I'm not sure if I'm following you correctly, so let me just say the
following with regard to perception and sociality.  This is off the top of
my head, and I refuse to be held to anything I say.  I hope it is
sufficiently clear how what I say relates to perception.
	Clearly anything that is conceptualized is conceptualized socially, in the
sense that concepts are social constructs.  But from this it does not
follow that our concepts do not refer to or in some other way pick out
aspects of the world that are how they are quite independently of our
conceptual constructs.  In that case, it may be that part of what explains
our having certain concepts rather than others is a feature of the way the
world impinges on creatures like us, a way of impinging that is not itself
the product of the concepts we possess.  By this I mean to recognize the
(tautological) point that how the world is for creatures like us is
dependent on our being creatures like us, but leave open the possibility
that it is also dependent on how the world is, period.  How do I know that
world "is" some way, independently of how we conceive it?  I don't.  But
nor does anyone know that it is not.  The real question, then, is whether
the world works its effects on all of us, qua human beings, in certain
ways, regardless of how we conceive of the world.  I know of no reason to
suppose that it does not.
	Let's take an example.  In order to judge whether one thing is larger than
another, we require concepts related to the notion of size, comparison,
etc.  It may be that someone without these concepts could literally not
"see" that the empire state building is larger than a man.  Fair enough.
But this does not show that the empire state building is not "really"
larger than a man, at least not in any sense of "really" I (or most
contemporary realists) would care to defend.  My claim would be that the
empire state building is really bigger than a man just in case A) anyone
with properly functioning perceptual capacities and the relevant concepts
would agree that the empire state building is larger than a man; and B) the
reason for such agreement has something to do with certain properties of
the empire state building and the average man which obtain independently of
how we conceive of them.  Idealism and phenomenology rest at (A), claiming
there is is no warrant for inferences to (B).  But I say (A) itself is a
warrant for inferences to (B), given that we assume that it is possible
that the world is certain ways independent of how we conceive of it.  This
is not assuming realism; it is assuming the possibility of realism (which I
have yet to see well refuted), and claiming that given the possibility, and
certain sorts of ubiquitous intersubjective agreement, there is a case for
realism.
	We can, of course, razor (B) away, and be none the worse for wear in our
daily endeavors.  But this is to transform all physics into sociology, and
while I know that there are plenty of philosophers would say this is
exactly right and good, I'm not yet ready to concede the case.  For those
tempted to take a middle ground in pragmatism ("some concepts are more
useful than others, though no more reflective of how things *really* are
than others"), end with this question:  What makes some concepts more
useful than others?  And don't say, "Because they fulfill certain aims,
such as increase of power, and ideological hegemony" and the like, because
this just pushes the question back a step to: What allows some concepts to
fulfill these aims better than others?




At 11:59 AM 2/25/99 +0000, you wrote:
>Dear Colleagues, especially Jeff and Boris -- now time allows a quick 
>return to an earlier thread . . . 
>
>If we try to imagine a mode of perception which is asocial, we need to 
>presuppose two terms
>
>First we require an object, but not a simple one - an object that 
>presents itself _as_ object for perception, that distinguishes itself 
>through its own agency as a coherent whole from the rest of the world, 
>which occupies a bounded space disconnected, for example, from the 
>light that bathes it or the environment it inhabits and that inhabits 
>it.
>
>Then we require a subject capable of distinguishing the object as 
>object, a subject possessing that agency through which it can present 
>itself to itself as perceiving. In the phenomenological accounts I 
>know, that subject is distinct from the subject of cognition, ie from 
>the capacity for distinguishing the objecthood of the object and of 
>doing so (asocially) without recourse to memory or expectation 
>concerning the object form. The asocial subject must for example be 
>capable of perceiving a wave distinct from sea or light without 
>recourse to the cognitive process of naming.
>
>Exemplum: 'natural', asocial perception is always framed within a 
>horizon of time and space, but these are socially formed, eg in 
>establishing the perceiver-perceived or measurer-measured etc 
>relation. Such perception is then always already social. 
>
>My suggestion is that, by Ockham's razor, we avoid proliferating 
>metaphysical entities by assuming only sociality, more specifically 
>communication, which 'speaks us' and in doing so produces both 
>subjectivity and objecthood. 
>
>so -- how wrong am I ?
>
>best
>
>sean
>-- 
>Sean Cubitt
>Screen Studies
>Liverpool John Moores University
>Dean Walters Building
>St James Road
>Liverpool L1 7BR
>England
>T: 44 (0)151 231 5030
>F: 44 (0)151 231 5049
>U: http://www.livjm.ac.uk/~mccscubi/screen.html
>U2: http://www.livjm.ac.uk/mediareview (Your contributions sought)
>
>Now Available: Digital Aesthetics, Theory, Culture and Society/Sage 
>London and New York
>http://www.ucl.ac.uk/slade/digita
>
>
Jeff Dean
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