Hi Chuck,
You seem to be not getting the core part of the argument. Perhaps I'm not
being clear enough. Jihan understands it without problem. I'll try again.
There are two main positions:
1. Cognitive theory that assumes the individual self (with all its agency,
decision making, responsibility etc) is the sense of self that we
subjectively feel as 'I' in our minds. It is the 'I' that appears to us to
be the whole of ourself when we are thinking or self-consciously feeling our
emotions. Most theories of cognition and psychology operate from this
assumption. From this point of view, the language refers and focuses only on
the person as seen from within that person. An example fo this (using your
quote) is "When they look out at the world and think, 'What should I do
now?' they see dozens of choices but lack immediate internal feelings of
like and dislike. They must examine the pros and cons of every choice with
their reasoning but in the absence of feeling they see little reason to pick
one over the other.". This kind of focus is exemplified in any theory of
human action that is interested in 'Intentional Thought'. The above
'thought-centred position on self is assumed in your explanation of the
role of feelings on intentional thought. Neurological findings from
cognitive-neuroscience was originally interpreted from this perspective.
Increasingly the literature is moving towards the interpretation of evidence
in 2. below. Damasio's work in the 1990s can be seen as part of that 'self
as subjective experience and thought' tradition in which the new direction
of the position in 2.
2. Human activity can also be viewed ethologically. We are animals. The
neurological explanation of human activity appears to fit better with an
explanation of human activity that centres on the detail of the internal
processes of the human organism in which thought is a secondary phenomena
along with the human subjective sense of self. From this perspective, humans
respond to their situations and all of this is dictated almost completely
by processes other than thought and the mind. More, this process also
dictates the thoughts that are thunked, the feelings that are felt, and the
decisions that are apparently made by the subjectively perceives self. From
this point of view, the self-perception that we have an individual self as
we perceive it in thoughts and feelings, and that we have decision making
agency can best be viewed as an illusion. The decisions happen, the
activities occur, the interactions with the world occur. It is the body
activities independent of thought that undertake them and in addition run
the mental film show that we call sense of self and feeling. These
developments in theory are occurring over a broad spectrum starting with
Lorenz' /Darwin's fixed action patterns and following to more recent
developments in evolutionary biology and evolutionary epistemology. All of
these are seen to align with the shift in reinterpreting the concept of
'executive function' to the point where it no longer exists in that sense,
and instead is a 'response from the whole body to external events -
independent of cognition. An example is Banich's Cascade of control theory
(e.g.
http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/faculty/caa/Classes/Readings/BanichExecFun
c09.pdf) . At this stage, Banich is simply hanging onto the term - it no
longer means executive function but he hasn't got to the point of realising
that what he is writing means there is no sense of agency of the self that
the idea of executive function depends.
From this second position on interpreting neuro-science, there is no
homunculus in any form, including the executive function. There is no need.
For example, do trees or roses need an executive function to interact with
the world?
Design theorists and researchers have struggled in this area because of an
assumption that executive function is needed in some form. We have the
power to mentally model and perceive, and accumulate perceptions. These
provide input to human bodies responses to the world. To date, these
behviours have been interpreted via a world view (position 1.) that has used
'subjective sense of self' as the starting point for explanation and theory.
Shifting that starting point to the 'whole body responding to its
environment' (position 2.) reveals different forms of explanation about
those areas that designers and design theoriest s struggle (creativity,
intuition, interaction with objects, usability etc etc). My observation is
this second approach offers better explanations and better design theories.
*** More, it (position 2.) offers a theoretically definitive causal path
between design research and design theories for outcomes that does not
appear to be available to position 1. (or rather, it appears no one has
found one yet)
Years ago doing some exploration of how many parallel trains of thought
could be perceived (about 12), a question that became obvious was 'How were
these parallel thoughts being devised and chosen?' Something was doing them
and it wasn't happening 'in thought' . Another set of tests was around
undecided movement e.g gibberish, spontaneous dance, improv, spontaneous
jazz, martial arts responses etc. Another set was around whether action
stops if thinking stops. One finding was that sense of self disappears if
thinking stops. The conclusion of all these experiments align with theory
outcomes from ethology , evolutionary cognition, evolutionary biology and
evolutionary epistemology.
An example of how this works is in an earlier exchange between Ken and
myself. My body has a relatively automatic response to critically explore
and remake theory models to fit evidence. It did so responding to Ken's
statements about neuroscience and Project UMA. Ken's body's response was to
be grumpy and criticise my ' self in thought'. Thinking, Ken knows I did
some pretty full time exploration of the application of neuro-science to
theories of design cognition for 10 years or so and he knows that I publish
only a small amount of what I get involved in. An obvious response from
Ken to me might have been to ask whether I felt what I was seeing would be a
problem for Project UMA. Ken's body though triggered a personal and
emotional critical attack. Which is running the show? The body or the mind?
Best wishes,
Terry
==
Dr Terence Love
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+61 (0)4 3497 5848
==
-----Original Message-----
From: PhD-Design - This list is for discussion of PhD studies and related
research in Design [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Charles
Burnette
Sent: Thursday, 29 November 2012 1:00 AM
To: Dr Terence Love
Subject: Re: The Love-Friedman Conversation
Well, I can't resist this one!
On Nov 26, 2012, at 7:32 PM, Terence Love wrote:
> One of the essential differences that new findings of neuroscience
> bring is there is no need for an executive function in explaining
> phenomena or human action, thought and feelings.
>
> The idea that an executive function is needed is a throwback to the
> subjectivist view of phenomenology based on the reification of the
> idea there is a 'me' that is doing the looking. Ditto the idea of
> looking through the window to see if one is there.
Terry,
You need to cite the neuroscience you refer to, or, at least, argue your
opinion more convincingly. An executive function (I call it Intentional
Thought) exists in our understanding of mind as soon as we acknowledge that
the brain/mind makes decisions as it processes neurally coded information
(references, organizes, resolves, compresses, forgets, defers, etc.) The
"self" is no homonucleus doing this decision making, it is the brain doing
what it does. In my view "self" is a person focused accumulation of
interpreted experience in that person's memory. "Self" knowledge is applied
(through Reflective thought) to "subjectively" interpret experienced
phenomena. It also informs that nasty old executive function, intentional
thought, about preferences, habits of mind and any other cumulative
expressions of self thought relevant to the focus and conduct of thought.
Interpretation is subjective, phenomena are actually experienced (unless
just talked about or recalled subjectively) Even "objective" measurements of
phenomena are subjectively interpreted. That is why scientists and engineers
try so hard to assure replication of outcomes.
If you continue to believe that no such a thing as executive function is
needed to explain" human action, thought and feelings" why not chew on this:
Although rational thought remains possible after damage to the prefrontal
cortex where feelings are processed, people who suffer such damage find
themselves unable to set goals and make the decisions that characterize
intentional thought. "When they look out at the world and think, 'What
should I do now?' they see dozens of choices but lack immediate internal
feelings of like and dislike. They must examine the pros and cons of every
choice with their reasoning but in the absence of feeling they see little
reason to pick one over the other." Haidt, Jonathan 2006: The Happiness
Hypothesis, New York, Basic Books p12 Rational thought isn't the only
executive function. Feelings about what to think or do are essential to
Intentional thought, the executive mode that directs and manages purposeful
thought regarding a focal situation.
Or so I believe,
Chuck
Charles Burnette, PhD
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