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    Vol. 5  No. 25, August 2001
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    Richard Allen

    Looking at Motion Pictures (Revised) [1]



I
What is it we see when we look at a motion picture? This is a fundamental
question addressed by all film theory. It derives from a much older
question: what is it we see when we look at a picture? But the answer to
this question depends in turn upon how we understand the activity of seeing
itself. The philosophical understanding of what seeing is has been
dominated by the causal theory of perception. The concept of a causal
connection is central to understanding the natural world and it serves to
characterize the physical connection between our sensory organs and what it
is that we perceive. We can only see objects of a certain colour, shape, or
size because these objects impinge causally on our senses. However, the
causal theory of perception makes two further claims: first, that by acting
causally upon our senses, objects cause us to have a visual experience;
second, that the asserted causal connection does not simply describe our
knowledge of the physical world but it is part of our 'ordinary notion of
perceiving'. [2] The first claim assumes a sharp divide between 'the
mental' and 'the physical' worlds in order to assert the existence of a
causal connection between the two. The second claim, wishing to deny this
sharp divide, asserts that the idea of a causal connection is built into
the concepts we use to describe our interaction with the world, in this
case of the concept of perception. It is the burden of Wittgenstein's later
philosophy to contest both these claims. First, he argues there are not two
worlds, 'mental' and 'physical', that are causally connected to each other,
but one physical world that consists of causal connections. Secondly, he
argues that a philosophical understanding of the mind consists in attaining
a perspicuous overview of the concepts we use to characterize it and the
way these concepts are grounded in human behaviour, not in the
investigation of the causal preconditions for the application of those
concepts. In other words, there is a sharp distinction between conceptual
and empirical inquiry: grammar, in particular the grammar of our mental
concepts like 'perception', is autonomous. The causal theory of perception
provides a signal instance of the failure to observe this distinction.

I shall begin this essay by sketching some Wittgenstein-influenced
arguments as to why the causal theory of perception is inadequate. However
my main concern is to explore the ramifications for pictorial perception of
understanding perception in terms of the causal theory. When 'our ordinary
notion of perceiving' is characterized in terms of the existence of a
causal connection between an object perceived and our sensory experience of
that object the case of pictorial perception generates a paradox. For when
we look at a representational painting, a photograph, or a film, arrayed
before us is the two-dimensional disposition of pigment upon a canvas or
light registered upon photographic paper or projected on a film screen
organized into the shapes of recognizable objects. According to the causal
theory, my 'visual experience' of a picture is caused by my two dimensional
object array. Yet when we look at a painting, photograph, or film, and
report upon our 'visual experience' we commonly report that we see not
simply the disposition of pigment or array of light but what is depicted in
the representation. This is especially true when we report on what we see
in photographs, on television, and in the cinema. It seems that we see
William Shatner in _Star Trek_, not simply see a representation of him, and
consequently we see that he has grown older in _Star Trek: The Motion
Picture_. However, we may also report seeing William Shatner when he is
depicted in a painting, though we may feel that our experience of seeing is
different in the case of paintings as opposed to photographs. To the extent
that our ordinary concept of seeing permits us to speak of seeing what is
depicted in a motion picture, our ordinary understanding of perception in
the cinema conflicts with the causal theory of perception, for how can we
report that we see William Shatner when our 'visual experience' is of a
representation of William Shatner?

Visual theorists have sought to resolve the paradox of pictorial perception
in a way that conforms to the causal theory of perception. As they have
been applied to the problem of perceiving motion pictures, these theories
are of at least four kinds: illusion theories, transparency theories,
imagination theories, and recognition theories. According to illusion
theories of pictorial perception we see what a picture depicts because a
picture causes us to have a visual experience that is like the visual
experience that we have when we see the object. We may be deceived by the
illusion, in which case it is a cognitive or epistemic illusion, or the
illusion may be merely sensory or perceptual. Theories of illusion were
highly influential in the film theories of the 197Os and early 1980s that
sought to explain the special power of movies to shape the imagination.
Transparency theories are associated with the realist tradition of film
theory: Bazin, Kracauer, and Cavell. Transparency theorists claim that the
unique properties of the photographic image allow us, in some sense, to
actually see the object when we look at a motion picture. The photographed
object causes the image to be produced in the photograph which causes us to
have a visual experience of the object photographed. The thing photographed
is not absent but indirectly made present to us via its photographic
reproduction. Imagination and recognition theories of pictorial perception
are of more recent vintage and are associated with the turn toward
'cognitive' approaches to understanding motion picture perception within
film theory. Imagination theorists of pictorial perception deny the fact
that we see what is depicted in a motion picture, our 'visual experience'
is simply one of a two-dimensional representation. If we are still inclined
to speak of seeing what is depicted in a picture it is because although we
do not actually see what a picture depicts we imagine seeing what a picture
depicts. Recognition theorists, like imagination theorists, resolve the
paradox of pictorial perception by denying that, strictly speaking, we see
what is depicted in a picture. For recognition theorists, pictorial
perception mobilizes a capacity to recognize objects already possessed by
the spectator. Recognition theorists may also deny that we imagine that we
see something and simply claim that what we see is the disposition of
colours on a flat surface that cues our recognition of what the picture is
of.

Each of these theories attempts to resolve the paradox of looking at
pictures by rejecting one or other horn of the dilemma generated by
conceiving pictorial perception in terms of the causal theory of
perception. Either we see what a picture depicts because what we see is
really the thing itself or an illusion of it, or we do not see the thing
itself and instead we either imagine that we see what the picture is of or
it affords us a recognition of what it depicts. I shall argue that none of
these solutions are satisfactory: we require an understanding of seeing
(motion) pictures that, contrary to imagination and recognition theorists,
respects that fact that seeing what a (motion) picture is of is a genuine
case of seeing, without committing ourselves to the idea that what we see
is either the thing itself, as opposed to a representation of it, or else
an illusion of the thing itself. Such an understanding is predicated upon a
rejection of the causal theory of perception and hence of the paradox it
gives rise to. When I see a representation of William Shatner in a painting
or film I see William Shatner. To deny the role of the causal theory of
perception in the explanation of pictorial perception is not, of course, to
deny the existence of a physical, causal connection between the painting or
film and the sensory organs of the viewer. It is simply to claim that this
connection cannot explain or justify the content of our perceptual report.
But how do I justify my own claim that (motion) picture perception is a
genuine case of seeing? I do not offer an alternative theory here about
what it is we see when we look at motion pictures. Instead, my strategy
will be to diagnose what it is that impels the theorist of vision to insist
there is something strange about our talk of seeing something that is
depicted in a motion picture. Dispel the strangeness, or recognize how
widespread this strangeness is, and the pressure is allayed to revise our
customary ways of speaking on account of a theory.

