Dear Ken,
Thank you for your message.
The challenge in this area is that the concept of knowledge has implicitly taken knowledge to be an object for a very long time. What you have written about knowledge is in that tradition. As far as I can see, your writing about knowledge fits with the 'knowledge as object' picture, regardless of your recent post suggesting that somehow your use of the term 'knowledge' as an object means you are regarding it as an activity. This is belied by your phrases such as 'knowledge is embodied'. If you see design as a process, then in your way of writing, that process becomes an object - a very object-oriented view!
In contrast, I'm suggesting knowledge is better studied and theorised about in terms of the *activity* of knowing. And in studying and understanding this area of human being, I suggest the content of the knowing (the 'knowledge' in your analyses) is relatively irrelevant both in terms of the actual content and in terms of the concept of knowledge.
I digress. To get back on point:
As soon as a threesome is made of knowledge-information-data, they must be of the same type (basic epistemology, first order logic etc - and I'm assuming from your writing you are not involved in higher order logics, although this analysis, I'm using here is in effect a second-order logic analysis)
As it is generally regarded (quite reasonably) that data refers to real world objects - collections of numbers, words or whatever that could be evidence , and information also refers to objects that are typically data objects transformed into more coherent forms, then by implication, knowledge must be regarded as an object to maintain the relation. This all aligns with the use of the term 'knowledge' as a noun.
It also aligns with majority of positions taken in the prior discussions on whether it is possible to get knowledge from a book. I.e., by implication, is there a lump of knowledge objects that one can somehow put in one's head/mind that one can get from a book.
I've suggested that better theory comes from focusing on the verb form, 'knowing'.
You also point towards this path when you (I suggest mistakenly) comment that 'knowledge is embodied'. It points to the activity-based nature of knowing but still implies too much that the embodiment is like a blob of something in the head - a bit like that the idea that Dewey and many other educationalists have argued against that learning is a process of filling people's heads with knowledge (those object blobs again).
I suggest it is much more useful and gives much more depth of understanding, explanation and epistemological sense to drop focusing on 'knowledge' and shift instead to 'knowing'.
Then, it is easier to see and explore 'knowing' as an embodied activity or process.
The book question then transforms into 'Is the human activity of knowing influenced by reading books (or observing objects)?'
This is more sensible, easier to answer, and links immediately to explanations and recent research findings in a variety of fields.
I hope this helps.
BTW, I've given those references to Damasio many times on this list. His publications on his evidence, research findings and conceptual development are consistent and fill out the detail of what are in essence a small number of complex and difficult to comprehend concepts that contradict many of the norms in relation to cognition, knowledge and emotion. In case you are having difficulties and still wish to read his material, which I recommend, his Wikipedia entry is at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antonio_Damasio and the books I referred to are:
Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain, Putnam, 1994; revised Penguin edition, 2005
The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness, Harcourt, 1999
Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain, Harcourt, 2003
The articles I listed in which in which I precis Damasio for design researchers are mostly based on Descartes Error and The Feeling of What Happens. Looking for Spinoza makes the bridge between Damasio's research findings and the concepts and ideas developed by Spinoza
The Feeling of What Happens is probably the best and is conceptually tough reading in spite of it being very lucidly written and easy to read. It’s the only book in ages that I had to seriously mark up and cross-reference extensively using page markers just to keep the concepts and their relationships straight. I recommend it.
In addition.... Daniel C. Dennett wrote a good review of Descartes Error that might tempt you to read it. Its available at https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/damasio.htm
Warm regards,
Terry
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Dr Terence Love
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Director
Design Out Crime & CPTED Centre
Perth, Western Australia
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-----Original Message-----
From: [log in to unmask] [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Ken Friedman
Sent: Thursday, 26 October 2017 1:17 PM
To: PhD-Design <[log in to unmask]>
Subject: Re: Knowledge
Dear Terry,
You risk of repeating old argumentative patterns when you post a comment that shows the danger of going off half-cocked. You may think that you are writing an insightful but unpolished post. This is not so as I see it. In the rush to send off a swift reply, you failed to read carefully what I wrote. You did not respond to or disprove my comment. You did not read what I wrote carefully, nor analyze it well enough to offer a reply. In the rush to reply, you’ve put forward a hasty argument that get what I wrote wrong. One result is a confused reply.
Your key objection seems to be that I wrote: “knowledge is a property of consciousness.” You claim that this sentence entails "a false noun-verb developments.” You must show that this is so, and why. You don’t.
I wrote a process description. A process description examines aspects of phen0mena that must be considered as processes in a relational network or matrix. To say that “knowledge is a property of consciousness” is not like saying, “this battery belongs here at the base of the power transmission unit.” I did not bolt together inanimate things. I described relations among processes.
Further, I explained why this proposition doesn’t really answer the question. Data and information may be stored and treated mechanically. They may thus be defined in a fairly crisp way. Whether that definition is right or wrong, limited or extensive, a technology or a technical system may be strictly defined. In contrast, knowledge requires fluid definitions, and these definitions must always be framed in terms of the context and application.
The context and application involve the living systems that generate knowledge.
Knowledge is a property of consciousness. Information may be stored. Knowledge must be embodied. A computer may store information. Only a human being may embody knowledge. Some higher mammals clearly embody knowledge, as do some other animals. Since they do not represent their knowledge or create information, I did not consider them.
