Klaus:
I really wanted not to disrupt the current developments on the list but
since you responded on list I feel the need to reply.
On 1/9/05 3:06 PM, "Klaus Krippendorff" <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
> your intention effectively distinguishes one part of the brain, which is
> causally managed, from another part, which does the managing.
You are absolutely right here! My theory holds that intention manages what
is attended to in order to reach the goals of intention. No problem.
you might recall
> an early ashby paper, which you probably read).
From your class in cybernetics? I would like to read it again and make my
own response. Could you reference it for me?
then you (at least i) would
> be lead to ask what causes the intentions to be what they are and you
> probably would come to a homunculus-like construction of the brain.
Way off! (and even a little offensive) My construction is entirely based on
the "information" (neural potentials) in the brain and the way I theorize
that they are organized and interact in thought.
Also the "intentional fallacy" you and Michael have referenced concerns the
idea that an authors intention should not be the basis for literary judgment
of their work. I do not think it is relevant to what I am saying as the last
public post indicated (ie causal effects have many interpretations).
Let's stay offlist.
Chuck
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