Following Wittgenstein, I shall argue that the content of our perceptual
reports is specified not by a theory but simply by what we report that we
see when we make veridical reports using perceptual verbs. In the
_Philosophical Investigations_ Wittgenstein discusses cases of visual
perception that involve the seeing of an aspect, such as looking at
Jastrow's duck-rabbit figure or seeing a family resemblance. [3] In aspect
seeing any characterization of the physical properties of what is seen
fails to unambiguously determine the nature of what it is that we see, for
while the physical properties of what we see do not change we seem to see
something different. For example, when previously we have seen the
duck-rabbit figure as a rabbit, now we see it as a duck, but we cannot
explain the change in what it is that we see by any physical change in the
thing perceived. It is tempting to understand the switch from the duck to
the rabbit as an interpretation of the figure, for we can choose to look at
it one way or another once we recognize that the figure contains two
aspects. However, when the aspect first dawns upon us we are not in a
position to 'choose' what we see, our perception of the duck-rabbit as a
duck is compelled upon us by the figure. And it is the way the figure
compels us to see it under any given aspect (unless we switch) that renders
the perception of an aspect like ordinary seeing. I shall argue that
pictorial perception in general is a case of 'continuous aspect seeing':
(motion) pictures allow us to continuously see what they depict where the
difference in what we see between merely seeing a two dimensional array and
seeing what is depicted by that array is not specifiable in terms of the
physical properties of what we see. Once again, this is not to deny the
existence of a causal relationship between an object with certain physical
properties and the sensory organ of the observer, it is to deny that a
specification of the physical properties of the object can serve to
characterize what we really see, and hence support a denial that we really
see what is depicted in picture.

My concern is to address the paradox of looking at pictures. However,
contained within the problem of whether or not we can see what a picture
depicts is a problem posed by a certain class of pictures: pictures of
fictions. Fictional objects do not exist. How can something that is
non-existent be depicted, and if it cannot be depicted how can we see it in
a picture? The idea that we can perceive fictional objects is surely
nonsensical: a 'metaphysical impossibility'. [4] My approach to the problem
of perceiving fictions is simply this. Assuming that fictions can be
depicted, then the arguments that I make about looking at pictures in
general apply to pictures of fictions as well. That is, just as we might
report that we saw Larry Hagman acting the part of J.R. being shot, we
might also report, if we were avid _Dallas_ watchers, 'J.R. has been shot .
. . I just saw it.' Similarly, assuming that what is fictional can be
depicted, then we can see what is depicted in a painting, whether the
painting is of a horse or a unicorn. However, I shall not argue the case
here.

II
The causal theory of perception is motivated by two apparently common-sense
arguments about visual perception. The first argument contrasts ordinary
seeing with hallucinations and the perception of illusions. The dagger that
Macbeth thinks he sees is an hallucination. But suppose that while Macbeth
is hallucinating the dagger a real dagger was placed before him that
corresponded to the hallucinated dagger in every conceivable respect. We
would still not claim that Macbeth actually saw the dagger, and it seems
natural to explain this by saying that the reason Macbeth did not see the
dagger is that the dagger did not cause his visual experience. Or suppose,
to consider another case, I was looking at a pillar and unknown to me a
mirror was interposed in front of the pillar that reflected a numerically
different pillar. It is certainly tempting to explain the fact that I see
the second pillar (in the mirror) and not the first by the fact that the
first pillar was not causally relevant to my perception. [5] Finally,
suppose that it seems to me that I am perceiving a clock on the shelf but
it turns out that my visual cortex is being stimulated in such a way so as
to engender the impression that I am seeing a clock, then it seems natural
to claim that I do not actually see the clock on the shelf because the
clock on the shelf did not cause my experience of seeing the clock. It is
tempting to think in these cases that perceiving something and
hallucinating something or seeing an illusion have something in common,
namely, a perceptual or visual experience. The difference between the case
of genuine perception and hallucinations or illusions seems to lie in the
fact that in the case of genuine perception my visual experience is caused
by the presence of the object in my visual field.

As John Hyman points out in his carefully argued critique of the causal
theory, these arguments fail to establish what they seem to. [6] These
stories appear to illustrate different ways in which visual impressions may
be caused: they may be caused by hallucinations or illusions or they may be
caused by an uninterrupted perception of something. However, what they
conclusively demonstrate are only the different ways in which someone can
be causally prevented from seeing something. They do not by themselves show
that the concept of perception contains the idea of causal connection
between the environment and our experience of it. They merely illustrate
the platitude that if I see something I am free from any causal constraints
that would prevent me from seeing it. Nonetheless, these arguments do
prepare the ground for us to think of our concept of perception as one that
contains a causal relationship, for they allow us a way to think of
perception as a distinctive type of subjective perceptual experience that
is connected to something outside subjective experience, that is, to the
world that surrounds us. If our 'visual experience' in the case of the
hallucination is one that is caused, and the 'visual experience' we have
when we hallucinate an object is identical to the 'visual experience' we
have when we actually see something, then it is natural to conclude that
the 'visual experience' we have when we see something is one that is caused
by the presence of an object in our visual field.

This intuition gains support from a second kind of argument based on the
idea that perception is a cognitive faculty, a way of finding out about the
world around us that is responsive to that world. How can we think of
perception as being dependent, in this way, upon things in the environment
unless we think of perception as causally explained by things in the
environment?

We think of perception as a way, indeed the basic way, of informing
ourselves about the world of independently existing things: we assume, that
is to say, the general reliability of our perceptual experiences; and that
assumption is the same as the assumption of a general causal dependence of
our perceptual experiences on the independently existing things we take
them to be of. [7]

In the case of hallucination, we do not find anything out about our
environment and this is why hallucination is not a genuine case of seeing.
But to say that when we genuinely see something we are finding out
something about the environment is to say, it seems, that something in the
environment caused us to see it.

