Dear Ken,

Thank you for your comments on my previous email about authority. It looks like  I didn't explain things well  and  I think you may have misunderstand what I wrote. At heart, I think this may be due to an assumption there is  only one perspective on the use of evidence and reasoning in research. I was pointing to an alternative way and to the benefits of it.   Andrew's recent post in part tacitly followed the same direction I was  suggesting.

There are several different perspectives  on evidence and reasoning. The historical development of the 'scientific way of viewing the world'  can be viewed as having three themes:

1) "Metaphysical perspective" -  in which views of the world are defined by reasoning concerning texts about god (bible etc). In its essence, the metaphysical does not derive its authority from reference to empirical evidence except the words of authorities such as Abraham, Jesus and Mohammed. 

2) " The Empirical Reaction against Metaphysics perspective"  -  this theme comprised a long history of fights against the primacy of metaphysical arguments  and claims. This theme  comprises the work that reifies empirical evidence above casuism. 

3)  "Modern Research perspective" - This perspective comprises the use of a combination of evidence and reasoning to develop  extensive bodies of theories  and knowing (science) about the world  that replace meta-physical claims.

The third theme also comprises sub-themes. Sometimes, all the aspects of this third approach aimed at sound knowing (science) are tacitly  lumped together and sometimes one subtheme of this third theme is taken to be the whole thing. I was suggesting this is problematic when one looks in detail at the differences between practical projects such as Wikipedia and refereed journal papers   and issues of authority of knowing. My post was pointing to a different subtheme from the one that you were using and identified the differences. Your response assumed we were referring to the same sub-theme.  

There are historically three sub-themes  of the third theme above:

a) "Reasoning first and evidence second" - The creation of theory and knowledge based on deep  critical reasoning referencing everyday careful empirical observations. The approach is driven by  and focused on powerful skills in critical reasoning  and this  reasoning is both about, and tested by, empirical  evidence (the secondary factor). This  aspect of 'Modern Research" is found extensively in the development of science from Arab science through to its later translations  for the western world by people such as Kepler, Brahe, Galileo, Leonardo de Vinci and Newton.  The approach typically  expects new theories to comport with and/or modify prior theories. Fundamentally, the approach assumes that reality comprises interacting 'systems'. Many would also regard this as the 'core' of modern science as practiced by (say) Einstein. In this approach, authority resides in correct reasoning and proof of accurate reasoning.

b) "Observable evidence first and reasoning second " - The second sub-theme comprises an obsession with observable evidence over reasoning - if it can't be measured. This is part of  the last couple of centuries  rejection of meta-physical tendencies in research - " if an event wasn't observed did it happen'. From this perspective, evidence is primary and the role of theory is only as a description of observable evidence. In this approach, authority resides in evidence and proof that evidence was correctly obtained.

c) " Composite  of evidence and reasoning"  - This perspective has empirical evidence and reasoning used together in ways that are socially-defined. Typically, however, empirical evidence is reified over 'reasoning about empirical observation'. This composite  approach further divides between those who expect new theories to comport with and/or modify prior theories; those who regard theories as primarily a matter of evidence (e.g. grounded theory); those who regard theory as casuistically constructed (from theories based primarily on evidence); and those who assume that evidence provides the basis of theory that is independent  of prior theory. In essence, this sub-theme is highly tacitly influenced by logical positivism to view the world through a tunnel that privileges evidence over reasoning. In this approach, being 'critical' is a matter of being critical primarily about *evidence* or representations of evidence. This  approach leads to particular views on 'how authority is given to texts' that  are primarily focused on authority in relation to evidence and casuistically-based representations of evidence similar to 3b). 

In my previous post, I was suggesting two things. First, is this latter (3c) approach is commonly  uncritically and unthinkingly viewed as the only perspective on research. In consequence,  it leads to particular presumptions about authority relating to the validity of theories and the ways that authority structures are developed for information-sharing that is part of scientific knowledge-building. Second, I was suggesting that there is, in Design, significant benefits in using the (3a) approach which focuses primarily on the use of careful critical reasoning to develop theory, with such reasoning focusing on having integrity with many observations and theories, and referenced off, and tested by, empirical observations.  In this approach, empirical evidence is secondary to sound reasoning and authority of validity is tested by each individual that uses texts and the information shared by others in terms of  using critical reasoning to identify whether the shared information is internally consistent  and whether  and how it comports well with existing theories and empirical observations. This provides a different form of authority process. From a simplistic perspective  the issue can be seen in terms of personal development and laziness - whether people do their own thinking and reasoning and make their own judgments,  or whether they insist on having  a system that does their thinking for them and provides a consensus view of reality for them to use in ways that minimise their effort of critical thinking.

