Terry and all,
Some non-US readers might have missed this small but telling piece (with
a notable powerpoint graphic) from the New York Times that illustrates,
for another context, a comparable complexity.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/27/world/27powerpoint.html?scp=1&sq=Afghanistan%20powerpoint&st=cse
While any approach to the re-configuration of complex situations that
involves thinking through implications and consequences is to be
welcomed, the posited "solution" of modeling a situation like the Greek
economic crisis by "using system dynamics or similar and then
observ[ing] which factors have more or less effect and how the effects
of strategic interventions play out" does not in itself solve the
problem that Terry lays out. The reason does not lie only in the
question of the acuity of the feedback loops but in the limits of
modeling itself, i.e., in any model models what it is capable of
modeling; what it is capable of modeling will always be a more-or-less
(and usually less) approximation of the situation (and a situation
caught at a particular moment). In simple systems where we can take the
model as metaphor and discount the divergence (e.g. of diagrammatic
subway system maps to geographic actuality) this scarcely matters. But
in complex systems this is a real problem. No matter what complexity is
built on top of the initial model (economics) lack of fit between model
and actuality has the potential, particularly in abnormal conditions, to
induce crisis (the banking failures of 2007-8). But the inherent
tendency of the technological towards simplification and the reduction
of valency is not the only problem. The deeper irony is that the
construct of the system dynamic models depends in the first place on
precisely the kind of analyses or outline sketch of the situation that
Terry described and decried. The addition of "dynamics" to the systemic
model therefore changes less than might be supposed. But what is missing
in the whole process is the hermeneutic of the multiple
political-economic situations that involved in this event. What is
ultimately required is an adequate depth-comprehension of the situation
in terms of its factors and dynamics. This cannot be substituted for by
"system dynamics" alone.
Best from springtime NYC
Clive
Clive Dilnot
Professor of Design Studies
Dept. Art and Design Studies, Rm 609
Parsons School of Design,
New School University,
2w 13th St.
New York NY 10011
T.1-212-229-8916 x1481
>>> Terence Love <[log in to unmask]> 05/05/10 10:17 PM >>>
Dear David,
Solving the Greek situation is a design problem the Greek government is
facing. Perhaps more interesting is to look at design issues and methods
of
the design situation.
Here's an outline sketch of the design situation as I understand it (and
most of this comes from Stratfor. I recommend a subscription - less
than a
daily newspaper). The design analysis is only at the order of one
feedback
loop.
The fundamentals of the Greek design situation are geopolitical.
EU wants to become a bigger trading block and the US wants Europe to
extend
across towards Russia to reduce Russia's geopolitical buffer zone (which
it
needs for territorial integrity.
Greece is and has been economically problematic for many decades.
Greece's
government wants to stay in power and have an easy life by placating its
people. For that (which included the best quality social security
arrangements in Europe) the Greek government needs lots of cash and the
economy doesn't provide it
Joining the EU offered Greece's government the opportunity to get
access to
very cheap credit on a large scale. Greek gave false financial figures
to
give Europe the illusion that it was more credit worthy to enable it to
join the EU to get access to cheap cash (mainly German). The Greek
government continued to provide 'adjusted' financial figures. It appears
the
approach worked something like an institutionalised Ponzi scheme where
new
borrowings pay for interest on previous borrowings.being funded from abroad rather than from the 'sweat of the brow of its
population'. To many of the Greek population this obviously has not
been
apparent.
The situation is less obvious in times of increasing wealth. The
approach
fails in times of economic pressure. The failure occurs both because it
becomes harder ( now much harder) to rent money and the benefits of it
are
less - yet the previously borrowed capital and interest must still be
paid.
In essence Greek financial future is dependent on people with money
feeling
trusting enough to lend it to the Greek government on the basis that
they
will get some profit back.
As a design problem, there are three obvious solution paths: 1)
Massively
reduce the amount the Greek government spends; Change the value of the
Greek
currency; 2) find someone with a different reason to lend Greece the
money
than simply profit on interest. The second and third are what form the
interesting parts of this design problem.
Reducing the amount that the Greek government spends directly affects
those
who have benefited and who have got use to being benefited by the Greek
government's aims in keeping in power and keeping the population happy.
This
is now coming back to bite in spades. The Greek government, however,
still
wants to remain in power. Reducing cash flow to beneficiaries can only
go
so far before the government is rejected. Civil disturbance is a normal
part
of this process.
Greece is not able to change the value of its currency. It is locked
into
the Euro. As an aside, UK banks and economy are in a similar mess. The
UK
would be in Greece's position, except, it can devalue its currency,
which is
what it is doing informally. This has minimal civil disturbance effects
because people see the same salaries and pay cheques going into their
banks.
The change in value of the currency, however, means that prices will
creep
up as exchange rates affect new products coming through the supply
chains.
It will be most likely to be first noticed in food because the UK
imports
over half of its food. Back to Greece, Greece could secede from the EU.
