Jim T. wrote...

>I hope I addressed some of your questions about my use of the Williams
>quote in an earlier email, so I won't atttempt a line by line discussion of
>your deconstruction of the quoted passage.

Yes, I'm quite the eager deconstructionist, I admit it :)  I still don't
think the quote is saying anything substantial, but I'll leave open the
possibility that I am wrong.

>Not sure I understand what's circular about it

Well here's how I read it:  Before we ask how animals should be treated, we
should first ask how they should be treated.  That may not technically be
circular reasoning but I couldn't think of a better word.  Redundant maybe.

the point seems relatively
>straightforward, that animals stand as "moral patients" in relation to us.

I can accept this.

>We're the ones doing the thinking about ethics, policy, management, etc.,
>and so the only question we can ask is, "Do *our* activities benefit or
>harm animals?"  Not (theoretically inconclusive questions like), "Do they
>have rights?" or, "Are they persons with full moral status?"

I still don't see why we should not ask the latter two questions.  Mind you
I have no problem asking the former question either.

>Well, for one thing, as autonomous [moral] agents with free will, other
>human beings can choose *not* to be on the receiving end of either the
>benefits or harms we dish out to them.

Can they?  Not if "we" don't give "them" the option to.

This, I take it, is the idea behind
>human freedom and human dignity.

Again, do we have this freedom and dignity or do we give them to each other?
I'm still searching for the fundamental difference between humans and
animals (in relation to moral consideration).

In deciding to act on other humans'
>behalf, we need to take into account *their* views of the matter if we are
>to act ethically toward them.

I agree.  If we are to act ethically toward them, we should take into
account their views.  Is this not the same as taking into their account
their best interests?  They are just verbalizing what they think their best
interests are (they may not even be aware of what is in their best
interests).  Isn't it the same with animals?  If we are to act ethically
toward them, shouldn't we take into account their best interest?

>>But in the case of human
>>>relations to animals, the analogues to such thoughts are simply correct."
>Hyden:
>>Huh?  Was that to be read "incorrect?"  If so, it makes more sense, but is
>>still baseless in his argument.
>
>Not sure here that you've read the passage correctly--the word, "correct,"
>is the correct word--"incorrect" would be incorrect.  <smile

Well, I just don't get it then.  But I'm ok with not having it.

A weak speciesism says our
>influence over nature and animals is inescapable, but that we must justify
>our actions with good reasons.

This makes sense to me.  Though I believe that it's still possible for
humans to be completely non-speciesist, if they so choose.

>that (some) hunters actually have as good a claim or better to *use*
>animals in their hunting activities, even though those activities cause the
>death and occasional mutilation of animals, than do those activists who
>romanticize animals as abstractions.

Well, just to be clear, not all animal activists view animals in the
abstract.

(My view extends, by the way, to
>other human activities with human benefits, including medical
>experimentation that involves nonhuman animal subjects.)

This one gives me a seriously creepy feeling.  I had a physiology class once
and we were learning about the functioning of the spinal chord.  There was
this little movie of experiments with domesticated cats where the scientist
had spliced the spinal chord of the cat to observe it's movement patterns.
Call me a bleeding heart, but I'd sooner die of cancer than perform such an
experiment.

I think
>most thoughtful hunters *could* give good reasons for their activities,
>even though they may not do so in actuality; whereas I am not at all sure
>that most moral vegetarians or vegans, however well-intentioned, could give
>even a minimally satisfactory account of their activities when it comes to
>either the environmental effects or the impacts on animals.

Are you saying that hunters could describe the non-trivial pleasures and
benefits that they attain from hunting, and that vegetarians could not
describe the positive effects of their eating habits, such as less energy to
produce vegetables, better health, ect?  Really I'm not sure what you were
saying but instead of just asking I thought I should at least attempt an
interpretation as I understood it.  I AM interested, however, in a
clarification, if you'd be willing.

Thanks.

Bryan H.


-----Original Message-----
From: Jim Tantillo <[log in to unmask]>
To: [log in to unmask] <[log in to unmask]>
Cc: [log in to unmask] <[log in to unmask]>
Date: Tuesday, March 23, 1999 12:07 AM
Subject: Re: Hunting [was Re: Utilitarianism [was: Britain
PushesthePanicButtononBiotech Foods]]