 I suggest that making sense of the discussion about authority  in Wikipedia, the PhD-design list   and journals/conferences depends on the choice of position from the above themes and sub-themes. This contrasts  with seeing research only from the point of  the  3c perspective. 

The different thematic positions lead to different attitudes on validity and authority. For example Logical positivists might want to delete most of Wikipedia and the academic literature. Authority would reside only in accurate observation of 'real' events. Similarly, TeaParty and creationists  adopting a fundamentally metaphysical rhetorical (1) position, might consider everything that does not accord with their beliefs as invalid. Authority in their case  is ideology and religious belief as described in particular texts.

For those  adopting the current scientific style (3c)  and prioritising empirical evidence 'facts' over reasoning in making theory, then authority will be seen either as outside the individual (e.g. as a system of 'unbiased' peer review) or as a matter of  authority residing in unique individuals who are the elite experts with authority of accurate 'knowledge of the facts'

The alternative I was pointing to (the 3a thematic position)  is more democratic, yet requires more individual responsibility, skill and freedom.  It assumes validity (or not)  is identified  by individuals from the expression  by others of theories and descriptions of facts. It requires in individuals the ability to reason carefully and sensibly and acquire over time a reasonable general knowledge of the world - things that might be expected of the development of any human being. From this view point,  authority resides in individuals' personal judgments about what they wish to regard as valid or not. From this perspective, any  content of  Wikipedia,  journal papers (or the phd-design list) may or may not be valid, complete or incomplete, useful or not useful - whichever; it is does not depend on systemically-based authority by peer review or some other means, it depends on individual judgements by individual  users. 

I can appreciate the efficiencies of seeing the world in the 3c manner with systematised and 'authoritatively agreed' versions of reality (and hence the deep need to assume that validity and knowledge are socially constructed). Problems it raises are many, including  that it leads to overdependence on judgement of others, is potentially a pathway to failed personal development, and is open to hijacking in ways that can lead whole societies astray. 

The 3a approach seems more helpful in terms of individuals achieving increased maturity and wisdom. It also offers a more stable basis for the development of a societies based on knowledgeable understanding of the world. For designers and design researchers, it is an approach that offers a way to address and potentially resolve some of the complex socio-technological and ethical issues in the design realm to which a predominately evidence-based approach does not helpfully apply.

My apologies for writing such a long piece. Perhaps it would have been preferred if I had could have simply pointed to a fact or  created a quick-and-easy-to-think 'law' !

Best wishes,
Terry

-----Original Message-----
From: PhD-Design - This list is for discussion of PhD studies and related research in Design [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Ken Friedman
Sent: Wednesday, 17 August 2011 10:07 PM
To: Dr Terence Love
Subject: Re: Wikipedia? The PhD-Design list?

Dear Terry,

You’ve proposed a theory of authority based on a great many hidden
assumptions. The two cases you propose – the land-locked nation and
the circle – don’t really work. You’re assuming intuitive
knowledge or advance information on data points and inter-related facts.
Without intuitive knowledge or advance information in the form of
assumed facts, the examples do not sustain your conclusion. The proposal
is also deficient if intuitions or unexamined assumptions are
incorrect.

The example of the circle assumes advance information of the “1 piece
of data” that something travels in a circle. This is only a single
data point for Pythagoreans, Ptolemaics, or those who benefit from data
collected in advance by others.

This runs quite contrary a famous case that played a role in
overturning the “single data point” circles of Ptolemaic astronomy.
Kepler started by assuming regular geometric forms. It took years of
careful observation to reach the three laws that paved the way for
Newton.

Warm wishes,

Ken

Professor Ken Friedman, PhD, DSc (hc), FDRS | University Distinguished
Professor | Dean, Faculty of Design | Swinburne University of Technology
| Melbourne, Australia