The general claim that perception is a way of informing ourselves about the
world, and therefore that our concept of perception contains in it the idea
of a causal connection, is credible only if it makes sense to conceive of
perception in terms of a relation that obtains between a 'subjective'
psychological event or perceptual experience and the object perceived. Once
this psychological event is detached from the overall activity of seeing,
then a conceptual space has been created between what is seen and the
experiencing of seeing that allows for the specification of a causal
connection. For a causal connection obtains only between two distinct
existences, cause and effect, where it is logically possible for one to
exist without the other. In this case, the causal connection lies between
the object perceived and the putative perceptual experience. Only then can
we speak of 'a general causal dependence of our perceptual experiences on
the independently existing things we take them to be of'. But as I have
suggested the comparison between seeing something and hallucination seems
to establish just this point. The theory of what it is to see an illusion
or have an hallucination of an object -- that it involves the same visual
experience as the one involved in seeing the object -- seems to show how it
is that our visual experience of seeing can be detached from the
specification of what it is I actually see. The 'visual experience' is the
same in both cases but only in one case -- the case in which the visual
experience is causally attached to the object seen -- is a case of genuine
seeing.

However, is this claim coherent? Does it makes sense to claim that the
concept of 'visual experience' can in this way be detached from and then
re-attached to the concept of seeing something? 'Is it not implausible',
Hyman writes, 'that the experience of hearing something and the experience
of seeing something are experiences once can have despite failing to hear
or see anything at all -- even in total darkness and perfect silence?' [8]
One cannot have the experience of a university education without having a
university education, or of playing the piano without playing the piano, or
have the experience of a toothache without having a toothache. Why is the
case of visual perception different? Clearly from the third person
perspective seeing something and hallucinating it do not describe the same
experience. 'They are so different indeed', P. M. S. Hacker notes, 'that
they do not even look alike, for no observer would mistake Macbeth's having
an hallucination of a dagger for Macbeth's seeing a dagger.' [9]
Furthermore, even the person who hallucinates or sees the illusion of a
dagger will distinguish their experience from the case where they actually
see a dagger or where someone else actually sees a dagger. They will report
that they seem to see a dagger or that what they see looks like a dagger,
rather than reporting that they actually see a dagger. So what is the
visual experience in common between hallucination and perception that
allows us to think of ordinary perception as containing a visual experience
as its subjective part?

Suppose we consider the hallucination from standpoint of someone who,
unlike Macbeth, doesn't realize that they are hallucinating a dagger.
Surely it seems to this person that they are seeing something in exactly
the same way as they would if they were actually seeing the dagger. Indeed
from the subject's point of view there is no difference. But what exactly
is it that is shared in these two cases? The person who believes he sees a
dagger believes that he is having the same experience as a person who
actually sees a dagger. In this sense we can speak of what someone believes
they see as being, from the subject's point of view, indistinguishable from
actually seeing something. However, for the person who experiences an
illusion to *believe* that he is having the same experience does not mean
that he has the same experience. For although the reports we make about
what we see in general provide a sound basis for ascribing a certain kind
of visual perception to us, these reports, like any other first-person
avowal, may be defeated by (anomalous) circumstances. The defeating
circum stances are, in this case, precisely that the person is not seeing a
dagger but hallucinating it, and thus although he reports that he sees a
dagger, he actually only seems to see it. While there is a clear
distinction between hallucinating x and seeing x, the subject who is
hallucinating is not in a position to draw it. Thus the absence of his
ability to distinguish between hallucination and perception does not entail
that the experiences he has are the same.

There is not something -- a visual experience -- in common between genuine
cases of perception and cases where we merely seem to see something,
therefore the comparison between perception and hallucination provides no
basis for conceiving of perception as containing within it such a visual
experience as a component part, one that is detachable as it were, from the
concept of perceiving something. Since, as I have argued, the causal theory
of perception depends upon the intelligibility of the idea that our visual
experience of something can be detached from the exercise of our perceptual
capacities in order to establish the idea of a causal relation between the
visual experience and what is perceived, the failure to establish an
experience in common between the genuine case of perception and
hallucination renders the causal theory of perception itself
unintelligible. The causal theory of perception requires that we can
separate out a mental component of perception from the physical component
to make room for an explanation of the causal connection between them. But
there is no room to be had. Mental and physical are indissolubly linked in
our perceptual reports.

III
The illusion thesis of pictorial representation is one that is associated
with contemporary film theory, though its roots are ancient. The theory
that pictures are cognitive or epistemic illusions that cause us to believe
mistakenly that what we see is real has been thoroughly debunked and can be
laid to rest. [10] But elsewhere I have tried to defend a weaker version of
the illusion thesis: cinema and other forms of pictorial representations
can function as a form of perceptual or sensory illusion that I call
'projective illusion'. I define projective illusion as a form of illusion
that is akin to our experience of an illusion like the Muller-Lyer
illusion, where we know that what we see is an illusion yet our senses are
still deceived. However, it is also a weaker form of illusion than this
kind of sensory deception, since in projective illusion, as I define it, I
can bring to bear my knowledge of the fact that the representation is a
depiction to prevent projective illusion taking hold, or to break the hold
of the illusion entirely. [11]

This idea of projective illusion is both empirically false and conceptually
confused. What is distinctive about an illusion is that it is a special
form of representation that is configured in such a way as to confound our
senses: our senses become unreliable guides to what lies before us. For
example, in the Muller-Lyer illusion we seem to see two lines of unequal
length, even though we know that the two lines are of the same length.
However, representations do not, in general, drive such a wedge between
perception and belief in this way; we do not customarily take a
representation for something other than it is. I try to build into the
theory of projective illusion a recognition of the fact that my knowledge
that the representation is a depiction is sufficient to break the hold of
the putative illusion. However, the kind of mistaken perception engendered
by an illusion is not one that can be corrected by my knowledge: that is
what makes it an illusion. I argue that the correction occurs in the manner
that I can change my perception when I perceive an ambiguous figure like
Jastrow's 'Is it a duck? Is it a rabbit'. However, the idea that the
correction of our perception of projective illusion occurs in this way
still presupposes that I see the image as an illusion in the first place.
As Noel Carroll points out, if the illusion theory is wrong, then so is the
explanation of how the spectator's experience of the illusion is countered.
[12]

The confusion that characterizes my own theory is, I think, typical of
illusion theories. However, it is important to recognize the feature of
looking at motion pictures that illusion theories, however confusedly, are
trying to explain. Illusion theories take seriously the fact that it is
meaningful to speak of looking at what a motion pictures depicts. However,
illusion theorists are mistakenly drawn to the counter-intuitive conclusion
that pictures therefore must be understood as illusions, for they rely upon
the assumption that what we specify in our perceptual reports must be the
content of a visual experience that is caused by what it is that we see.
Since we make our perceptual reports in the presence of a picture and not
what is depicted in it, we must be under the spell of an illusion that
causes us to have a visual experience of the object without the object
being present.