>Hi Bryan,
>
>I hope I addressed some of your questions about my use of the Williams
>quote in an earlier email, so I won't atttempt a line by line discussion of
>your deconstruction of the quoted passage.
>
>>Hi Jim...  I'd like to respond to your post here...
> [deleted}
>
>Williams quote:
>>Before one gets to the question of how animals should
>>>be treated, there is the fundamental point that this is the only question
>>>there can be: how they should be treated.
>>
>Hyden:
>>Huh?  Talk about circular reasoning!  wow....
>
>Not sure I understand what's circular about it--the point seems relatively
>straightforward, that animals stand as "moral patients" in relation to us.
>We're the ones doing the thinking about ethics, policy, management, etc.,
>and so the only question we can ask is, "Do *our* activities benefit or
>harm animals?"  Not (theoretically inconclusive questions like), "Do they
>have rights?" or, "Are they persons with full moral status?"
>
>Williams:
>>The choice can only be whether
>>>animals benefit from our practices or are harmed by them.
>Hyden:
>>Fine.  But why does this differ from whether other humans benefit from
"our"
>>practices or are harmed by them.  He simply does not say.
>
>Well, for one thing, as autonomous [moral] agents with free will, other
>human beings can choose *not* to be on the receiving end of either the
>benefits or harms we dish out to them.  This, I take it, is the idea behind
>human freedom and human dignity.  In deciding to act on other humans'
>behalf, we need to take into account *their* views of the matter if we are
>to act ethically toward them.
>
>[deleted]
>Williams:
>>But in the case of human
>>>relations to animals, the analogues to such thoughts are simply correct."
>Hyden:
>>Huh?  Was that to be read "incorrect?"  If so, it makes more sense, but is
>>still baseless in his argument.
>
>Not sure here that you've read the passage correctly--the word, "correct,"
>is the correct word--"incorrect" would be incorrect.  <smile>
>
>
>>Well Jim, you say here that you are speciesist to some degree (however
small
>>of a degree).  Were you not arguing that speciesism does not exist?  I'm
not
>>saying that you did, but I'm wondering exactly where you stand on this.
>>
>
>
>Fair enough.  A brief discussion of where I stand on this.  I come from a
>background that is fairly sympathetic to the animal rights/animal welfare
>perspective.   I had long assumed that animal rights (and rights of nature)
>was the inevitable extension of English Liberalism outward from humans to
>nonhumans, and that just as people had been mistaken about slavery and
>women in the past, they would someday come to realize their views about
>animals were similarly mistaken.  I helped put together one of the first,
>if not the first, courses on animal rights/animal welfare philosophy to be
>offered at Cornell, in 1991.  The course dealt with such thinkers as Singer
>and Regan, Frey, Sapontzis, Midgley, Rollin, Clark, Jamieson, and a number
>of others, including sociological/anthropological accounts from Tester,
>Nelkin, Cartmill, etc..  To make a long story short: the longer I studied
>the formal philosophical literature on the subject, the more disenchanted I
>became with it.  It became my conviction that the stuff just doesn't hold
>up, philosophically.  Thinkers whom I respect a great deal have helped me
>understand some of the problems with a universalist approach to animal
>ethics, as well as identifying similar problems with environmental ethics.
>Or maybe I'm just getting old. :-)
>
>I was arguing that speciesism is based on a false analogy to racism and
>sexism.  Significance?  Racism and sexism are bad things, whereas (here
>goes nothing) speciesism is a good thing.  (I can feel the flames coming
>on.) Or at least, speciesism is an unavoidable thing.  The discussion here
>takes on some of the flavor of the debate about anthropocentrism versus
>biocentrism.  Philosopher Bryan Norton distinguishes between "weak" and
>"strong" anthropocentrism.  Just as we are inescapably "weakly"
>anthropocentric by virtue of being human, so too I think we cannot escape
>our ("weak") speciesism, because we are human.  The ethical question is,
>then, how do we exercise our power over nature and over animals?  A
>"strong" speciesism would say that we can run roughshod over nature and
>animals and simply do whatever we want to them.  A weak speciesism says our
>influence over nature and animals is inescapable, but that we must justify
>our actions with good reasons.
>
>And to relate it back to the hunting theme of the thread: whereas I used to
>have a pretty conventional anti-hunting perspective, I have come to think
>that (some) hunters actually have as good a claim or better to *use*
>animals in their hunting activities, even though those activities cause the
>death and occasional mutilation of animals, than do those activists who
>romanticize animals as abstractions.  (My view extends, by the way, to
>other human activities with human benefits, including medical
>experimentation that involves nonhuman animal subjects.) One reason is that
>I have come to see that hunting is a very complicated human cultural
>activity, not easily reducible to the hunting=killing equation that people
>make it out to be.  It's a lot more than that, and that is why I think the
>pleasures or benefits that arise from hunting are not trivial.  I think
>most thoughtful hunters *could* give good reasons for their activities,
>even though they may not do so in actuality; whereas I am not at all sure
>that most moral vegetarians or vegans, however well-intentioned, could give
>even a minimally satisfactory account of their activities when it comes to
>either the environmental effects or the impacts on animals.
>
>Jim Tantillo
>
>





%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%