalisations - often
>rapidly outmoded by technological devlopments.
>
>Hrvoje: Our concepts do underly revisions in the face of new evidence, or
counter-examples. New technological developments does not introduce nothing
metodhologically new into this revision process. New instances (either
existing but newlly introduced into attention field, or newly introduced by
new technological inventions) usually force you to check the generality or
specificity of your concept, and, in the proces of communicationally
clearing up your concept, your definitions.
>>
>>Now, of course, definitions may not be just landmarks, proviso
instruments,
>>but become essential component of a theory. Namely, they may become a
>>strategic "catalist" of an argument, as it is common in analitical
>>philosophy. One starts with a definition, then questions its plausability
by
>>facing it with counterexamples, then tries reformulation, questions the
>>reformulation again etc. Such procedure may seem like a chase for
"precise"
>>definition, but it is actually a substantial theoretical elaboration of
>>different relevant aspects of researched subject, where definitions serve
>>just as argument trigers.
>
>Yes, I did a degree in philosophy in a department in which this approach
>was the dominant one and passed many hours in such (usually harmless) word
>games. Wittgenstein was trying to cure us of some of the misconceptions
>which lead to many linguistic pseudo-problems, and hoped his students might
>take up something of more obvious use such as medicine.
>
Hrvoje: I agree if you mean language oriented analysis. But a conceptual
analysis which takes to clear up not just wordings of definition, but takes
empirical film examples as problem cases to be explained by a series of
strategically chosen and revised definitions, such analysis may give actuall
insight into the empirical matters, not being just "harmless word games".
>
>>What counts as explanation of its subject in
>>speculative analysis of this kind is the whole theoretical discourse, not
>>just its definition parts.
>
>Yes - the definition of parts does not count :-)
>>
>
>>And, I think, that is what Jeff and I have been
>>doing: not trying to fix an impeachable definition of film, but to bring
out
>>some important points and arguments by questioning particular definition
>>formulations, and by dealing with question-begging examples.
>
>I seem to have missed the "important points" which emerged.
>
>
>You seemed to think it worth repeating this:
>
>>Let me repeat: film is basically a temporaly ordered sequential
>representation (let me speak about "temporal representations" - what
Lessing
>named "temporal arts"). One of the important capabilities of temporal
>representations is the representation of evolving movements and complex
>events. <
>
>Why repeat this banality ? It's verbose and has redundancies - if something
>is "temporally ordered" then one needn't add that it is "sequential".
Hrvoje: redundancy here has a function of rethorical emphasis: repeat the
concept differently to be more emphatic about the wished for meaning. O.K. I
coud do without it.
>
>One might more simply say: Films represent events. Events (like films
>themselves) necessarily take place in time (as does the viewing of a
>photograph).
>
Hrvoje: No. Narrative paintings and photographs represent events, and they
are not films (cf. Gombrich: "Moment and Movement in Art" in _The Image and
the Eye_; and Arnheim: "Movement" in _ Art and Visual Perception _ ).
>>It is not necessary to have an illusory movement (apparent
>movement) in order to have a movement representation in film. <
>
>Obviously - movement has been represented in paintings for thousands of
years.
Hrvoje: And events too.
>
>>And there is my contribution, an actual example of the same kind of
problem: a
>protagonist of "anti-film" movement in Zagreb (Ivo Lukas) projected just
the
>projector's light on the screen at the experimental film festival
>in Zagreb (GEFF) in 1965. The only thing that moved was an unobservable
>intermittent darkness on the screen produced by the working of Maltese
>cross. But for all relevant accounts, nothing movable or changing was
>represented. <
>
>Nor is any intelligence displayed by such puerile "experiments".
>
Hrvoje: "It's all in the eyes of a beholder". The described performance was
conceived as an agrument "ad absurdum" against the "anti-film" movement.
"Anti-film" movement intended to challang radically traditional conceptual
restrictions that governed filmmaking, and the performance tried to show one
of the possibly ultimate consequences of conceptually unrestricted approach
to filmmaking. Anyway, it may be taken as "borderline case" against which we
have to check our implicit knowledge about what is still a film (no matter
wether a "puerille" one, or not), and what can not be taken as film any
more. New technological developements may do the same. Is this so
"uninteligent"?
>I await some enlightenment about film from such theoretical discussion.
>
Hrvoje: Again: "It's much in the eyes of a beholder".
>
>Ted Welch Lecturer in history and theory of the media and webmaster
>School of Communication, Design and Media
>University of Westminster, London, UK
>http://www.wmin.ac.uk/media
>web designer of http://www.frontlinetv.com
>
>"Truth Matters" Noam Chomsky
>
>
>
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