Ah, the 'what is a theory' question!
Most of us use this word in different and not altogether consistent ways. I try to get my kids to say 'hypothesis' rather than 'theory' when they mean 'prediction to be tested' - but modern science teaching, even at university, seems to conflate the two. I suspect the biggest battle realist review has to fight on 'theory' is the one with the objectivists ["positivists"] who say theory when they mean hypothesis. I know there's lots of nuanced debate to be had about "what is a [realist] theory", but we shouldn't lose sight of that big space over there where the Cochranites are coming from.
Another point for discussion. Mary Dixon-Woods takes issue with the realist approach for confusing theory-building with theory-testing. She argues passionately on this front but I can never seem to follow the logic. But as I understand it, she's articulating a widely-held philosophical challenge to realism. Can anyone explain the challenge and the counter-argument?
Trisha Greenhalgh
Professor of Primary Health Care and Director, Healthcare Innovation and Policy Unit
Centre for Health Sciences
Barts and The London School of Medicine and Dentistry
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-----Original Message-----
From: Realist and Meta-narrative Evidence Synthesis: Evolving Standards [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Geoff Wong
Sent: 18 August 2011 05:16
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: Interim summary - Theories local....
A good point... to avoid any confusion that comes from simplification :-) ....
I would agree a mechansims is a form of theory. I did not say it wasn't, though I accept that my posting by implication may have suggested so. (More interesting is the question of whether or not all mechanisms are theories??)
If we define a theory as "... an attempt to organize the facts – some ‘proven’, some more conjectural – within a domain of inquiry into a structurally coherent system.”
[Klee R. Introduction to the philosophy of science. Cutting nature at its seams. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. It's only an example of a definition that I like as it is simple and easy to remember] .... then a mechanism is a theory and it would be surprising it is not as in explaining 'how' an outcome is generated there is a degree of overlap with 'why'.
Perhaps a 'better' explanation of what I was trying to say is that you can't always just stop in a RS when you have 'found' a mechanism. More 'work' is often needed - is it reasonable to call this more theory? For example, feeling safe may be a mechanism, but whether or not is is triggered will depend on context and also needs to be linked to the outcome of interest. An example of the importance of having 'more' theory where feeling safe acts may be found in Jackson et al.'s review on Moving to opportunity (MTO) (attached). In brief summary (that does this review little justice) for this programme (MTO) the refinement needed was to specify this feeling safe mechanism in more detail. One finding was that moving to a 'better' new neighbourhood was a more positive experience for females (vs. males) as the former felt physically safer. (Which nicely ties in with Gill's comments that CMOs are also theories ...)
Geoff
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