>Natasha wrote:
>
>>>These [physical v. cognitive] are definitely communities that not only
need
>to work together, but frequently overlap. But the (physical and cognitive)
>disabilities rights community often wants to distance itself strongly from
the
>mental health rights movement for fear of being lumped in with those
>"crazies".<<
>
Dona M. Avery responded:
>Hi Natasha, and welcome to the list. There are many significant issues in
your
>eloquent post, but I first wanted to counter the notion that it is "fear of
>crazies" that separates phys. disabled identities from groups more concerned
>with cognitive impairments.
>If defective in physical appearance, the entity under our gaze must be
mentally
>defective as well. Such thinking underlies the impulse to raise one's
voice or
>speak slowly or use a child's vocabulary, when meeting the obviously
physically
>disabled person in any contact zone. This response to physical appearance
is
>unnerving and yes, the phys. disabled person must resent it--but they resent
>the *objectifying response* and the generalizing assumption, not the
population
>who IS actually cognitively impaired.
Actually, you make exactly my point. My post did not say that the
separation of traditional disability activism and communities was a result
of "fear of crazies" (though, of course, this has its effects, just as it
has on all populations in Western society). My post said that it was the
result of fear of being "_lumped in_ with the 'crazies'". Emphasis here is
definitely on the "lumped in". And the examples you have given are
precisely examples of being "lumped in" with folks who are either
cognitively impaired or have mental disabilities (which, by the way, seem
to be fairly different--and you have again "lumped" them together. No
discussion or definition of "cognitive impairment" on this list has come
close to including mental health disabilities. And some mental health
disabilities don't really have any "cognitive impairment" aspect, but
manifest more as a "social impairment," which "normal" folks don't know
how to deal with and then institutionalize, treat (therapeutically and
medically), separate out, isolate, etc. those who make them
"uncomfortable".) It is the response to the general public "lumping
together" the physical and cognitive disability communities and issues and
mental health disability communities and issues (all for lack of better
vocabulary, because I am not particularly happy with this vocabulary) that
I am talking about. And definitely part of that response has been to
differentiate these communities and issues by putting up definitional
boundaries of "normalcy" between them that reinforce the general public's
prior stigmatization of mental health disabilities. For instance, the
emphasis that someone in a wheelchair is "normal just like everyone else,
and should not be assumed to have mental problems." I am not saying that
this type of argument and boundary-defining occurs out of malevolence
towards or fear of people with "mental health disabilities," but rather in
response to society's treatment of both people with physical disabilities
and cognitive impairments and people with mental health disabilities. I
hope I've made my distinction clear.
Natasha
Natasha Kirsten Kraus
Assistant Professor
Department of Sociology
430 Park Hall
Box 604140
University at Buffalo-SUNY
Buffalo, NY 14260-4140
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(716)645-2417 x 457
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