I have argued, following Hyman, that the causal theory of perception
mistakenly assumes (a) that the content of a putative 'visual experience'
can be detached from the specification of what it is that I see, and (b)
that the seeing of an illusion shares this content -- a visual experience
-- with actual seeing. It is these mistaken ideas that motivate the analogy
between pictures and illusions: in seeing a picture of an object I am said
to have the same visual experience as when I see the object itself.
However, as we have seen, the assumptions underlying the causal theory of
perception are mistaken. The factor that lies in common between the seeing
of an illusion of x and seeing x is simply the belief that one is seeing
the same thing, and, in the cases where the illusion is merely sensory, not
even this belief is shared. Clearly, in the case of seeing what is depicted
in a picture I do not erroneously believe that I am seeing the object
itself, but neither do I seem to see something in a way that confounds my
knowledge that what I see is only an illusion. Once we abandon the causal
theory of perception together with the explanatory role it bestows upon
illusion for understanding the role of 'visual experience' in perception,
the argument that seeing things depicted in a picture is like seeing an
illusion and hence like seeing things themselves loses its appeal.

IV
Kendall Walton has provided a rigorous, defensible version of the central
claim of the realist tradition in film theory, that what we see in a
photograph or motion picture is not simply a representation of the object
but the object itself. Bazin claimed that: 'No matter how fuzzy, distorted
or discolored, no matter how lacking in documentary value the image may be,
it shares, by the process of its becoming, the being of the model of which
it is the reproduction; it is the model'. [13] This assertion is based upon
a conflation of photographic representation with what the photograph is of.
Walton revises Bazin's account in the following way. He argues that when we
look at a photograph or a motion picture we may speak with justification of
seeing an object photographed just in those cases where the object depicted
in the photograph is something that existed in front of the camera when the
photograph was taken (something that we can assume in the case of the
standard photograph of a non-fictional object). However, we can see the
object not because the representation is in some sense the object
photographed, as Bazin claimed, but because the photograph allows us to see
the object indirectly. The object photographed is, in this case, seen
*through* the photograph in a manner that is akin to the way that we look
through eyeglasses or a telescope at an object. [14] We thus really are
looking at William Shatner when we see _Star Trek: The Motion Picture_, but
he is not directly present to us, nor do we believe that he is present to
us in the manner of an illusion.

Walton argues that the main reason we can see what is depicted in a
photograph is because the photograph preserves a 'counterfactual
dependence' between the photographic image and what the image depicts that
is independent of the beliefs held by the photographer about what he or she
is photographing. In other words, irrespective of what the photographer
believes he is taking a picture of, the photograph will register what is in
front of the camera. The 'counterfactual dependence' of the photograph on
the thing photographed means that were the thing photographed to change
(counter to fact), the picture would change in a corresponding fashion,
regardless of the photographer's beliefs or intentions. The photograph
contrasts in this respect to the painting. Regardless of what actually
stands before the painter when he paints, what he paints and we see is what
he intends to paint and for us to see. However, in the standard case, even
if the photographer intends to photograph something else, what he
photographs and hence what we see stood before the camera. Gregory Currie
expresses the contrast this way: the counterfactual dependence in
photography is 'natural' rather than 'intentional'. [15] Natural
counterfactual dependence is not sufficient to establish transparency
because we can imagine, for example, a light sensitive machine that printed
out descriptions of what it records that would obviously fail to produce
representational transparency. Thus Walton argues that visual transparency
is only guaranteed by the fact that photographs, unlike verbal
descriptions, preserve real similarity relationships between objects: the
word 'house' is more likely to be confused with 'hearse' than with 'barn',
but a photograph of a house can be confused with a barn just as a house can
be mistaken for a barn. The range of discriminatory error is alike in the
case of seeing photographs and seeing things.

Walton's argument about photography and cinema has the advantage that it
can make sense of the fact that we do speak of seeing the object depicted
without resorting to an illusion theory. However, it does so upon the basis
of a theory that draws a sharp distinction between looking at photographic
depictions of existing objects or persons, like William Shatner, and
looking at photographs of fictional objects or persons, like Captain Kirk,
or looking at a painting of either William Shatner or Captain Kirk. For
Walton, when we look at a representational painting or a motion picture
fiction we imagine seeing what the painting or the fiction represents.
Walton is committed to the idea that there is a sharp or categorical
difference between what we report when we exclaim 'There is William
Shatner' when we look at a painted poster of _Star Trek: The Motion
Picture_, and when we look at the film. In the first case, we imagine that
we see what is depicted, in the second case, we are reporting upon what we
actually see via its photographic reproduction. Yet, is my conviction that
I can see what is depicted justified only in the case of looking at
photographs or motion pictures and not in the case of representational
paintings?

Walton's argument about natural counterfactual dependency is insufficient
by itself to establish the sharp distinction that Walton requires between
what we see when we look at a photograph and what we see when we look at a
painting. It merely establishes an important difference between
representational paintings and photographs. The further argument needed is
one which establishes a relationship between the character of the natural
counterfactual dependency that characterizes photography and the
counterfactual dependency involved in ordinary seeing. Walton writes:

'Why is it that we see Lincoln when we look at photographs of him but not
when we look at his painted portrait? The answer requires an account of
seeing . . . I would subscribe to some variety of causal theory: to see
something is to have visual experiences which are caused, in a certain
manner, by what is seen. Lincoln (together with other circumstances) caused
his photograph and, thus, the visual experiences of those who view it.' [16]

Reports about what we see are counterfactually dependent upon what is seen.
If the animal caught in my headlights was a bear and not a deer, my report
about what I saw (if veridical) would be that I saw a bear rather than a
deer. However Walton is committed not simply to the counterfactual
dependency of ordinary seeing, but to a characterization of that
counterfactual dependency in causal terms. [17] Since, when we see
something, we have a visual experience that is caused by what is seen,
ordinary seeing exhibits the same kind of natural dependency that
photographs exhibit. Furthermore, since ordinary seeing is transparent,
then so too is our perception of what is depicted in a photograph.

