To reduce terms to an easy constrast, two communications theories have recently
been advocated on this list. One might be termed open discourse theory; here
hermenuetics takes the place of epistemology. In contrast to this position is
what might be called the simplified language theory, which seems to me to fall
into what Richard Rorty deems an epistemology of fundamental ground. So it is
that the use of "Noam Chomsky" on this list has so far been to establish an
ultimate position in terms of a hierarchy of communications values. To simplify
this relationship between the two theories, let me show you the nature of the
argument via Richard Rorty, who says,

      "I think that the view that epistemology, or some suitable
successor-discipline, is necessary to culture confuses two role swhich the
philosopher might play. The first is that of the informed dilettante, the
polypragmatic, Socratic intermediary between various discourses. In his salon,
so to speak, hermetic thinkers are charmed out of their self-enclosed practices.
Disagreements between disciplines and discourses are compromised or transcended
in the course of the conversation. The second role is that of the cultural
overseer who knows everyone's common ground--the Platonic philosopher-king who
knows what
everybody else is really doing whether _they_ know it or not, because he knows
about the ultimate context (the Forms, the Mind, Language) within which they are
doing it. the first role is appropriate to hermenuetics, the second to
epistemology. Hermenuetics sees the relations between various discourses as
those of strands in a possible conversation, a conversation which presupposes no
disciplinary matrix which unites the speakers, but where the hope of agreement
is never lost so long as the conversation lasts. This hope is not a hope for the
discovery of antecedently exisiting common ground, but _simply_ hope for
agreement, or, at least, exciting and fruitful disagreement. Epistemology sees
the hope of agreement as a token of the existence of common ground which,
perhaps unbeknown to the speakers, unites them in a common rationality. For
hermenuetics, to be rational is to be willing to refrain from epistemology--from
thinking that there is a special set of terms in which all contributions to
conversation should be put--and to be willing to pick up the jargon of the
interlocuter rather than translating it into one's own. For epistemology, to be
rational is to find the proper set of terms into which all contributions should
be translated if agreement is to be possible" (_Philosophy and the Mirror of
Nature_ 317-318).

So, let me further define the disagreement in communications theory on this list
as a disagreement between epistemologists--those who think that a foundational
set of terms exist or that a reduction to simplier terms is always possible,
useful, or necessary--and hermenuetics--those who are happy to engage a
conversation where they find it.

JMC