I agree Gill,

I think that if we look at Pawson and Tilley’s stuff in comparison to Bhaskar’s early  ‘Realist theory of science’ and set to one side the narcissism of small differences, we can see fundamental commonalities in relation to their celebration of the effectiveness of scientific method and their rejection of the notion of causation as simply one damn thing after another. Both realisms are depth realisms in that they refer to the reality of underlying generative mechanisms that in their various combinations cause events to occur.

While this sort of realism is ‘critical’ in the Kantian sense (it’s asking Kant’s transcendental question of what must exist for things to happen in the way that they are seen to), critical realism (as opposed to depth realism) didn’t really get going until Bhaskar turned his attention from natural to social sciences in 'The possibility of naturalism’. If I remember right, it was at this point that Bhaskar adopted the term critical realism, ‘critical’ being used in a similar way to the way the Frankfurt School of critical theorists used it – it involves critical analysis of social mechanisms for the purpose of understanding how they either promote or inhibit human needs. This is where the values issue that Gill refers to comes in, with Pawson and Tilley being loath to move in this direction because they regard it as compromising scientific neutrality.

I think there are a couple of other major differences between critical realism and realist evaluation that have important methodological consequences. The first relates to how social mechanisms are conceived. Pawson and Tilley regard them as a combination of reasons and resources, whereas critical realists, and especially Margaret Archer, argue strongly that reasons and resources have to be separated – that you have to treat the social structures that enable and constrain human action separately from the people who experience them. Where you come down on this issue will have significant consequences for the focus of your research.

While I am with Archer on the explanatory confusion that results from eliding social structures with human agency, I would take Pawson and Tilley’s side in the second difference. In ‘the possibility of naturalism’, Bhaskar was very sceptical about the possibility of social sciences ever being able to generate the sort of predictive knowledge that the natural sciences can (a predictive knowledge that depth realists see as identification of tendencies rather than constant conjunctions). He argued that while the experimental method in natural science can effect closure so that the powers of specific natural mechanisms can be examined, because the social world is intractably open, social science cannot progress much beyond post hoc  explanation. I think that the major contribution of realist evaluation is that it has shown how it is possible for social science to identify how things will tend to occur in the future in certain given circumstances.

So, to go back to Gill’s point about the philosophical positions and the uses to which they are put, while there are significant differences in the philosophies here, in practical terms it is possible to combine their insights in practice by, for example, performing a realist evaluation designed to identify future tendencies (Pawson and Tilley) that analytically separates the mechanisms contained in the intervention and the context from people’s responses to those mechanisms (Archer), and interrogates the experiential consequences of the intervention on those affected by it (Bhaskar).

Best wishes, Sam


Sam Porter
Professor of Nursing Sociology
Head of Department of Social Sciences and Social Work
Bournemouth University


From: "Realist and Meta-narrative Evidence Synthesis: Evolving Standards" <[log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>> on behalf of Gill Westhorp <[log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>>
Reply-To: "Realist and Meta-narrative Evidence Synthesis: Evolving Standards" <[log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>>, Gill Westhorp <[log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>>
Date: Saturday, 11 March 2017 at 04:40
To: "[log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>" <[log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>>
Subject: Re: Realist informed research

I think we might be in danger of a form of conflation ourselves here.  I think we need to keep the philosophical underpinnings separate from the uses to which they are put, or the groups who put them to those uses.

If one examines the philosophical underpinnings, we can (and I’d argue should) do so in relation to three key words: ‘critical’, ‘scientific’, and ‘realist’ (or realism).

We can then ask: In what sense(s) are/are not the philosophical underpinnings of the schools each of those things (critical, scientific and realist)?  How are they the same or different, and what is the significance of the difference(s)?

Then we can ask: In what sense(s) are/are not the uses to which the schools of thought are put each of those things?  How are they the same or different?  Do these differences necessarily follow from philosophical differences, and if so, which differences?  Or is it just that slightly different ‘framings’ of the same underpinnings took off with different audiences?  If the latter – in what way are the audiences different? Is it the nature of the investigations they are doing? The political perspective from which they are approaching the work?