Once the casual theory of perception is abandoned, the natural
counterfactual dependency that characterizes photographs can be used to
explain only the difference in relationship that a representational
painting or drawing has to the scene painted, and a photograph to what is
photographed: photographs are natural representations, paintings are
intentional representations. This difference between paintings and
photographs is crucial to understanding the evidential nature of
photographs and films: photographs can reliably show us where things are
located and how they looked at a certain time and place. But this
difference cannot be conceptualized in terms of a difference between a case
of genuine seeing and a case in which we do not, properly speaking, see the
object depicted at all. Furthermore, the fact that photographs or films can
count as evidence of what they depict does not entail that when we look at
a photograph or film we actually see what the photograph of film depicts
through the image, or that we are brought into direct perceptual contact
with the object. Such a thesis could be justified only if it were correct
to describe 'ordinary seeing' and the counterfactual dependency it entails
in terms of the causal relationship that characterizes the dependence of
the photograph upon the object photographed. But as we have seen there are
good reasons for denying the causal theory of perception.

V
I have suggested that illusion and transparency theorists are right to take
seriously the idea that we see what is depicted in a picture, but they
mistakenly try to fit their explanation of what it is that we see within
the framework of the causal theory of perception; it is this attempt that
leads to error. Pictures are not like illusions and the transparency thesis
draws too sharp a contrast between looking at representational paintings
and looking at photographs. However, one may agree with this criticism of
illusion and transparency theories without accepting that the reason for
their failure is the fact they rely on a particular theory of perception.
Instead, the reason for their failure might seem to lie in their mistaken
assumption that when we look at what is depicted in a picture we actually
see what it depicts.

As we have seen, other than in the case where we look at a standard
photograph of a non-fictional object, Walton argues that looking at what is
depicted in a picture is a form of imagined seeing rather than seeing,
though he emphasizes that the activity in which we imagine seeing the
object depicted is bound up with our actual seeing of the surface of the
picture. Referring to Meindert Hobbema's picture 'Wooded Landscape with a
Water Mill', Walton writes: 'Rather than merely imagining seeing a mill, as
a result of actually seeing the canvas (as one may imagine seeing Emma upon
reading a description of her appearance in _Madame Bovary_), one imagines
one's seeing of the canvas to be a seeing of a mill and this imagining is
an integral part of one's visual experience of the canvas.' [18] Walton's
thesis of imagined seeing is advanced as a general thesis about seeing
pictures; he offers the transparency thesis as a further thesis that
pertains to looking at photographs alone.

Walton's account of imagined seeing is derived in part from Wittgenstein's
contemplations (in the _Philosophical Investigations_ and elsewhere) on
aspect seeing. However, Wittgenstein's reflections on aspect seeing are
more complex and nuanced than Walton's extrapolation. Under the rubric of
'aspect-seeing' Wittgenstein investigates a range of cases that illuminate
the diversity and complexity of the concept of seeing and in particular the
borderline between seeing and imagined seeing. The relationship of 'seeing
aspects' to imagination is illustrated by Wittgenstein in the example of a
triangle that can be seen in a number of different ways: as a solid object,
as the geometrical drawing of a triangle, as standing on its base, as
hanging from its apex, as a mountain, as a wedge, as an arrow, as a
pointer, as an overturned object which is meant to stand on the shorter
side of the right angle, as a half-parallelogram, and as various other
things. [19]

At least two considerations suggest that seeing the aspects of the
triangular figure is a case of imagined seeing. First, discriminations
between the different aspects are not specifiable in terms of the physical
properties of what we see; we cannot discriminate one aspect from another
on the basis of the physical properties of the object depicted. Secondly,
it undoubtedly requires imagination to see the triangle as one thing and
another, just as it requires imagination to see the shape of creatures in
the clouds as Leonardo asked of an aspiring painter. Aspect seeing in this
case is subject to the will in a way that ordinary seeing is not. [20] The
first consideration is not conclusive. Despite the fact that we do not
discriminate aspects on the basis of different sets of physical features,
it is the physical features of the triangle that lead us to see it one way
or another; we do not simply project properties onto the triangle at
random. Yet it is hard to conceive of our perception of the different
aspects as the perception of something different, for the aspect lacks the
fixity or permanence that typically characterizes an object of sight. The
'perception' of the aspects of the triangle does seem to be a good
candidate for imagined seeing. However, to concede that seeing the aspects
of a triangle is a case of imagined seeing is not to concede that the
thesis of imagined seeing provides a general explanation of what we see
when we look at a picture, for it is only an unusual type of picture that
elicits or encourages this kind of imaginative activity. Typically, a
picture will endow a given aspect with a sense of permanence, that is, a
given aspect becomes a property that the picture compels us to see: this is
a picture of a wedge, this is a picture of an arrow. While we must be able
to recognize what the picture is of in order to see picture of a wedge or
an arrow, in these cases it takes no distinctive activity of the
imagination to do so: our recognition of what the picture is of is
immediate and the aspect is a permanent feature of the picture.

The affinity of looking at what is depicted in a picture with seeing, as
opposed to an activity of the imagination or imagined seeing, can be
illustrated by considering Jastrow's drawing 'Is it a duck? Is it a rabbit'
and Wittgenstein's discussion of it. The duck-rabbit figure contrasts with
the triangular figure for we are not free to interpret what it is that we
see in different ways. Instead, we are compelled to see the figure one way
or another. Imagination is not required to see the two aspects of the
duck-rabbit figure, simply the capacity to recognize ducks and rabbits.
Seeing the figure, say, as a duck, is like seeing a duck, for two main
reasons. First, the perception is immediate and direct. Someone who has
only seen the duck-rabbit figure as a duck, that is, who perceives the
figure as an unambiguous picture, will not report when asked what it is
that she sees: 'Now I am seeing the figure as a duck', as if seeing the
figure as a duck was the product of some special kind of mental activity on
her part. She will simply point to a duck or picture of a duck, or make
duck noises in order to explain what it is that she sees in the same way
that she would explain what it is that she sees when she sees an actual
duck. It would make as little sense for her to say, 'Now I am seeing the
figure as a duck', as it would for her to say at the sight of a knife and
fork, 'Now I am seeing this as a knife and fork'. Wittgenstein writes: 'One
doesn't 'take' what one knows as the cutlery at a meal for cutlery; any
more than one ordinarily tries to move one's mouth as one eats or aims at
moving it.' [21] Secondly, like a visual perception, seeing the duck aspect
is a mental state with a measurable duration. For example, we might say, 'I
saw the figure as a duck for exactly two minutes, but now I am seeing the
figure as a rabbit and I shall do so for a further five minutes.'

