Keith,
Just a last quick one on this (which has been very satisfying): One of the reasons Lisa and I work in the ethnography of communication as a grounding for our policy design work is that it allows us to rapidly, and empirically, come to understand what some have called "persuadables" in a given discourse. I haven't read Don's work on affordances, but from the way we're talking, I suspect there is a strong resonance there. So please send me a reference (I know Don might be lurking out there on this forum too, so please do comment).
Overstepping here with some presumptions, but I'll bet that one can persuade if there is an affordance in place (metaphorically speaking, as "place" makes no real sense in discourse). Gerry Philipsen, U.Washington and the founder of speech code theory, is now working on the issue of "discursive force." I'll bet that's right on the money too.
Back to my lecture now on "reducing cultural barriers to maritime security." Which, believe it or not, really is a design problem.
d.
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On Friday, April 1, 2011 at 11:31 AM, Keith Russell wrote:
> Dear Derek,
>
> yep, I got that far (enthymeme as a "syllogism of a type" rather than "a type of syllogism) and I like your illustrations - especially the shocked democrat.
>
> I can see Zeno smiling, in his perverse way - the paradox is self-evident to all but those who are fooled by the adequacy of the first presentation of a case. That is, one case, of necessity, implies another case whereas one proof, if indeed it is a proof, is adequate. So, the burden of an argument is persuasive "proof" or exhaustive illumination.
>
> I also use the extended uses of enthymeme that have found their way into advertising and persuasive communication. That is, if I can call upon the ideas, images etc. that are already in a customer/reader's mind, then I can have them make my argument as if it were their idea and as a proof.
>
> Of course there can be good uses of the things in the mind of users. If users see handles as things to turn, or push, or pull etc. then we can use these understandings in their mind as proof of Donald Norman's kind of affordances. And Klaus Krippendorff's semiotics.
>
> cheers
>
> keith
>
>
> > > > Derek Miller <[log in to unmask]> 01/04/11 8:07 PM >>>
> Keith,
>
> My three years of classical Greek in high school is of no use me to other than reading street signs aloud in Crete. But the reason we need to rely on people like Burnyeat is that he does read Greek, and actually, his argument revolves around a mistranslation (he explains), and offers the new translation of enthymeme as a "syllogism of a type" rather than "a type of syllogism."
>
> Again, no need to go into it now, but the reason this should be of interest to the wider forum is that Aristotle is wondering why we should bother listening "to the second speaker." Zeno boldly said (I'm paraphrasing) that the first guy either made his case or he didn't. So there's no need to listen to a counter argument.
>
> Aristotle found this unconvincing and most of modern democrats would find it sort of shocking. So he was wondering, why SHOULD we listen to another argument?
>
> What kinds of arguments — worthy of our serious consideration — can come from anything other an a definitive case? And so ethymemic argumentation (but only since Burnyeat!) helps us understand the kind of arguments we make every day, and I think are the kinds of cases we make in design.
>
> It seems to me that there is a connection to be made between enthymemes and pragmatic acts in design. That is, "this is convincing, and this is productive" even if not "scientific" and even if not perfect.
>
> So while we're back to Aristotle here, I think we're still on the same topic about generating design theory for productive and responsible action.
>
> d.
>
> _________________
> Dr. Derek B. Miller
> Director
>
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