Dear Eduardo,
Thanks for your reply.
My contrast between Heidegger and Wittgenstein
did not involve contrasts inherent in their
philosophies. It had to do with the implicit
emphasis on Heidegger in the Design Philosophy
Papers CFP as contrasted with David's emphasis on
Wittgenstein in his philosophical inquiries.
The Vienna Circle loathed Heidegger, but I don't
think that Wittgenstein despised Heidegger. He
kept his distance from the Vienna Circle on many
issues. He also refused to attend their meetings
despite repeated invitations to do so.
My attempt to frame the clash of language here
involved describing two language positions
arising from different nomoi. Or perhaps it
involved two nomoi that emerge from differing
ways to use language. Either way, I wasn't posing
Heidegger and Wittgenstein against each other in
any larger sense.
Peirce and Popper raise yet more questions. I
respect Peirce, but I can't say that I aspire to
Peircian clarity. Ordinary English clarity via
Samuel Johnson or even Winston Churchill would do
just fine. My prose models today would be
Clifford Geertz, Mary Catherine Bateson, Ursula
K. Le Guin, or Daniel Boorstin.
Popper's brief debate with Wittgenstein was
something else. I agree with both positions in
that debate. As Popper argues, life presents
genuine philosophical problems. As Wittgenstein
argues, many apparent problems are simply puzzles
that we can dissolve by clarifying language. Thus
my appreciation for clarity. That and the fact
that clarity helps us to speak across cultures,
disciplines, and groups.
Yours,
Ken
Eduardo Corte Real wrote:
-snip-
My "Building Dwelling Thinking" was "Bātir,
Habiter Penser" and the book was Essays et
Conferences and not Poetry, Language, Thought. It
is interesting that your wonderful post digresses
through these maters. We must confront what are
the essays in both editions. Thinking about
Language and Thought, naturally, you oppose or
complement Heidegger with Wittgenstein (somehow a
red worm in my word processor underlines
Heidegger as an error and Wittgenstein doesn't. I
guess that's what you meant by different
traditions) apart from Vienna's Circle loathing
of his philosophy.
I also was appalled by Heidegger's apparent lack
of tact in talking about the "fourfold" when
Europe was laid in ruins caused by the Nazi
folly. I wrote about it in "How to make your
ideas obscure." Back then, I opposed Heidegger
with Peirce, a very good but insidious man that
is behind, I think, the forms of clarity that
David, Chris and you, still, embrace and not
Wittgenstein's.
In Wittgenstein's Poker: The Story of a
Ten-Minute Argument Between Two Great
Philosophers, by David Edmonds and David Eidinow,
we can read about the opposition between
Wittgenstein and Karl Popper which one could
summarize, from Popper's side, on the lack of
Wittgenstein's interest in the real human
problems reducing philosophy to riddles of words
constructions.
The way in which philosophy escape from the nomic
anathema that you speak of has been by plunging
deeply in sentiments (funny that you bring
Kierkegaard into the conversation) which tend to
afflict both barbarians and Greeks. That's why
suffering is so worked out.
-snip-
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