What I wrote, explicitly, it that knowledge is a process rather than a thing. We can describe the subs-systems of the knowing process as parts of the larger and smaller systems off which they are a part. In that sense, it may sound as though I am writing about things, but only if you read the sentence out of context. I was describing a process. To write: “knowledge is a property of consciousness” is something like writing: “the perfect cutting edge of sword begins to emerge after folding and hammering the steel out 300 times. This give it the right temper, and it gives the steel properties that allow it to take a strong, durable edge. It is important to quench the blade at temperature [x] for the first 50 quenches, changing the temperature of the quench to [x-1 ... x-2 ... x-3] during there last stages, down to [y] for the final quench.” It may seem that I am describing an object, but I am describing a process. The end result of this process is to produce an object perfectly fitted for a role in another process.
This does not simply describe a sword, but a rage of issues embodied in a tradition and a culture. Catharina Blomberg takes this approach in _The Heart of the Warrior. Origins and Religious Background of the Samurai System in Feudal Japan_, describing networks of culture, ethos, ethics, behavior, and artifacts that once constituted the living and difficult to describe processes of a way of life.
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Heart-Warrior-Religious-Background-1995-01-19/dp/B01FKTK8L6
https://www.amazon.com/Heart-Warrior-Origins-Religious-Background/dp/1873410131
Seen from another perspective in the system, we must describe the warriors and the traditions of the great samurai families:
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Autumn-Lightning-Education-American-Samurai/dp/1570621152
https://www.amazon.com/Autumn-Lightning-Education-American-Samurai/dp/1570621152
I do not suggest that you need attend to the intricacies of samurai culture. I do assert that you must be able to understand the nature of process descriptions, and the role they play enlarger networks of behavior, culture, and knowledge to address these kinds of problems fruitfully.
There are several giant figures in learning to describe process issues — in many cases, the work models the kinds of steps that we must take; in some cases that actually describe how to to do it.
I suggest Clifford Gertz, Ruth Benedict, George Herbert Mead, John Dewey, Martha Nussbaum, Søren Kierkegaard, and Primo Levy.
How does one make an effective descriptive claim? I’d suggest reading Helen Sword’s two books with Harvard University Press. One is titled _Sylish Academic Writing_- The other is titled _Air & Light & Time & Space. How Successful Academics Write._. If you want to use the principles of neuroscience to write better, try Steven Pinker’s _The Sense of Style. The Thinking Person’s Guide to Writing in the 21st Century._.
By now, you have noticed that I did not spend much time on your arguments. That’s because you did not state a clear argument in your post. You offered a couple of hints with the promise that if I were to read your earlier paper, I’d find the answers.
As I see it, you must make your own, full argument in the text at hand. You did not do this. You said that I was wrong and tat I must read elsewhere too learn why.
Francis asked a question. I provided the sources he requested. Then I wrote an argument, a brief one.
Then, I offered resources to support my view — and I offered the resources that would allow people to get up to speed. External sources cannot replace the author’s argument. You confuse the two, and you provided links to your own conference papers as sources. That is, you 1) fail to state the specific claims you assert in describing my view as mistaken, and 2) you do not bother to show which rebuttal appears at what point in four long papers. The lack of a clear point in the thread means that these papers don’t support a statement you have made here, on the list. The careless way you cite the papers means that we must read the papers in full by way of attempting to infer the points you should have state clearly.
Francois asked a clear question. I answered. To clarify my position I offered a short, self-contained argument. Then I provided key broad sources for multiple views in two widely cited reference works, along with several responsible scientists doing first-rate work on this issues.
Antonio Damasio is an important thinker in these fields, but you are not giving a serious account of Damasio’s ideas. To do that, you must take the time to tell us what he writes — and you must provide appropriate sources that allow us to see whether Damasio’s account is what you say it is. Otherwise, it’s like those kids on the cricket field who settle an argument by shouting, “Well my uncle saw Don Bradman play, and my uncle says I should swing like this!”
Since I’m not really sure what you wrote here, I’m not trying to reply.
I am simply restating the brief sentence that you claim “has problems epistemologically as a derivative of a false noun-verb development.” The sentence is a process description. If there are epistemological problems, or problems that “derive” from “false noun-verb development” please show the problems.
Aa I wrote, I was not making a complete argument in my response to Francois. I made a few short arguments. These were complete as far as they went, but that wasn’t very far. What I also did was to provide sources and resources for people who want to read up on the problem of knowledge.
A stack of five conference papers hosted elsewhere don’t convince me in the absence of an argument here. You don’t even bother to tell us what Antonio Damasio writes though careful cited quotes or carefully cite paraphrases. You jumble up your own precis from memory.
It is my view that one should not put together a careless and peremptory critique. If you are going to understand the nature and process of knowledge, we require care. It’s not as though the PhD-Design list will suffer if we must wait two or three days for a careful post that states what you intend. As it is, I don’t know if what you wrote is what you intended to write, but you simply wrote up other, better ideas in a clumsy way. Or, perhaps, what you wrote is what you did intend to write. If so, it really is wrong, and if it is not wrote, it is clumsy and imprecise.
This all began with a brief sentence, the statement that “knowledge is a property of consciousness.” You claim that my brief statement “has problems epistemologically as a derivative of a false noun-verb development.” From there, you wander off to a great many poorly-sourced and confusing claims.
Please start by explaining, precisely, why my brief statement “has problems epistemologically as a derivative of a false noun-verb development.”
If we are going to discuss knowledge, the topic requires us to take ourselves and each other seriously enough to give it our best effort.
Yours,
Ken
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