Daniel Sayer wrote:
>
> My point is that "hidden agendas" in language can be ferreted out by
> de-construction (whether or not Chomsky has a good opinion of Derrida) as
> well as by the methods Chomsky uses.
The basic difference between deconstruction and plain astute
interpretation, for these purposes, is that deconstruction proposes a
reduction of the purposes of the phenomenological project to the funky
themes offered in the course of its analysis. Derrida positions himself
to reduce phenomenology's effort to establish the grounds for all
science on the philosophical certainty of inward insight and
perspectivity, to his own notions.
It's a clever ruse, but once you see the game, the jig's up.
Deconstruction is no biggie once you get to the point of understanding
that it doesn't really, finally, stand as grounds. Deconstructionists
would never come anywhere near this question, of course.
All deconstruction is, is occulted subjective idealism. It's an
overblown application of structural analysis to phenomenology. Neither
the reduction regarding the purported standing of the deconstructive
analysis, nor phenomenology itself, survive the inquiry. The end result
is not, as Derrida would have it, the opportunity to establish some set
of bizarre ultra-primordial concepts/functions/grammatological sorta
thangs, but really an occasion to recognize that the phenomenological
project that Derrida leans on, can no longer profess to stand as the
ground of all science. (He basically pokes holes, and then plugs the
holes with notions that gain credence merely in that respect.)
But a lot of people never cared for subjective idealism anyway, and they
don't really have to be bothered with it. A lot of academicians,
however, don't realize their reliance on the phenomenological project,
whether by way of deconstruction or otherwise.
Seth Johnson
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