Sorry to interject, but I just wanted to make a few comments.
Jim wrote:
>the point seems relatively
>>straightforward, that animals stand as "moral patients" in relation to us.
Bryan responded:
>I can accept this.
>
Jim wrote:
>>We're the ones doing the thinking about ethics, policy, management, etc.,
>>and so the only question we can ask is, "Do *our* activities benefit or
>>harm animals?" Not (theoretically inconclusive questions like), "Do they
>>have rights?" or, "Are they persons with full moral status?"
Lorin here:
It seems that the latter two questions are encumbered with a lot of issues
that are tangential to the essential point being made which is, I think,
summarized in one question: Does morality matter to animals? Or,
alternately, are animals only moral patients? Asking questions about the
"rights" of animals transgresses into the politico-legal, and asking
whether animals are "persons with full moral status" unfairly caricatures
the issue by assuming that moral status is an all-or-nothing affair.
I think the appropriate answer to the question posed is that, yes, morality
does matter to animals more than merely as an outcome of the question "Do
*our* activities benefit or harm animals?" For morality to matter to
animals does not necessitate that they be active moral agents; all it
requires is that they have non-anthropocentric moral status. There is a
distinction to be made here between moral status and moral participation.
It is possible to have moral status without being able to participate as a
moral agent, just as a stone can be a chemical composition without
understanding and being able to manipulate its chemistry. In other words,
morality need not be wholly reciprocal; moral agency is not a necessary
condition for inclusion into the category of things which have moral value.
Of course it is the case that humans are the only ones who can
substantively participate in a moral code, but this does not mean they are
therefore the authors of the source of moral value. Moral value is, to my
mind, an anthropocentric label applied to a set of non-anthropocentric
properties intrinsic to an entity. Animals are only moral patients in the
sense that they cannot be "doctors," they are not patients in the more
substantial sense that their patient status is wholly created by doctors.
Bryan responded:
>
>I still don't see why we should not ask the latter two questions. Mind you
>I have no problem asking the former question either.
Right. The questions are not mutually exclusive.
Unfortunately, the above does not even completely satisfy me, so I'd be
interested in what others have to say.
Lorin
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