Ray Lanier comments:
> Thus, I view the theories about the basic types of ethical thinking as a
> first step to understanding ethics.  Which is, perhaps, merely a human
> construction?  I think not.  Correct me if you think I am wrong, but it
> seems to me that *action* is the essence of the universe.  Most action
> follows something akin to the Darwinian evolution theory.  No  value, no
> purpose, no right/wrong.  And in the past, humans were part of that
> indeterminate action.  However, humans have now reached sufficient
> understanding that we can forsee consequences (to some extent) of our
> actions.  Because we can forsee consequences (somewhat) and can see
> alternatives, it becomes a *responsibility* of humans to decide what
actions
> are "right actions" and to come to some conclusions about the nature of
the
> "right" action.
>
> As we try to understand "right" action, we develop various hypotheses,
> theories, try to test them in the amorphous venue of human being.  There
may
> be some few folks that conflate "theory" to "reality" but that does not
> negate the necessity of moving carefully, even "rigorously" from ignorance
> to consiousness of problem to an attempt to better understand.

There is one common understanding regarding ethical theories I believe.
Reading Hare in "Ethics" by Singer last night I was struck by his definition
of ethics as 'action'. In the evolutionary sense then action is behaviour,
and behaviour always is pratical. Hare's analysis of ethics is interesting
because he indicates in a summary that there is 'formal' or 'logical' basis
for all questions of an ethical nature. He contrasts formal questions with
substantive ethical questions. He writes that the first requirement in
ethical discourse is to establish an agreement between interlocutors (or the
self in thoughtful deliberation) the meaning of the words that applied to
the logical form of the question. He writes that unless there is an
agreement over the content of the question, the meaning of the words used to
communicate the question, there can be no agreement between actors in
obtaining an answer to the question. The logical form of the ethical
question must meet a formal requirement.

For instance, the example I think that he used was: "one aught to do what
one is not supposed to do or aught to do." This is a simple formulation of
the question from a logical perspective. Now if two actors are in
disagreement regarding the formal requirement of the ethical question, then
there can be no agreement. There are other problems which become
'substantial'. One of the problems is that the failure to agree on the
meaning of the words, and the logical requirement of the ethical question is
that one or both actors will fuse the substantial requirement with the
formal requirement and thus make a 'naturalistic' fallacy. In my
interpretation the actors will confuse the 'good' or 'bad' with the object.
The substantial requirement becomes the logical requirement.

So firstly the error is generated initially at the level of the question.
Asking great questions is the secret to ethical comportment which resolves
the ethical problem. Thus for example if an actor indicates that the
question is incorrect in some way from a formal requirement, then there is
not going to be any substantial fullfillment between the actors. One erro
would be like the above where a premise is stated that 'one aught to do what
one should not aught to do.' The only way that that this becomes a question
for ethics is if there is some substantial premis left out of the premise.
Logically no actor can be doing what they should not aught to do unless
there is a contingency or condition that would warrant the action to do
something wrong.

Moreover, the analysis extends to the substantial requirement for ethical
questioning. Ethics is about choosing between alternative courses of action.
The action that is contemplated are weighed against various standards which
lead to an evaluation of the relative merits of possible action. Hare
indicates that the common substantial form of the ethical question takes the
form of an 'intuitionistic' reflection. This is to say that the actor
evaluates the question regarding an alternative course of action by
reflecting and imagining how it is to feel for the obeject in question. The
naturalistic fallacy is permitted - I might add - in some situations, but
not all. There may be conflicts arising from an evaluation of the actions
from a substantial requirement. For instance an actor may assent to the view
that all existing bears in the wilderness are good, that they are
intrinsically valuable. From this intuitionistic reflection it is possible
certainly that all bears are valuable; however another actor may not have
this intuition based on circumstances. Another actor may not value bears as
good for the wilderness and may wish to hunt them, or destroy them, if the
actor has cattle, or if a bear is a nuisance in his apple orchard. From a
substantial basis the question is not formulated properly in the first place
due to intuition regarding the value of the bear. There can never be
consensus therefore between the two actors in the question regarding the
value of bears in the wilderness.

