Shelley wrote:
>My point is that in order to address the modes of oppression which
>people with cognitive impairments confront the conception of disability
>(i.e., restrictions of activity) which is promulgated on the terms of
>the hegemonic version of the social model needs to be reconceptualized
>also. In short, I think that if 'we' (people with cognitive impairments)
>are to have our particular experiences of oppression (and
>discrimination) acknowledged and addressed, it won't suffice to change
>PRACTICE (e.g., to simply do more and better awareness training or
>advocacy.) Theoretical revision is needed. I think one way in which we
>should begin to do this is by interrogating epistemological
>positionings. I hope others on this list will suggest additional or
>alternative ways
I totally agree, Shelley! And that is partly why I find it very
interesting that _no one_ on the list has replied to my comments on the
very different epistemological bases held by folks with "acquired"
disabilities vs. those who've had disabilities from birth. Because, along
with all the other recognized differences between various disabilities and
concomitant experiences and knowledge, this seems to be another crucial
and, apparently, silent difference that cuts across various disability
"types".
Natasha
Natasha Kirsten Kraus
Assistant Professor
Department of Sociology
430 Park Hall
Box 604140
University at Buffalo-SUNY
Buffalo, NY 14260-4140
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(716)645-2417 x 457
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