Friends,
Terry Love’s question does not make sense to me. Martins reasonable response asks Terry the right question: “Could you elaborate on what those 'strong reasons' are? … I am wondering whether you mean that, even if we can't know something, we should pretend that we do in order to facilitate theory?”
What do we mean when we speaks of a theory? In my view, a theory is a model of the world. Useful theories tell us something about the things we look at. They offer information on things we try to understand. Depending on the nature and level of the theories that we use, theories always involve a choice of position and views, and all theories entail theoretical presuppositions and methodological presuppositions. Since this is so, it is useful for a theory to capture the properties of the world. I’ve discussed my view of these issues in an article on theory construction (Friedman 2003). The article provides information on what a theory is and how a theory ought to work. You will find a copy in the papers section of my Academia page at URL:
https://swinburne.academia.edu/KenFriedman
The problem of any kind of theory is that no theory can map the full world without being as large as the world it maps. To create reasonably parsimonious theory, therefore, we must abstract features of the world — choosing what to leave in our maps and models while deciding what to leave out. Hal Varian (1997), professor emeritus of economics at Berkeley and chief economist at Google, discusses some of these issue in a useful article on how to build economic models.
Two very useful articles on these issues are Herbert Blumer’s (1969) discussion of the methodological perspective of symbolic interactionism, and an article by Robert Sutton and Barry Staw (1995) on what theory is not. (The real Don Norman sent me the Sutton & Staw article.)
You will find copies of these in the teaching papers section of my Academia page at URL:
https://swinburne.academia.edu/KenFriedman
They will be accesible until March 1.
Anyone interested in developing theory will find these useful. To generate theory, it is vital to state our explicit assumptions and make available the information on which we shape our models. The problem with Terry’s post is that he claims strong reasons without stating them. I’m not going to addressing the specific problem Terry brings forward because the question is not framed in a way precise enough to be useful in theory construction.
Why, precisely, “Is it better to assume as an axiom in making design theory that colour always comprises a set of fixed colours rather than assuming colour as being a continuous spectrum?"
If we were to adopt this assumption, how, precisely would we determine what colours belong in this set?
What strong reasons make these claims reasonable?
The shape of this argument is extremely weak. It starts as a question, but it’s not really a question. It’s actually a thesis. Terry opens with a question in an effort to back us into a debate. Nevertheless, Terry does not state his thesis. Neither does he offer an account of the strong reasons he claims. Terry’s post opens with a statement masquerading as a question. It neglects to account for the premises and assumptions, and then asks for thoughts and comments.
My thoughts resemble Martin’s, and my comment is that an effort to develop serious theory requires a better way of asking questions.
Martin caught the unreal aspect of this when he asked, “I am wondering whether you mean that, even if we can't know something, we should pretend that we do in order to facilitate theory?”
There are two reasonable answers to this question, and an unreasonable answer. One reasonable answer is that we can pretend to know something to facilitate theories that may be useful in a thought experiment. That’s not the case here. In this case, Terry is making the claim to strong reasons, that is, he is claiming that this proposal will help us better to understand the real world of design choices.
Another reasonable answer is that we can pretend to know something we cannot know to facilitate theories that have no meaning. Everyone knows the urban legend of the physics student (or engineering student) who gets the only A in his section by answering the question “Is hell exothermic or endothermic.” (If you don’t know it, Google it. There are many versions from gently amusing to utterly bawdy.) But the real question has no meaning. This also occurs in an intriguing and theoretically profound answer to the Scholastic question about how many angels can dance on the point of a pin. Anders Sandberg’s (2001) treatment of “Quantum Gravity Treatment of the Angel Density Problem” is, indeed, a thought experiment. It is neither meaningless nor real — what makes this imaginary paper meaningful is that Sandberg defines his assumptions explicitly. Terry doesn’t do this either.
There is a third answer to Martin’s question. It is the one answer we generally do not accept as a basis for research. That answer is, “Because I say so.” It’s not clear that Terry is simply saying we are supposed to believe in his strong reasons because he says so, but so far, that’s all the evidence we see.
If we are to take seriously a claim to theory, it is vital to state out assumptions and evidence. Any post that claims strong reasons for theory should provide the evidence on which those claims rest and state the assumptions that lead to valid theory.
Yours,
Ken
Ken Friedman, PhD, DSc (hc), FDRS | Editor-in-Chief | 设计 She Ji. The Journal of Design, Economics, and Innovation | Published by Tongji University in Cooperation with Elsevier | URL: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/she-ji-the-journal-of-design-economics-and-innovation/
Chair Professor of Design Innovation Studies | College of Design and Innovation | Tongji University | Shanghai, China ||| University Distinguished Professor | Centre for Design Innovation | Swinburne University of Technology | Melbourne, Australia |||
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References
Blumer, Herbert. 1969. Symbolic Interactionism. Perspective and Method. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., pp. 1-60.
Friedman, Ken. 2003. “Theory construction in design research: criteria, approaches, and methods.” Design Studies, 24 (2003), 507–522. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0142-694X(03)00039-5
Sandberg, Anders. 2001. “Quantum Gravity Treatment of the Angel Density Problem.” Annals of Improbable Research. URL:
http://www.improbable.com/airchives/paperair/volume7/v7i3/angels-7-3.htm
Accessed 2016 February 19.
Sutton, Robert I., and Barry M. Staw. 1995. "What Theory is Not." Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Sep.), pp. 371-384
Varian, Hal R. 1997. “How to Build and Economic Model in Your Spare Time.” The American Economist, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Fall), pp. 3-10.
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Martin Salisbury wrote:
—snip—
Could you elaborate on what those 'strong reasons' are?
When trying to get to the bottom of how many colours are distinguishable by the human eye, we tend to encounter those dreaded words, ‘experts estimate ...' followed by any anything from 100,000 to 10 million. And of course perception of colour varies from individual to individual. I am wondering whether you mean that, even if we can't know something, we should pretend that we do in order to facilitate theory?
—snip—
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Terry Love wrote:
—snip—
Is it better to assume as an axiom in making design theory that colour always comprises a set of fixed colours rather than assuming colour as being a continuous spectrum?
There seem to be strong reasons in theory and practice to make this assumption, and that it is possible calculate exactly how big the set is (i.e exactly how many different colours) for each design scenario.
The advantage in design theory and research is between fixed and known variety and 'infinite' variety.
—snip—
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