The solution therefore must originate at the beginning from a 'meta-ethical'
requirement which would require that the question is logical in the first
place. The ethical question regarding the possible ethical alternatives in
dealing with problem and beneficial bears must be properly worded and
consistent in a logical sense between the actors. For instance the question
could be re-worded appropriately by first acknowledging that bears are
valuable in several senses: (a) ecological sense for the purposes of
predation of some small mammals, etc., and seed dispersal, or even nutrient
cycling in the salmon spawning and forested ecosystem. On the other hand
problem bears constitute a subset of the species which cause some suffering
for actors in specific circumstances. In the logical requirement therefore
it may be agreed that several premises are required prior to formulating an
ethical question with substantial content leading to a ethical way of
dealing with bears. The logical requirement would necessitate that some
bears cause human suffering, but on the whole bears are a necessary and
essential organism in their native habitat. If the actors agree that any
treatment of bears in general must recognize that bears in general are good
for the ecosystems they live in, then the question can proceed to the level
of the substantial ethical question.

The actors must be able to ask the logical question about bears by stating
that bears are necessary to the ecosystem but that some bears are not
necessary in some situations, for instance in orchards. The logical
requirement therefore would result in a question regarding bears that
focusses on the most important feature about bears. If an actor does not
assent to the logical question formulated by a claim that bears are not
necessary for the ecosystems, then this reprensents a failure in the logical
requirement at the start since if it is agreed that bears as a whole do not
cause human suffering (like malaria for instance), then there can be no
subsequent substantial ethical question formulated that would resolve into
alternative courses of action weighed somehow by 'intuitionistic' and
'critical' thinking.

No action could proceed that would satisfy the personal preferences of the
actors if the logical requirement was not met. This seems to me to be the
basic argument that supports the theory that where the words and the logic
in the ethical question are in agreement between actors, there will be in
the answers something of substance that will resolve the ethical issue.

It thus does not matter essentially what the individual perspective, or
world view, is of the actors from a stricly logical perspective, rather it
does matter that the question is worded in a way that there is consensus as
to the logic of the question in the first place. This is why I see a
failures in the management of environmental amenities for the most part.
Often there is no basis for a resolution because the question cannot be
worked out in advance.

To take an attempt at formulating the logical question I would assert
(rather than deny):

1.    there a beneficial bears;

2.    there are problem bears; and as a result,

3.    Aught we to ask whether something needs to be done to resolve the
issue of problem bears, as well,

4.    Aught we ask whether somethings needs to be done to resolve the issue
of beneficial bears?

The substantial question then becomes:

Yes. We should do something about the two types of bears both from an (a)
intuitionalistic and (b) a critical thinking of the question about what
aught to be done about bears:

1.    Beneficial bears must be protected and conserved; and

2.    Problem bears must be managed so as to reduce human suffering.

The substantial question that is asked acknowledges that it is critical to
differentiate between the two essential alternative courses of actions. The
specific answers to what should be done must then proceed from a
scientific-cognitive and emotional-valuational understanding about the
logical form of the question. Obviously if one of the actors only chooses to
proceed on an entirely intuitionistic level, then there can be no
resolution, much as there is no resolution in the acts of the problem bears
eating apples in the unfenced, and untended orchard at the mountain cabin
when the dogs and the owner are not around.

In terms of critical thinking I have resolved the substantial requirement in
part with respect to problem bears. I first of all do not leave garbage or
food near my house. This has prevented the bears from being here most of the
time, but they still spend about two weeks eating dandelions in my yard (I
had four of them in the spring of 1999).
The deer eat my maple trees but now that there are 40 huskies nearby they
restrict their browsing to outside my property, but the howling is so loud
that I was being woken up from my slumbers for the first three months after
their arrival. I have adjusted now...

The two easiest solutions to preventing bears from eating and damaging the
apples and trees is to either cut down the trees (a basic no win solution)
or to pick them prior to the bears getting scent of the apples (this is what
I have failed to do on occassion here at my mountain retreat. The trees and
myself have suffered as a result. This year I picked them before the bears
got them). The option of an electric fence is one option that I have not
attempted, and the purchase of a bear dog is also another one. My cat runs
away from dogs so ...no win there either....I cannot have a dog.

addios

john foster





> --------------
>
> > Firstly, man creates his own values. He searches for value, and some of
> > those values are oriented in various topos (places) as sensory objects,
> and
> > as non-sensory objects. These objects define what are classified as
> natural
>
> Ray here:
> It seems to me that humans do not *create*their own values.  I do think
> that, as humans have become capability of choosing among alternative
> actions, they have been compelled to try to find what "value" means.
> Humans, having choice, are forced to confront that, in the universe, there
> seem to be values - better and worse.
> --------------
>
> I do not feel competent to comment on the rest of your interesting post.
Of
> course, I am not competent to comment on most of the posts on
environmental
> ethics.  But I try to understand and raise issues when they seem pertinent
> to me.
>
> Thanks for listening,
>
> Ray
>
> >