There is a difference between theory and philosophy, as there is a difference between validity and soundness. If one is interested in whether a subjective experience is generalizable, it becomes a research question, which invites a research design appropriate to the form of claim it aspires to make.

The movement from philosophy to science is the move that seeks validation, and aims to build theory on the basis of validity. Philosophy itself does not require this because it states its premises and builds sound arguments (hopefully) from these, or else reflects on premises to create sound arguments about them (from, of course, other premises).

The problem with radical constructionism is that it is self-contradictory. If meaning cannot be determined or successfully imparted, one wonders why they these people keep talking. It would seem that the least they could do — for the sake of integrity — is shut up.

Likewise, the claim that "nothing is knowable" is also self-contradictory because it holds itself as a known and knowable truth. This is what killed Skepticism in ancient Greece. 

The constructivist turn itself — one I do work in — recognizes a plurality of social systems of meaning, and those who are indeed scientists (I am one) seek to determine  those meanings empirically. 

For those interested in the empirical understanding of constructed forms in communication, I suggest the work of Gerry Philipsen and Donal Carbaugh who have helped build the field of ethnography of communication.

If design wants to move towards theory from philosophy, it is going to need to address the standards of scientific inquiry into social phenomena. 
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On Feb 7, 2011, at 7:42 AM, CHUA Soo Meng Jude (PLS) wrote:

> I'm sympathetic to Terence's concerns about subjectivity, and this reminds me of the following. One of the things I've been struggling with when detailing what design is or what constitutes a design theory or science of design is the scope of what is to be studied and detailed under "design" or "design thinking" etc. My colleagues (also in philosophy) complain that design seems to be anything practical and it's so broad if one attempts a essentialist study of what constitutes a common denominator of design you either get too much in it or else so little its not illuminating. My colleagues in sociology (or history) basically argue that everything is more or less constructed so there's no objective essence of anything and you need to study something in context, so they recommend studying what this or that particular designer says, here, then, etc. There are parallels here; in education for the longest time the philosophers (Hirst et al) at IoE were interested in detailing the essence of this and that, and their colleagues in sociology and history (McCullogh and Whittey, etc) thought this was totally wrong headed. In jurisprudence there was something similar with people like Austin trying to define "law" as imperatives and Hart arguing that sociologically that was not how the Englishman grasped the law, but rather these were, rules. But John Finnis suggested that there was a self conscious attempt even in Hart's case to avoid merely describing in context what someone thinks the law is but that Hart self-consciously choose some rather than other view points as representative of a viewpoint about the "law".  Retrieving Aquinas and Aristotle, he called this the quest for the central case, or the focal meaning, and here even if law can mean many things, the theorist would only choose a select type of viewpoint and it's understanding of the law for study. Herbert Simon had that approach it seemed to me: he wanted to detail the epistemology not of any designer (syn. "professional") but only of those whose reasoning was sound. Nigel Cross I noticed somewhat self-consciously does the same: he is interested mostly in the work or thinking of "good designers", and not anyone who comes along and who could still be loosely called a designer. I think this is a sensible way to go.  There's a kind of selectivity, a kind of recognition that, while there are many designers and many design epistemologies, design theory should focus on the central instances, and not the peripheral types (which whilst peripheral still are design-ings, just as for instance in the case of jurisprudence, legal positivists would say, an evil law is still a law, but a central case theorist would agree but point out, that this law whilst law was law only in the peripheral sense.) The challenge in the development of a central case, however, is the justification of the criteria for selecting what should be focal and what is peripheral; Finnis argues that we should always adopt the viewpoint of the person whose reasoning is sound (including practical, moral reasoning). But this then leads to another problem; is there such a viewpoint that is objective, defensible, etc? This viewpoint, as Finnis argues, is that viewpoint of the practically reasonable person, i.e., to be worked out by the ethicist. Here I find Simon's account of practical reason limiting, given his earlier positivism and later affirmation of the naturalistic fallacy, and his general skepticism of the existence of normative precepts with an account of terminal values.  Cross I find limiting in another way since he prefers research on design by designer-researchers but clearly this exclusivism blinds us to important work on axiologies done by non-designers, and indeed undermines his attempt to discern the thinking of "good" designers, and who are good designers should not, I feel, be left to some arbitrary, conventional or preferential judgment.
> 
> Ideas in need of more work
> Jude
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: PhD-Design - This list is for discussion of PhD studies and related research in Design [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Terence Love
> Sent: Friday, 4 February, 2011 2:56 PM
> To: [log in to unmask]
> Subject: Re: generalizability of research through/by design
> 
> Hi Luke
> 
> 
> Any  subjective-based approach to making design  theory,  whether
> continentally high flying such as Dreyfus, Heidegger, Sartre or Husserl, or
> lowflying as in protocol analysis self reporting and opinion-sampling
> empirical surveys depends on their being some justifiably accurate
> connection between what people report about 'inside of themselves' and what
> is observably going on as seen by others in ways that can be subjected to
> some kind of empirical checking.
> 
> It's pretty effortless to show that subjectivist reality isn't a great basis
> for deriving theory from. We don't know what we think or feel. We lie about
> it to ourselves. We are subject to widespread illusions and delusions moment
> by moment as well as over the longer term. All these make subjective 'truth'
> pretty undependable as a basis for making theory about being, nothing ness -
> or design.
> 
> This puts a pretty big challenge to continental philosophy to get round -
> and I've not yet come across a sincere attempt to prove empirical validity
> of continental philosophers' speculations  by members of that group  who
> have continued to remain in that tradition.
> 
> Or can you think of a situation otherwise?
> 
> Best wishes,
> Terry
> 
> National Institute of Education (Singapore) http://www.nie.edu.sg
> 
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