>
>
>At 08:55 PM 1/6/99 -0000, you wrote:
>>Try a Wittgenstein-like approach. Don't seek to define the word. 'Film' is a
>>family of related practices. Like games, there is no necessary and
>>sufficient condition which is found in every instance, but there are groups
>>of games with family resemblances. And don't forget that we are talking of
>>something living, with new babies being born every day.
>>
>>Michael Chanan

>Morris Weitz used a similar argument to try to show that there could be no
>essentialist definition of art, its being an 'open concept'.  Weitz's
>argument fails, because he fails to see that it is possible to produce
>definitions which recognize that shared sets of aesthetic features are not
>the only kind of thing that can be used to produce a definition.  We don't
>define families based on their resemblance, not because resemblance is
>intransitive, but because it is not explanatory in terms of family
>membership.  Genetic lineage, on the other hand, is (though it will not
>account for extended senses of the term 'family' which include adoption).
>Genetic lineage not only explains family groupings, but accounts for
>resemblance as well.  While socially constructed concepts such as 'art' and
>'film' are doubtless more difficult to define that those that correspond to
>natural kinds, it is at least possible that such definitions can be
>constructed--based on functional considerations, say, or historical
>genealogy (which corresponds, for example, to the most fruitful attempts to
>define species; functional and historical definitions of art are also
>possible--Steven Davies offers the former, while Jerrold Levinson attempts
>the latter).  Of course, such efforts at definition may fail.  But
>Wittgensteinian considerations are not nearly sufficient to show that they
>*must* do so.
>
>Jeff


Michael beat me to citing Wittgenstein as a useful way to avoid this
interminable and rather useless process of trying to find some specific
definition of a term like "film" - as with "art". I am not at all persuaded
by the arguments presented by Jeff.

   There is a clear difference between such natural phenomena as biological
species and cultural phenomena  such as "art" and "film". Jeff claims that
"functional and historical definations of art are also possible". Oh really
? Only at the expense of what interests most people about it - viz the
evaluative component. Thus, of course we can say historically - this
artefact has been called a "painting" and has been used for various
purposes  (function)on  the walls of churches, palaces and bourgeois living
rooms. But this leaves open the question of whether or not it is really art
- as opposed to, e.g.  boring pastiche.  With film we can of course resort
to technical defintions, but then, as Michael rightly points out, though
using an unfortunate metaphor, given the current objection, "new babies are
being born every day".

  The more fundamental question is surely - why would you want a definition
of "film" ? Especially when the adequacy of any definition is then tested
against our culturally acquired ability to use the term - i.e. we already
have an understanding of the term which any definition has to be judged
against.

  The desire for definitions stems from a mistaken belief that we can only
be thought to be serious and scholarly if  we define all our key terms very
precisely. Were we to adopt such a strategy in perception, we would not be
able to identify even individual members of our family from one moment to
the next, since each perceptual experience would have differences (angle,
light, etc)  - we learn to intuitively grasp the resemblance between these
perceptions and that they are of the same object/person.

   Definitions become important in the sciences when accurate measurements
are required of specific, limited aspects, e.g. temperature, speed, etc.
and these are often of things for which we have no ordinary terms, e.g.
voltage,  which can be expressed mathematically and no general
understanding against which to judge the technical definitions.

  What is gained by having some general definition of film, over and above
our normal understanding of the term (the determinant of the adequacy of
any defintion) ? Such terms have blurred, fluid edges, overlap with related
terms: "video," "photograph," "story," "narrative," etc. This is part of
their richness and utility. Much of the best work in most fields stretches
traditional terms and shows relationships with previously unrelated areas.
I would not reject a work of criticism because it didn't start with a
strict definition of film. I would tend to reject one which failed to
illuminate the way this film related to relevant earlier and contemporary
ones (without requiring  strict definitions of "genre" "thriller"
"narrative" "character" etc), AND to works in other areas - e.g. paintings,
novels, plays. photographs, history, biography, etc.

   Wittgenstein's rope (its many overlapping threads like similarities and
a variety of relationships) enables us to escape from the prison of
Platonic attempts to arrive at precise definitions. It would also have
rescued Plato himself from the  "third man" (not the film, the paradox).

Anyway, what IS philosophy ? - and can I do any BEFORE I have given a
precise definition of it ?  :-)



Ted Welch, lecturer  and webmaster
School of Communication, Design and Media
University of Westminster, London, UK
http://www.wmin.ac.uk/media
web designer of http://www.frontlinetv.com
European Society History Photography: http://www.wmin.ac.uk/media/ESHP
Case of sacked CNN producers: http://www.wmin.ac.uk/media/tailwind





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