The standard case of pictorial perception does not involve the distinctive
visual experience of aspect dawning for a picture does not typically offer
the possibility of two contrasting perceptions. The physical cues provided
by the standard picture as to what we see in it are not ambiguous. Rather,
representational paintings and photographs are like the case where we see
the duck-rabbit figure as a duck or a rabbit in ignorance of the
alternative 'interpretation' of the figure. In the case where we just see
the duck-rabbit figure as a duck or as a rabbit, we do not see the 'duck'
or 'rabbit' as an aspect of the figure at all. Here the perception of the
duck or rabbit is simply like the case of standard pictorial perception.
Representational paintings, photographs, and films manifest what
Wittgenstein terms 'continuous aspect seeing' in which, as I have said, the
aspect becomes a property of the picture that the picture compels us to
see. Unlike cases of imagined seeing, no distinctive activity of the
imagination is commonly required to recognize what a painting or photograph
is a picture of. Given the affinities that continuous aspect seeing or
looking at a pictorial representation bears to seeing in general, it is
surely only the prejudicial adherence to a mistaken theory of perception
that prevents visual theorists from acknowledging that seeing what is
depicted in a picture is a form of seeing and not simply a form of imagined
seeing. For only the causal theory of perception requires us to insist that
what we really see when we look at a picture is only a two dimensional
image and not what is depicted by that image. [22]

VI
Some visual theorists agree that the thesis of imagined seeing is not
required to explain the activity of looking at pictures, but argue instead
that the activity can be explained through the idea that when we look at
pictures we deploy capacities to identify and recognize what they depict.
The exercise of recognition capacities does not require that we actually
see the thing that we recognize, merely that we are provided with a
sufficient number of visual cues to correctly identify something. Pictorial
representations can be understood to provide such cues without it being
necessary to postulate that we see or imagine seeing what they depict. Noel
Carroll argues against the thesis of imagined seeing on the grounds that it
seems unnecessary to postulate the activity of imagining looking in at
least one class of depictions: non-fictional depictions. What is in common
between looking at non-fiction and fictional depictions is simply the fact
that we recognize what they are by looking, rather than, say, by reading:
'Recognition', he writes, 'without the additional process of imagining
seeing, is basic to analyzing depictive representation.' [23]

Gregory Currie has offered a detailed elaboration of the recognition
thesis. Currie, like Carroll, proceeds from the assumption that 'cinematic
images, like paintings, are representations, that we perceive
representations of things when we see photographs'. [24] However, this is
obviously only a starting-point for an analysis of what it is we see when
we look at a picture, for we can easily imagine circumstances in which we
look at a picture but we cannot see what it is the picture is of: our
glasses are misty or the room is dark, we see a rectangular shape on the
wall but we cannot see that it is a still life. The difference between
seeing a picture and seeing what is depicted in it consists, for Currie, in
recognizing what the picture is of. The apparent advantage of the concept
of recognition is that it allows us to capture what is in common between
seeing an object and seeing a picture of the object in a manner that is
consistent with the causal theory of perception. When we see a horse,
seeing the horse involves recognition that it is a horse we see; when we
see a picture of a horse we recognize by looking at the picture that it is
a horse depicted. What lies in common between seeing a horse and a picture
of a horse is that both activities deploy horse-recognition capacities, but
in the one case we see a horse, in the other case we merely look at the
picture of a horse. But how is it that when we recognize that the picture
is a picture of a horse by looking, we do not see a horse?

The specifics of Currie's account of how we draw upon our object
recognition capacities when looking at pictures develops a theory of
pictorial cognition proposed by Flint Schier. [25] Following Dennett,
Fodor, and others, Currie argues that the brain is organized into a number
of relatively autonomous subsystems that operate on a hierarchy of the
complex to the primitive. Primitive subsystems of the brain act to
categorize the 'visual input' as the object itself, whether or not what we
see is a depiction of the object or the object itself. More complex
subsystems then operate to correct this diagnosis if it is erroneous and
allow us to recognize the depicted object as a depicted object, or
alternatively, if what we see is the object, they confirm the diagnosis. He
admits that his view of picture recognition constitutes a sort of
illusionism about pictures: 'but this is an illusionism we can live with.
It allows, exactly, that the person seeing can recognize a picture as
representing a horse without him supposing he is actually looking at one'.
[26]

Is this an illusionist theory and can we live with it? Presumably Currie
does not want to maintain that the primitive subsystem of the brain
actually sees the visual input, so the 'deception' here is scarcely an
illusion. Furthermore, it seems inappropriate in this context to speak of
recognition or deception at all, since the failure involved is more like
that of a robot that lacks the capacity to discriminate between certain
sensory inputs than the response of a human being. Can a robot display the
shock of recognition, can it be aware of its mistake without quite knowing
how to correct it? So why does Currie personify the parts of the brain as
homunculi that see and are confused by what they see? It is, I think,
because he realizes there is a need to explain what it is that we see when
we recognize what is depicted in a picture, while at the same time holding
to the assumption that what we see must be specifiable in terms of the
physical properties of the physical object that lies in our visual field.
Since we do not in this sense see the depicted object when we look at a
picture of it, the only way of explaining how it is we do see what is
depicted is the illusion theory. But the illusion theory is untenable as a
theory of consciously looking at pictures, so it is buried in the
subsystems of the brain, in the cognitive unconscious, so to speak, where
it is hoped it can do no harm. But the illusion thesis cannot be buried
there without entailing conceptual confusion. [27] If we subtract from
Currie's discussion the misleading talk of homunculi in the brain doing the
seeing and being confused, we are still bereft of an explanation of how
seeing enters into our recognition of the depicted object.

