(Late reply owing to intervention of holiday)
This is a very interesting posting. However, it rightly shows the
limitations of seeking a lexical (dictionary) definition for terms. Words
do, indeed, take their meaning in a context of practice or use. This is not
fixed, though has a socially or culturally determined boundary which limits
that use so that words do not become completely arbitrary (contra Humpty
Dumpty who said that words could mean whatever he wanted them to mean).
Changes in linguistic use move these boundaries, e.g. the change in the
meaning of "gay" from "specious", through "joyful" to "homosexual".
What are the implications for the design debate? I suggest that arguing
purely from dictionary definitions is weak because it ignores specialist or
developing uses for terms. However, we must recognize that if we begin to
institutionalize a particular use for a term, e.g. "understanding", by
consenting to its new use in a particular situation, then we are
responsible for creating a new meaning. Only we, as the arbiters of what we
want a term to mean in our discipline, can control this. If we don't want
a term to have a particular meaning then it will be our practice of not
using it in that way, rather than our appeal to the dictionary, that will
determine whether it COMES to mean X or Y.
Michael Biggs
At 15:59 12/08/01 +0100, Terence Love wrote:
>Hi Rosan, Ken, Dick, Stephen, Bryn and others,
>
>There are several problematic words important to theorising
>about the ways that humans relate to the past and future. Two of them
>being 'knowledge' and 'understanding'. Three approaches are usually suggested
>to addressing the problems with them . The first is to ask "What does
>'X' mean?, the second is to study a good dictionary to find definitions
>of 'X', and the third is to ask how people use 'X'. I feel that for some
>words, all of these approaches are badly flawed - singly and in combination.
>
>
>To do a brief sidestep. Languages are developed in different situations
>and for different ranges of purposes (the '53 words for snow' argument).
>>From my experience, English words whose dictionary etymology points to
>Old or Middle English are often problematic becasue they frequently have
>multiple
>meanings that are ' sort of similar' but often philosophically contradictory
>or lie in different categories. My guess is that languages with a long
>tradition of use for formal administration of empires (e.g. Latin, Greek
>and Farsi) become more formalised and better defined. (Have we any
etymologists
>
>
>on the list? I'd welcome some advice.)
>
>Both 'knowing' and 'understanding' come from Old English roots ('cnawan'
>and 'under' +'standan') and 'knowledge' is derivative from cnawan via
>cnawleac (Websters Comprehensive Dictionary 1984).
>
>Here's where the fun starts. The etymology suggests almost inescapably
>that 'understanding' originated as a noun. , i.e. 'understanding' is that
>which 'stands under' To ask 'Does
>Prof Smith have understanding about theory X?' is to ask 'Does Prof Smith
>have 'all the the information and analyses' that underpin theory X'. (in
>other words the 'have' is a verb alone rather than part of the perfect
>tense of the verb 'understand'. This issue echoes the pronunciation-based
>shift implicit in the translation of 'naranja' in Spanish to 'orange'
>in English - 'a naranja' -> 'an aranja' -> an orange). An implication
>of this noun version of 'understanding' is that it does not refer to
>anything or any process happening inside a human - its category is a class
>of theory objects. Sounds good so far, but a problem is that the dictionary
>defintions focus on understanding as a human activity - or rather several
>epistemologically very different human activities. Mmm
>
>'Knowing', however, appears to be the opposite. Websters Comprehensive
>indicates that the primary
>form of the term 'knowing' is the verb form 'cnawan' referring to the
>human
>activity 'to know' (in whatever way THATwas conceived in the time of Old
>English (OE) speakers).
>
>For this term, the problem lies in its conversion to the noun form
'knowledge'.
>
>
>This conversion evidently happened in the same era because its OE origin
>is identified (cnawlaec) but is secondary to cnawan as said before. The
>problem arises from the multiple meanings we have now for this noun. They
>include: 'a product of knowing' (which can include artefacts), information,
>practical ability, certain apperception of Truth, the act/process/or state
>of knowing (the list is cut for brevity). These multiple meanings present
>epistemological problems because many of these meanings of
>'knowledge' lie (a less troublesome OE word from leggan and another possible
>root for the 'ledge' in 'knowledge') in epistemologically different
categories
>whose differences are
>crucial to differentiating and justifying different sub-theories about
>knowledge
>and its management. In other words, even if we accurately identified what
>cnawan meant as a verb describing a human process (which might be possible),
>it would leave us with the problem of multiple meanings of the word
'knowledge'
>
>that are categorically contradictory.
>
>Back to paragraph 1 and terms such as 'knowledge' and 'understanding'.
>
>Asking 'What does X mean?' is definitive for terms where there are multiple
>meanings or meanings do not run true to origins.
>
>For the above sort of problematic terms, studying a dictionary is helpful
>only in that it
>indicates when the origins and current meanings contradict and are
epistemologi
>
>cally problematic.
>
>Asking how people use 'X' is problematic where terms are used in multiple
>ways that are epistemologically contradictory and are not true to origins.
>
>A pragmatically more appropriate approach may be to ask 'What is the best
>way to define
>these messy terms (bearing in mind their origins and current useage) to
>support the development of coherent theory that takes into account the
>breadth of understandings (above OE noun meaning intended) humans have
>gained?'
>
>In the context of 'knowing how/that/of/etc' - without a good understanding
>(OE noun)
>for 'knowing' then these phrases get epistemologically a bit wobbly -
>especially
>when their discussions refer to understanding as a verb.
>
>A rule of thumb: 'check the etymology and if its origin is OE then it
>is likely to be problematic'!
>
>Thank you Rosan for a thought provoking question.
>
>Best wishes,
>
>Terry
>
>_________________________
>
>Dr Terence Love
>Love Design & Research
>GPO Box 226
>Quinns Rocks
>Western Australia 6030
>Tel & Fax: +61 (0)8 9305 7629
>Email: [log in to unmask]
>_________________________
>========================================
>
>From: Rosan Chow <[log in to unmask] >
>To: Internet Mail::[[log in to unmask] ]
>
>Subject: not sure
>Date: 8/2/01 7:23 PM
>
>Dear all
>
>I really have to admit I don't grasp the concepts of 'knowlege' or 'knowing',
>if
>you prefer, and 'understanding' all that well. However, just assume for
>now
>there are real meaningful differences between the two. And they exist
>independently. My question today is:
>
>What kind of knowledge do we have if we don't have understanding?
>
>Best Regards
>Rosan
>
>
>Rosan Chow
>Graduate Student
>College of Design
>North Carolina State University
>n
>
**************************************************************
Dr Michael A R Biggs
Faculty Research Tutor
Faculty of Art and Design
University of Hertfordshire
College Lane,
Hatfield, Herts. AL10 9AB
United Kingdom
Telephone UK+ (0)1707 285341
Fax UK+ (0)1707 285350
E-mail [log in to unmask]
Internet http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/practice/creac/
The full postgraduate prospectus is available online at
http://www.herts.ac.uk/
For information about art and design research degrees go to
http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/
and follow "postgraduate study in art and design"
The journal Working Papers in Art and Design is at
http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/ and follow the links for papers
**************************************************************
|