This would be seriously embarrassing for the EU and indicate that the EU
as
an economic union it is not financially strong enough to protect its
members. In effect the EU's credit rating would fall. From the Greek
side,
secession from the EU would lose Greece the protection of the EU and its
access to 'cheaper than it could be' credit as well as lose the military
security support of the EU. Instead, as a design strategy Greece can
leverage the problems that it is giving the EU to gain future benefits
from
the EU in a sort of polite game of blackmail.
The third part of the design situation is even more interesting.
Mainland Europe is dominated by Germany and France. Germany is
geopolitically insecure because of its location between France and
Russia.
Germany's natural protection strategy is imperial expansion. Germany is
both
the strongest economic nation in Europe and the financial cornerstone of
Europe. Over the last 60 years, the US has guaranteed German security;
in
return Germany has foregone its expansion strategy and has funded Europe
whilst not controlling Europe.
Recently, American security guarantees for Germany have become less
secure
and America has been sending adverse economic signals (e.g. the Opel
affair
in which the US supported a sort of double cross of Germany by GM) .
Simultaneously, Russia is both twisting Germany's arm (control of access
to
fuel in winter) and cozying up in friendship as a security guarantor. In
parallel, Germany appears to have reached a change of emotional position
becoming unhappy to fund and bail out Europe's financial problems. At
the
same time, the other EU countries banks are going though their financial
own
crises. This means they are unwilling to bail out Greece.
Together, this places Germany in a key position politically,
economically
and geo-politically and with potential to change thThis is THE interesting design situation for all of Europe's members.
How does each of Europe's countries' governments design their own
geo-political strategies to enable them to make the best of this
situation
both now and for the future? In this, Greece is a side show.
For what it is worth, design methods developed by myself and colleagues
in
Perth indicate that an effective strategy for many nations might be
selective disruption that increases the variety that Germany and other
potentially controlling powers have to deal with. Expect riots ,
threats
and increase in social tensions.
All of these, however, are part of larger design strategies relating to
control of oceans, future markets and territory. Expect a wide variety
of
external participants to be involved in the European action including
US,
Russia, China, Iran and Turkey. Geo-political design strategies must and
will incorporate them.
Now is the really interesting part. The above design analysis appears to
say
a lot and is mentally stimulating and accessible. It gives something for
us
to think about and gives the illusion that we understand the situation.
Worse, it gives the illusion that we understand the situation enough to
design intervention.
In reality, as a design approach it is useless. It’s a basis for amateur
guessing rather than professional design.
In reality, the geopolitical situation has multiple feedback loops. A
professional design approach would be to model the situation using
system
dynamics or similar and then observe which factors have more or less
effect
and how the effects of strategic interventions play out.
Multi-feedback loop design methods using system dynamics are now well
tested
by the US and other players in Iraq and Afghanistan. The problem, as a
design process, is using system dynamics whilst managing very short
term
high leverage events (e.g. deaths of leaders, small window actionable
intelligence). Similar situations occur in any complex multi-loop design
situation. The US has recently included Design as part of Field Manual
5.0
Operations Process for Battle Command. Here in Australia, Commanders
are
thinking through implications. My reading over the last week has
suggested
there is more to think about on this. The developments should soon start
to
filter through to design research, design education and design practice
.
Just two penneth from oz,
Best wishes,
Terry
____________________
Dr. Terence Love, FDRS, AMIMechE, PMACM
School of Design and Art
Director Design-focused Research Group, Design Out Crime Research Group
Researcher, Digital Ecosystems and Business Intelligence Institute
Associate, Planning and Transport Research Centre
Curtin University, PO Box U1987, Perth, Western Australia 6845
Mob: 0434 975 848, Fax +61(0)8 9305 7629, [log in to unmask]
Visiting Professor, Member of Scientific Council
UNIDCOM/ IADE, Lisbon, Portugal
Honorary Fellow, Institute of Entrepreneurship and Enterprise
Development
Management School, Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK
____________________
-----Original Message-----
From: PhD-Design - This list is for discussion of PhD studies and
related
research in Design [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of David
Sless
Sent: Thursday, 6 May 2010 8:36 AM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: Greece
Clive and all
On 06/05/2010, at 10:14 AM, Clive Dilnot wrote:
> … Mark Edwards is undoubtedly technically correct in his observation
> regarding the appropriateness of airing thoughts on Greek social
unrest
> in the hallowed spaces of the PhD design list…
I'm not so sure. It's clear that I'm sceptical about the value of Terry
Love's preoccupation with the large scale. Nonetheless, this should not
preclude it from consideration. I would have thought the Greek situation
could be considered a candidate for inclusion as a large scale design
problem.
Over to you Terry (BTW, I think he is away from his desk for a few days,
so
we might have to wait a little web: http://www.communication.org.au
Professor David Sless BA MSc FRSA
CEO • Communication Research Institute •
• helping people communicate with people •
Mobile: +61 (0)412 356 795
Phone: +61 (0)3 9489 8640
Skype: davidsless
60 Park Street • Fitzroy North • Melbourne • Australia • 3068
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