Is it meaningful to speak of recognizing something by looking in a manner
that does not imply that we are looking at the thing we recognize?
Carroll's formulation, quoted earlier, certainly implies this. He suggests
we can recognize by reading or by looking in such a way that the concept of
recognition is detached from the concept of seeing what it is that we
recognize. However, as Walton argues, the concept of recognition here is
detached from the idea of seeing what it is that we recognize only by
misconstruing the distinction between reading about something and seeing a
picture of it. [28] Carroll asserts that when we look at pictures we
recognize by looking rather than by reading, but when we read it is only by
looking that we recognize the words on the page, so Carroll has failed to
articulate what is distinctive about looking at pictures. Currie accounts
for the difference between our experience of written and visual fictions in
the following terms: visual fictions as opposed to written fictions involve
'perceptual imagining'; for example, 'I see displayed on the screen a man
with a knife, and I imagine that there is a murderer.' However, when Currie
writes, 'I see displayed on the screen a man with a knife', he means that
my man-with-knife recognition capacities are triggered by the image. Since
the recognition thesis already leaves us bereft of a distinction between
seeing something and reading about it, the thesis of 'perceptual imagining'
that presupposes the prior deployment of our recognition capacities -- what
we recognize cues our imagination -- cannot restore the distinction that
has been elided. [29] Looking at a picture, whether a painting, a
photograph, or a film, we recognize what the picture is of because we see
what it depicts.

VII
I have addressed what are, arguably, the four main kinds of theses that
film theorists and philosophers have offered to explain what it is we see
when we look at a motion picture: illusion theories, the transparency
theory, the thesis of imagined seeing, and the recognition thesis. I have
suggested that all these theories are individually flawed, but that their
underlying problem is the assumption that they share in common: the causal
theory of perception. By requiring that we separate our perceptual reports
into a mental component and a physical component the causal theory of
perception imposes a conceptual straight-jacket upon our understanding of
what it is to look at a picture: what it is that we see when we look at
something must be specifiable in terms of a physical object array that
produces in us a visual sensation. This profoundly distorts our
understanding of what it is we see when we see depictions because it
entails that we when we look at pictures what we really see is a picture,
photograph, or film and not what they depict. Each of the explanations I
have examined thus far as to what it is to see a motion picture conforms to
the straitjacket of the causal theory of perception either by producing by
theorizing that we see an illusion of things or the things themselves or by
denying that we really see what is depicted at all.

The insight afforded by the illusion theory is to take seriously the idea
that we do see the object depicted when we see a motion picture. However,
that insight is then distorted when it is construed as the claim that we
have a visual experience that is identical to the visual experience we have
when we actually see an object that is not a depiction. Walton is correct
to recognize that there are differences in the way we look at paintings and
motion pictures. However, the transparency thesis misconstrues the
distinctive character of cinematic depiction by claiming that in
photography and cinema we see the thing itself through the photographic
representation. As a generalized account of seeing pictures, the thesis of
imagined seeing acknowledges that there is more to seeing a picture than
simply recognizing what it is of, but it mistakenly construes seeing what a
picture is of as a mental activity that is added on to the activity of
looking; but looking at what a picture is of does not require a further
activity other than simply looking. Finally, the recognition thesis either
fails to offer an explanation of the visual basis of pictorial recognition
at all (Carroll) or it offers this only by recourse to an illusion theory
(Currie).

But surely one of these theories, or a theory like them, must be right? Is
it not superstitious to say that we can see what is depicted in a picture?
It would be superstitious to claim that when we look at what a picture
depicts something that is absent or non-existent is made present to us.
But, of course, this is not happens when we see what is depicted in a
picture, for we do not when looking at what is depicted cease thereby to
see a depiction. But then how can I claim that we see what is depicted in a
picture at all? It is because, as Wittgenstein points out, the verb 'to
see' has many uses, only one of which is captured in reports about the
deployment of things in space, and we speak of seeing what is depicted in
paintings, photographs and films because we react to these things in the
same spontaneous way that we react to the things themselves. As Hyman has
written:

'when looking at a painting, the natural answer to the question 'What do
you see?' is a description of the depicted scene, and not a description of
the disposition of pigments. This is not simply because we have learned to
assume that this is what the question is after. We can see what is
depicted; but it is generally more difficult, and it may be very difficult
indeed, to see how the pigments are disposed.' [30]

Photographs, like paintings, have a surface, but the elements of the
photograph are not constituted out of marks inscribed upon that surface.
The surface of a photograph registers or records what it depicts.
Furthermore, the projected image has no surface other than the screen upon
which it is projected. Features of the surface of the photograph, such as
graininess, may enter into our perception of it but they are not
constitutive of what a photograph depicts. The difference in the
relationship between surface and image in a painting or drawing compared to
a photograph or film suggests that we can revive Walton's transparency
claim once it is shorn of the argument that what we see when we look at a
photograph or motion picture is the object itself. A photograph is
transparent because even though it has a surface, it is usually not
constituted out of marks inscribed upon its surface. The projected moving
image is transparent for it lacks a surface altogether, other than the
screen upon which it is projected. Paintings, by contrast, tend to lack
transparency, though paintings that mimic photographs appear transparent.
This interpretation of transparency has the distinct advantage that it is
indifferent to whether or not a photograph is mechanically or digitally
produced, or whether a film is animated or live action. That is, a
photograph or film remains transparent whether or not its causal origins
lie in the registration of reflected light from an object.

New York University, USA


My special thanks to Malcolm Turvey for encouraging me, by his example, to
think through the significance of Wittgenstein for film theory and for his
comments on this paper. Thanks also to Berys Gaut, Paisley Livingston,
Murray Smith, Steven Schneider, and Michael Zryd for their helpful comments.


Footnotes

1. This paper has been revised in order to clarify a confusion in the
original version -- published in Richard Allen and Murray Smith, eds, _Film
Theory and Philosophy_ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) -- between the
causal theory of perception as an explication of the concept of perception
and the role of causality in perception. The result of this confusion was
that in the name of denying the causal theory of perception I at times
seemed to deny the role of causality in perception altogther. This is all
the more ironic, since this was precisely a distinction that I was keen to
observe. I am grateful to Samuel Guttenplan for precisely identifying this
confusion in his review of _Film Theory and Philosophy_ ('Analytic
Philosophy and Film', _Film-Philosophy_, vol. 2 no. 36, November 1998
<http://www.film-philosophy.com/vol2-1998/n36guttenplan>; accessed 16 April
2001). While I have made significant changes throughout, I have preserved,
as much as possible, the structure and content of the original essay, whose
argument, I believe, still withstands scrutiny.

2. This characterization of the causal theory of perception is taken from
John Hyman, 'The Causal Theory of Perception', _Philosophical Quarterly_,
vol. 42 no. 168, 1992, p. 278.

