Dear Chuck,
I fail to see contradictions in my post. It seems to me that I explained my position clearly, consistently, and without contradictions. I am reposting my post of September 28 again. To make my meaning slightly more clear, I have added a few words in brackets.
Following this post, I repost the definitions of the words “agency” and “agent” from the Oxford English Dictionary.
If you will explain the contradictions in this post, I will do my best to respond.
Yours,
Ken
--
Begin reposted message:
From: Ken Friedman <[log in to unmask]>
Subject: Re: Agents and agency
Date: 2014 Sep28 00:12:29 GMT+2
To: PhD-Design <[log in to unmask]>
Dear Chuck,
According to your post, the Oxford English Dictionary supports Terry.
To make this claim, you omit a key word from the OED definition. While you give your reason for removing the key word from a cited source, it changes the meaning of the definition.
The definition you provide for agency tends to support Klaus’s point, and mine, rather than Terry’s views. (Following this post, I am posting the definitions of the words “agency” and “agent” from the OED. Readers can decide for themselves which argument is most reasonable. If anyone wishes to study the usage exemplars, check the OED.)
The issue of agency involves motive power. That refers to the person or entity that “specifies” the specified effect in the second definition. Your post neglected the etymology of the word. And your [post] moved past the first definition: “a. A person who or thing which acts upon someone or something; one who or that which exerts power; the doer of an action. Sometimes contrasted with the patient (instrument, etc.) undergoing the action. Cf. actor n. 3a. Earliest in Alchemy: a force capable of acting upon matter, an active principle. Now chiefly in philosophical and sociological contexts.”
The power of agency is the power of an actor or principal.
The full second definition is “b. A person or thing that operates in a particular direction, or produces a specified effect; the cause of some process or change. Freq. with for, in, of. Sometimes difficult to distinguish from the means or agency by which an effect is produced: cf. sense A. 3.”
To speak of a “bleaching agent” does not mean that the bleach specifies what properties it has, nor does bleach specify that which it will bleach. In this sense, a principal or actor uses a bleaching agent for purpose that the principal or actor specifies. “Bleach” has properties that affect the world around it without regard to specifications. A “bleaching agent” uses those properties on the instructions of a principal or actor. As the OED notes, this is sometimes “difficult to distinguish from the means or agency by which an effect is produced.”
This is similar to my earlier comments stating that tools represent the agency of human creators or users.
It is true that Terry did not present his arguments particularly well, but the arguments are based on unclear concepts. The same is true of your reply. To make your point, you changed and distorted the definition you selected for the word agent.
An agent acts on behalf of a principal. The quality of agency is that quality that the principal delegates to the agent. To make your point, you removed the key issue that distinguishes the motive agency of the principal from the delegated agency of the agent.
I should state that words take on different uses in different context. Because of this, the term “agent” may sometimes be used instead of the term “principal” or “actor.”
There is an ambiguity to the term agent – but Klaus and I were not writing about “agents” – rather we were explaining why tools and artifacts do not possess “agency.”
Whether a principal or an agent has good effects or bad is a separate issue.
A principal may delegate authority to an agent for good ends. On occasion, the agent may not behave responsibly with the delegated authority. This specific issue occurs in philosophy and in social science as the “agency problem,” or the “principal-agent problem.” This does not change the fact that the principal possesses agency, and delegates this agency to the agent.
There are also examples of a principal delegating authority to an agent for evil ends. When the agent obeys the principal by doing evil, other problems arise. The core defense argument of the Nazi leaders convicted at Nuremberg was that they were obeying orders.
In both cases, agents are morally and ethically culpable for the bad they do.
In the case of a tool or object, this would not be the case. No matter the purpose for which one designs a car, a bottle of bleach, or a gun, we do not hold the agent responsible for the design or decisions of the principal. An artifact or tool may be an agent, but an artifact or tool does not possess agency.
While a principal may delegate agency to an agent, the agency or authority to act rests with the principal. The principal retains agency and authority. If the principal revokes the delegation of authority, the agent is no longer an agent.
The ways in which this may take place and the intricacies of delegation and authority are the stuff of law school debates and court cases. The basic philosophical principles remain the same.
Human beings – principals – possess agency. Tools do not. Human beings are responsible for their actions. Tools are not responsible for the uses to which people may put them.
Neither do we hold tools responsible for the intended or unintended consequences of their use. Poor specifications and unanticipated effects do not change the core philosophical issue.
Neither do natural calamities. There are specific clauses in many contracts that release contracting parties from their responsibilities when natural causes render performance impossible.
As I see it, you are confusing some of the issues that have made the conversation problematic.
It may be helpful to separate principal status from agency to understand cause and effect. This does not mean that it is possible to separate agency from the power to determine action.
Principals and actors possess agency. They delegate agency to agents. Some agents may be human. Others may not.
Because human agents possess agency of their own, they may deploy their own agency to act at variance to instructions of their principals.
Artifactual agents do not possess agency of their own. The action of artifacts may have consequences other than those intended by human principals. A car may roll downhill by itself, damaging life and property. A badly stored bottle of bleach may harm children or animals. While the artifact or substance has effects in the world, these effects do not involve agency.
Yours,
Ken
Ken Friedman, PhD, DSc (hc), FDRS | Editor-in-Chief | 设计 She Ji. The Journal of Design, Economics, and Innovation | Published by Elsevier in Cooperation with Tongji University Press | Launching in 2015
Chair Professor of Design Innovation Studies | College of Design and Innovation | Tongji University | Shanghai, China ||| University Distinguished Professor | Centre for Design Innovation | Swinburne University of Technology ||| Adjunct Professor | School of Creative Arts | James Cook University | Townsville, Australia ||| Visiting Professor | UTS Business School | University of Technology Sydney University | Sydney, Australia
Email [log in to unmask] | Academia http://swinburne.academia.edu/KenFriedman | D&I http://tjdi.tongji.edu.cn
Telephone: International +46 480 51514 — In Sweden (0) 480 51514 — iPhone: International +46 727 003 218 — In Sweden (0) 727 003 218
—
Chuck Burnette wrote:
—snip—
Although Terry could have presented his arguments better, I think he got a bum wrap from Klaus and Ken, especially Ken who likes to chastise those who don’t follow his model of scholarship and discussion.
Both Ks seem to speak of human agency as the only agency worth thinking about overlooking that the words “human” and “agency” distinguish two aspects to what they are saying.
Happily The Oxford on line dictionary sets us straight with its second definition of agent:
“Agent: A person or thing that takes an active role or produces a specified effect,” giving “bleaching agent” as an example.
I don’t think the word “specified” is needed in this definition although Terry has argued that it is what designers do. In my view the effect doesn’t always need to be specified (an indication of intentional human agency) but may just happen due to the properties and circumstances of the thing, however created. Naturally toxic things come to mind. We designers like to believe that everything we do is a service to humankind, an agency we aspire to provide. But our efforts sometimes have unanticipated effects. It is also sometimes helpful to separate “human” from “agency” in order to understand cause and effect in the things we manipulate and transform.
—snip—
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