Dear Rolf,
The quote from Peirce on Napoleon offers a perfect example of why abduction is a logic of discovery and not a logic of proof. The exact quote is: "Numberless documents refer to a conqueror called Napoleon Bonaparte. Though we have not seen the man, yet we cannot explain what we have seen, namely, all these documents and monuments, without supposing that he really existed.” (quoted in Megill 2007: 130).
But these do not prove that Napoleon really existed. The set us looking. From the evidence we find, we learn a great deal more about context and likelihood, and we are likely to decide that Napoleon did, indeed, exist. The same is true of Lord Nelson, Abraham Lincoln, or Louis Pasteur.
But consider a similar statement about Batman, Sherlock Holmes, or the figure described in John's gospel as the Beloved Disciple. "Numberless documents refer to a hero called Batman. Though we have not seen the man, yet we cannot explain what we have seen, namely, all these documents and monuments, without supposing that he really existed.” “Numberless documents refer to a detective called Sherlock Holmes. Though we have not seen the man, yet we cannot explain what we have seen, namely, all these documents and monuments, without supposing that he really existed.” “Numberless documents refer to a an apostle at the Crucifixion called the Beloved Disciple. Though we have not seen the man, yet we cannot explain what we have seen, namely, all these documents and monuments, without supposing that he really existed.”
We know that Batman and Sherlock Holmes are fictional characters, but this requires contextual knowledge. There have been centuries of debate over the identity of the Beloved Disciple — as well as debates on the historical facticity of the gospels.
This demonstrates yet again why Peirce wrote about abduction as a logic of discovery, while stating that abduction alone offers no reason for certainty.
Yours,
Ken
Ken Friedman, PhD, DSc (hc), FDRS | Editor-in-Chief | 设计 She Ji. The Journal of Design, Economics, and Innovation | Published by Elsevier in Cooperation with Tongji University Press | Launching in 2015
Chair Professor of Design Innovation Studies | College of Design and Innovation | Tongji University | Shanghai, China ||| University Distinguished Professor | Centre for Design Innovation | Swinburne University of Technology | Melbourne, Australia
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References
Megill, Allan. 2007. Historical Knowledge, Historical Error: A Contemporary Guide to Practice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
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Rolf Johansson wrote:
—snip—
To my understanding abduction is only possible within a context. Taking an example of retroductive abduction from Peirce:
"Numberless of documents and monuments refer to a conqueror called Napoleon Bonaparte. Though we have not seen the man, yet we cannot explain
what we have seen, namely, all these documents and monuments, without supposing that he really existed."
We come across a surprising fact and come up with a principle which is contextual (famous people generate, or trigger the production of, certain kinds of artifacts within a certain culture in a certain period of time) and when we apply that principle, what we have seen becomes understandable - the best explanation.
Apropos different kinds of abduction it comes to my mind that Eco makes a distinction between overcoded abduction, undercoded abduction, creative abduction (When even the rule has to be invented), and meta-abduction. (See his chapter in Eco & Sebeok (eds) The sign of the three)
Deduction and induction can be applied in a context-free situation.
—snip—
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