3. The main source for Wittgenstein's discussion of seeing aspects is
_Philosophical Investigations_, 2nd edition, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), Part II, xi. Further extensive discussion of the
concept is contained in three volumes of Wittgenstein's notes on the
philosophy of psychology: _Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology_, vols 1
and 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), and _Last Writings on
the Philosophy of Psychology_, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1982).

4. See, for example, Noel Carroll, _Theorizing the Moving Image_
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 368.

5. This example and the next are taken from H. P. Grice, 'The Causal Theory
of Perception', _Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society_, suppl. vol. 35,
1961, p. 142.

6. Hyman, 'The Causal Theory of Perception', p. 279. The argument that
follows is largely indebted to Hyman's paper.

7. P. F. Strawson, 'Perception and its Objects', in G. F. MacDonald, ed.,
_Perception and Identity_ (London: Macmillan, 1979), p. 51.

8. Hyman, 'The Causal Theory of Perception', p. 283.

9. P. M. S. Hacker, _Appearance and Reality_ (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), p. 234.

10. See Noel Carroll, _Mystifying Movies: Fads and Fallacies in
Contemporary Film Theory_ (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp.
89-146.

11. See Richard Allen, _Projecting Illusion: Film Spectatorship and the
Impression of Reality_ (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp.
106-14.

12. Noel Carroll, _Theorizing the Moving Image_, p. 368. I attempt to
circumvent this kind of objection to the theory by revising the concept of
projective illusion to one in which we entertain in thought or imagine that
we see the represented object. However, it is not appropriate to label the
thesis of imagined seeing projective illusion for it is not an illusion
theory at all. If I imagine seeing I do not see, just as if I imagine
eating I do not actually eat. If imagined seeing is not seeing, then it is
not the seeing of an illusion either.

13. Andre Bazin, 'The Ontology of the Photographic Image', _What is
Cinema?_, vol. 1, trans. Hugh Gray (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1967), p. 14.

14. Kendall Walton, 'Transparent Pictures: On the Nature of Photographic
Realism', _Critical Inquiry_, vol. 11 no. 2, 1984, p. 252.

15. Gregory Currie, _Image and Mind: Film, Philosophy and Cognitive
Science_ (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 55.

16. Walton, 'Transparent Pictures', p. 261.

17. My interpretation of Walton's argument is consonant with that of
Gregory Currie in _Image and Mind_, p. 63. Against Currie, Walton denies
that he has settled on an account of what it is to see something; see 'On
Pictures and Photographs: Objections Answered', in _Film Theory and
Philosophy_, p. 69. Walton's dismissal of Currie's reconstruction of his
argument flies in the face of the text I have quoted that demonstrates his
clear commitment to a causal theory of perception. For an article that
makes a similar diagnosis of Walton to the one I make here see Jonathan
Friday, 'Transparency and the Photographic Image', _British Journal of
Aesthetics_, vol. 30 no. 1, January 1996, pp. 30-42.

18. Kendall Walton, _Mimesis as Make Believe: On the Foundations of the
Representational Arts_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990),
p. 301. Walton derives his thesis of imagined seeing, in part, from Richard
Wollheim's characterization of looking at paintings in terms of
'seeing-in'. Unlike Walton, Wollheim claims that 'seeing-in' is not a form
of imagined seeing but a case of seeing. According to Wollheim, a picture
is not an illusion because seeing what is depicted does not preclude our
attention to the surface of the painting. The term 'seeing-in' is designed
to capture what he terms the 'two-foldedness' of the experience of seeing
what a picture depicts. Yet, in spite of his intention, Wollheim's account
of 'seeing-in' becomes an illusion theory since his analysis of seeing is
cast in terms of the causal theory of perception. He defines 'seeing-in' as
the capacity to have 'perceptual experiences of things not present to the
senses' -- _Art and Its Objects_ (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1980), 2nd edition, p. 217. According to Wollheim the picture of an object
causes us to have a mental state that is like the mental state of those who
actually see the object. While this experience of seeing something not
present to the senses is meant to coincide with the experience of seeing
the surface of the picture, Wollheim does not explain how this coincidence
of illusion and veridical perception can be achieved. For criticism of
Wollheim on this point see John Hyman, _The Imitation of Nature_ (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1989), p. 217. It is understandable then, that Walton should
interpret Wollheim's concept of 'seeing-in' as a form of imagined seeing:
we imagine seeing something that is not present to the senses.

19. Ludwig Wittgenstein, _Philosophical Investigations_, Part II, xi, p. 201.

20. The role of the imagination in aspect seeing is emphasized by T. E.
Wilkerson in 'Pictorial Representation: A Defense of the Aspect Theory',
_Midwest Studies in Philosophy_, vol. 16, 1991, pp. 152-66. While this
emphasis is valuable as an account of aspect seeing it distorts the role of
the imagination in looking at pictures.

21. Wittgenstein, _Philosophical Investigations_, Part II, xi, p. 195.

22. My own thoughts on Wittgenstein and aspect-seeing are partly inspired
by the imaginative and suggestive exploration of Wittgenstein's remarks by
Malcolm Turvey in 'Seeing Theory: On Perception and Emotional Response in
Current Film Theory', in _Film Theory and Philosophy_, pp. 441-53.

23. Noel Carroll, 'Critical Study: Kendall L. Walton, _Mimesis as
Make-Believe_', _Philosophical Quarterly_, vol. 45 no. 178, 1995, p. 97.

24. Currie, _Image and Mind_, p. 78.

25. See Flint Shier, _Deeper Into Pictures_ (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1986), pp. 188-95.

26. Currie, _Image and Mind_, p. 86.

27. On the 'reckless application of human-being predicates to
insufficiently humanlike objects' see Anthony Kenny, 'The Homonculus
Fallacy', in John Hyman, ed., _Investigating Psychology_ (New York:
Routledge, 1991), pp. 155-65.

28. See Walton's remarks in 'On Pictures and Photographs: Objections
Answered', in _Film Theory and Philosophy_, pp. 65-66.

29. In 'On Pictures and Photographs', pp. 62-65, Walton offers further good
reasons for thinking that Currie's thesis of 'perceptual imagining' should
be rejected.

30. Hyman, _The Imitation of Nature_ (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), pp. 42-3.


Copyright © Richard Allen 2001

Richard Allen, 'Looking at Motion Pictures (Revised)', _Film-Philosophy_,
vol. 5 no. 25, August 2001
<http://www.film-philosophy.com/vol5-2001/n25allen>.

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