So – while Pawson does not claim the title of ‘critical realist’, I doubt he would reject the title of ‘a critical thinker’.  (Two different senses of the word critical there.)  And Bhaskar was developing a philosophy of science – I doubt he would have rejected the term ‘scientific’ for his work, albeit he was working at the philosophical level.  He absolutely intended his work to be used in both natural and social sciences. I don’t read his work as being opposed to developing and testing hypotheses or to the conduct of science. I think he was just being very careful about how tests should be conducted and what their findings would really mean.

I did something like the comparison of philosophical underpinnings above for an early assignment as a student of realism, comparing the earlier work of Bhaskar with that of the early work of Pawson and Tilley.  I didn’t identify anything significant that was different in the philosophical underpinnings other than the political/values position.  (I should probably do it again now that I understand realism better… oh for the time to do things just because they’re interesting!)  I’d be curious to hear what others think the differences are.

Alan – Pawson and Tilley (1997) and Pawson (2013) both wrote about the heritage of their work – which includes Bhaskar, Harre, Archer et al…

Gill


From: Realist and Meta-narrative Evidence Synthesis: Evolving Standards [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Alan Taylor
Sent: Saturday, 11 March 2017 12:14 PM
To: [log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>
Subject: Re: Realist informed research

Hi all, Interesting! Agree there are forms of realism. Similarly there are forms of critical theory. But i had never thought of the CMO version as being critical, -- just rigorous and more useful in implementation research than elsewhere.

Has anyone done a diagram of the heritages of the various realisms? Could help us navigate this?

Sent from my iPhone
Alan Taylor
Flinders University.
eDevelopment Solutions.
Mobile 0412 032 576

On 11 Mar. 2017, at 10:58 am, Jagosh, Justin <[log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>> wrote:


Alan, that's a great question and comment. Just taking a step back, I would say that the philosophical underpinnings of Pawson and Tilley's realist methodology is scientific realism (not Critical Realism) because of the emphasis on theory testing and 'falsifiability' which does not surface as a priority for most thinkers/writers in the Critical Realism paradigm.

There are people who are using the CMO configuration while saying that the ontological basis is CR, which is not right or wrong per se, but choosing to do that requires I believe greater transparency about how the underlying approach in CR guides the CMO configuration analysis that would be different from a 'scientific realist' approach.

As an aside, one of the challenges with theory testing and falsifiability is that there remains the challenge of how to deal with those theories which may provide ontologically deep explanations about how programmes work but are hard to test or falsify. The challenge is to not run into the error that Bhaskar called 'epistemic fallacy' which could be interpreted as meaning that which is easily evidenced becomes part of the dominant discourse while the deeper mechanisms remain ignored.

I'm not sure if that really addressed your comment but happy to hear what others say and continue the conversation

sincerely
Justin




Justin Jagosh, Ph.D
Senior Research Fellow
Centre for Advancement in Realist Evaluation and Synthesis (CARES)
University of Liverpool, United Kingdom
www.liverpool.ac.uk/cares<http://www.liverpool.ac.uk/cares>

________________________________
From: Realist and Meta-narrative Evidence Synthesis: Evolving Standards [[log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>] on behalf of Juan David Parra Heredia [[log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>]
Sent: March 10, 2017 16:16
To: [log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>
Subject: Re: Realist informed research
Dear Justin (and all)

Alan’s comment made me think of Porter’s paper (Evaluation 2015, Vol. 21(1) 65 –82) warning on the risks of applying realist approaches is such applications end up conflating realism as a method (i.e. Realist evaluation) and as a paradigm (i.e. transcendental realism). I mention this because, on the one hand, I agree with Alan when he says that if we want the strengthening the discipline (of realist evaluation), we should be sensitive to these issues. On the other hand, I do so because I think that Porters conclusion might be helpful in your quest of seeking to conceptualise experience within a realist framework:

