> Let me start off by saying that I do not think that anyone has ever
>offered an adequate definition of art, and that I do not expect there will
>ever be one.
Quite, and this does not stop us discussing examples of it.
> My point was that supposed Wittgensteinian reasons for this
>are not good reasons, and that it is important not to be too hasty in
>discounting the possibility of definitions, since if successful they can
>serve important functions.
You've just admitted that a major term like "art" has not been adequately
defined, yet clearly there is a great deal of discussion of it, some of it
quite illuminating. Similarly writers write novels and critics criticise
them without any of them needing to give a precise definition of "novel".
> However, I *do* think that precision in terms
>is necessary to do good philosophy (or good science, history, economics,
>etc.),
But again you fail to say why and simply trade on academic habits of
thought. Providing precise definitions is probably one of the least
important parts of any intellectual activity in the humanties (however you
might want to define them) - except scholasticism.
>but that there are other ways to achieve this goal than essentialist
>definitions.
> Ted mentions that historical or functional approaches to
>definitions would
>leave out what we care about most--the evaluative component. He also says
>that there is a clear difference between natural and cultural phenomena,
>in a way that suggests that he takes the evaluative component to consist in
>this difference. I don't think this is right, but since I'm not sure
>that's what was intended, I'll leave that point aside.
Good, it wasn't - accuracy in argument IS important.
> What certainly
>seems wrong to me is the idea that there should be an evaluative component
>in a definition, such that saying definitions must fail because they do not
>have this component is like complaining that a fork doesn't cut well. A
>definition, if it is a good one, will pick out members of the defined
>class, and only members of the defined class. If a definition included an
>evaluative component, then it would pick out only members of the class
>which had a certain level of quality. This seems to be part of the problem
>with Tolstoy's attempt to define art; while he seemed to want to give us an
>idea of what art is, he really winds up giving us criteria for what *good*
>art is. But shouldn't a definition pick out *all* the members of the
>relevant class?
This omits the rather significant fact that the term "art", as opposed to
say "painting" or "writing" does imply an evaluative component - "this is
art but it is not good" does seem self-contradictory, whereas "this is a
painting and it is not good" does not.
But I then turned to "film" and argued, NOT that this is necessarily
evaluative, but that with regard to definitions of such non-technical terms
as "film":
a) they tend to be redundant since they depend on our general
understanding of how to use the terms in question.
b) they are not necessary to our discussions of films, which are rarely
based on some precise definition of "film".
c) given rapid technological change, even technical, non-evaluative
definitions are rapidly outmoded and force us to more general terms such as
"moving image" which points a) and b) apply to anyway.
>PS: I think Plato's problem with the third man is a problem of
>self-predication, not a problem of offering an essentialist definition.
>Indeed, there is some debate about whether this is really a problem for
>Plato (properly understood), or, if it is, whether it is unsurmountable.
As I recall it, the third man problem arises from Plato's attempt to use
"forms" to explain why things fall into particular categories. Thus two men
are both instances of man by virtue of their resemblance to the "form" or
essence of man. However the question then arises of what the two men and
the form have in common - another higher level form - or third man ?
Wittgenstein, avoided the problem by saying that there is no form or
essence of games which all games share, but rather sets of overlapping
similarities - and differences - just as there is no one thread running
through a rope which gives it its identity, but rather a lot of overlapping
threads, none of which run through the whole rope.
As Marx and Engels pointed out in the German Ideology, long before
Wittgenstein, some philsophical problems arise because of philosophers'
tendency to remove words from the ways in which language is actually used.
Wittegenstein emphasised just how complex and sophisticated the latter is.
We do not learn to use our native language by learning a set of precise
definitions, but by understanding the much more complex ways in which words
operate in actual language use - including, irony, sarcasm, metaphor, etc.
We use language very effectively despite not being able to give precise
definitions of the words we use. Similarly we walk downstairs without
consciously thinking about how we take each step - in fact a recipe for a
nasty fall. Intuively grasping complex relations is far more important
than pinning things down artificially with definitions - EXCEPT in the
atypical context of those sciences where precision and measurements is
possible and new technical terms necessary.
I notice that Jeff continued the philsophical discussion without feeling it
necessary to define "philosophy" - despite my half-joking conclusion.
Ted Welch, lecturer and webmaster
School of Communication, Design and Media
University of Westminster, London, UK
http://www.wmin.ac.uk/media
web designer of http://www.frontlinetv.com
European Society History Photography: http://www.wmin.ac.uk/media/ESHP
Case of sacked CNN producers: http://www.wmin.ac.uk/media/tailwind
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