“I have contended that evaluation of interventions needs to focus on both the social mechanisms they entail, and the responses to these by the actors affected by them. This in turn allows for the inclusion of critical hermeneutics in the process of evaluation research, with the purpose of establishing the degree to which social agents experience interventions as promoting or inhibiting the development and exercise of their natural, species powers. On this basis, interventions can and should be condemned (or praised)”

Best

Juan David Parra
PhD Student, International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam
https://sites.google.com/site/juanparraphd/

Enviado desde Correo<https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=550986> para Windows 10

De: Alan Taylor<mailto:[log in to unmask]>
Enviado: viernes, 10 de marzo de 2017 6:50 p. m.
Para: [log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>
Asunto: Re: Realist informed research

Dear Justin,

Philosophically speaking is it not the wrong way round to “allow” the Method (CMO configuration) and study objective (programme testing) to determine the ontological domain (critical realism)?

I am all for strengthening a discipline such as realism, but this needs to be done sensitively so that students such as myself do not understand the discipline as tied to just one strand of writing or even to one project such as RAMESES.

Alan Taylor Associate Lecturer,  CEng MIET, RPEng (IT&T).
Flinders University
Tel: +61 412 032 576
Only look on the bright side of life!



From: Realist and Meta-narrative Evidence Synthesis: Evolving Standards [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Jagosh, Justin
Sent: Saturday, 11 March 2017 5:44 AM
To: [log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>
Subject: Re: Realist informed research

Hi Paul,

Sounds like a very interesting study. I think 'realist informed' is a good way to describe your study if your analytic frame has been influenced or informed by principles of realist methodology but you do not make explicit use of the CMO configuration or engage in evidence-theory comparisons (or 'testing') of your programme theories. Some studies are quite exploratory so don't really get to the underpinning mechanisms or do so in a tangential way so some people when feel more comfortable describing their study as 'realist-informed'. Transparency of your research process is key. It might be the case that your first attempt applying realism to your research helps to conceptualize the programme and outcomes of interest, (and therefore 'realist informed'), and then in a subsequent phase you go deeper and engage with the CMO configuration to understand the interaction of dimensions of context with the mechanisms.

You could also think about modelling your causal pathway in a sequence, because from my impression there are two clusters of mechanisms - mechanisms that 'fire' for the CBT therapist and those that 'fire' for the service user. Presumably, the benefit of the the service user in receiving the motivational interview depends not only on their context, but also on the successful experience of the CBT therapist in their training. In other words, the CBT therapist will respond to resources offered through their training in MI, which may be positive, negative or neutral, which in turn will influence their delivery of the intervention, which in turn will impact on the service user's uptake of the resources and how they respond. Understanding instances of unsuccessful 'firing' of motivation at the service user level after receiving the intervention may provide insights into how to improve the training of CBT therapists in motivational interviewing.

Pawson and Tilley's definition of mechanism (in terms of resources and reactions) is in itself something like a theory of motivation. They said that interventions do not create change, but people do, - and unpacking that could mean that people receive resources and respond based on prior context, as well as the nature of the resource offered (and the interaction of the two).

You wrote:

Is it ok to focus say on service user theories of what works for them in these therapies and also to psychological therapist theories on how it works from existing  literature . I then will test and refine these theories based on their experiences of receiving and delivering this integrated intervention MI CBT .  At the same time set this in the social contexts of these interventions.

I'm looking for guidance on carrying out realist literature reviews and in the design of semi structured interviews.Any pointers or recommendations would be much appreciated.



Would it be: "service user experiences will be used to scrutinize the underpinning theories of motivational interviewing" ?. I think that makes sense. You can then ask: what is it about the social context (and social context differences) that enables or hinders the activation of the mechanisms underpinning the programme?



I hope that is helpful and best of luck with it!



Justin



--
Paul Earnshaw
Senior Psychological Therapist and Training Consultant

United Kingdom

[log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>
www.motivationalmatters.co.uk<http://www.motivationalmatters.co.uk/>

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