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FILM-PHILOSOPHY  October 2010

FILM-PHILOSOPHY October 2010

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Subject:

Re: Philosophical query to Bill & Co.

From:

John Matturri <[log in to unmask]>

Reply-To:

Film-Philosophy <[log in to unmask]>

Date:

Tue, 19 Oct 2010 22:09:34 -0400

Content-Type:

text/plain

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text/plain (887 lines)

  The hard problem is hard not because it is unlike the many other hard 
problems in science but because the whole notion of subjective awareness 
does not seem to fit into any established category of objective physical 
science. It is like the 'queerness' (uh-oh. . .) that John Mackie uses 
to argue for ethical anti-realism: goodness, as such, would seem to be 
unlike any other property accepted by science. Anti-realism is possible 
about ethics but not with consciousness; Descartes was wrong about many 
thing, I would suspect including substantial dualism, but I don't see 
how one could deny that we have special first-person access to _aspects 
of_ our mental like and that consciousness is not a word for what we do 
not know but for something with know with special intimacy. If 
physicalism is correct this is part of the data that needs to be 
explained and current science has no inkling of how to explain it. It 
isn't philosophers of consciousness that intrude on science but 
consciousness itself. There may be good reason to lay this aside this 
problem as intractable for the time being but our picture of the world 
would be incomplete without showing how subjective awareness of this 
sort is possible.

But certainly you are right that science has shifted in the past to 
accommodate phenomena that previously seemed to be out of its realm and 
that could happen again in ways we cannot currently understand. On the 
other hand, it could also be possible that we will run against an 
epistemic bound in this area. To assume that science can provide 
knowledge about everything may be overly optimistic. It is possible that 
physicalism is true but that we have not access to an understanding of 
how consciousness supervenes on physical properties. No way of knowing 
unless we plow forward, trying to come to terms with consciousness both 
experimentally and conceptually; without the latter analysis you would 
not know exactly what you are trying to explain.

If you think that philosophy is easier to read than biology and less 
boring than biology you may be reading a bit too much Searle. . .

j

On 10/19/10 9:03 PM, bill harris wrote:
> --_341ab46a-be72-498f-84e4-e6a4eb0468ec_
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
>
>
> Hi John=2C and thanks for your reply.
> =20
> Chalmers labeled his query "The Hard Problem" because his experience as a s=
> tudent in neuro-sci
> revealed a set of problems that his discipline could not answer. Whereas 's=
> oft problems' were solvable in theory in terms of understood properties=2C =
> the hards=2C by definition were not. hence=2C 'property dualism'=2C but wit=
> h a twist:
> =20
> Both he and McGinn developed the idea that these 'hards' were inherantly un=
> solvable. Mcginn's labeling of this was called 'mysterianism'. The epistemo=
> logical blind spot=2C so to speak=2C is what we're hard-wired not to see.
> =20
> I disagree=3B yet with the proviso=2C of course=2C that these two aren't tr=
> ying to bootlleg Heisenberg into the discussion=2C at which point I might b=
> ecome interested. Otherwise=2C I'm afraid what we have is The Book of Job r=
> edux=3B my answer to which would be that I was right all along in preferrin=
> g to read neuro-sci rather than indulging in The Great Consciousness Debate=
> .
> =20
> In short=2C I believe that Dennett is right. All of this is one=2C big defl=
> ationary exercise=2C and consciousness is just a fancy word for what we don=
> 't know. This is why i like Rorty=2C too.
> =20
> My personal pov is that=2C although I love philosophy=2C the consciousness =
> thing rather obnoxiously intrudes upon the conceptual space of an establish=
> ed science. It's simply foolish for philosophers to inform biology that 'ce=
> rtain' problems cannot be solved=3B or either incredably pompous to add=2C =
> 'by the criterion we philosophers set in terms of our own intellectual need=
> s'.
> =20
> Theories that insist that we'll never know exist to keep the subject alive =
> within Philosophy departments so that philosophers might remain employed by=
>   provoking nineteen years olds who would find the Biology 'too hard' and bo=
> ring' in equal measure. 'We'll never know' is a great excuse for not lookin=
> g.
> =20
> Indeed=2C Searle's article claimed that he wasn't a property dualist. Yet n=
> o where in the article does he offer up a working definition of 'property'.=
>   I claim that he is.
> =20
> Now to return to Chalmers=2C I agree that all hard problems in science are =
> defined as those in which new properties remain to be discovered. Therefore=
> =2C I believe that hard and soft adequately define a duality of research st=
> rategies=2C Chalmers' extreme pessimism not withstanding. Perhaps some of y=
> ou might remember Kuhn's notion of 'paradigm' in this regard.
> =20
> 'Property dualism' seems to adequately serve as an umbrella-term for the pr=
> esent state of biological state of affairs. What we don't know about brainw=
> ork refers to an undiscovered property or two=2C for which Nobel Prizes eag=
> erly await.=20
> =20
> To say then=2C  like Searle=2C that 'in the end it's all material' is to be=
> labor what we've assumed all along since the days of Aristotle. Might I the=
> refore suggest that 'materialism' when employed in this sense is as deflati=
> onary as that used by Engels and Lenin?
> =20
> In short=2C scientists enjoy going with a certain=2C distinct term that sum=
> s up how they believe that things are=2C and where they want to go. For exa=
> mple=2C "The Copenhagen solution". In this sense=2C neurosci status is "pro=
> perty-dualistic"=2C whether the philosophers like it or not.
>
> =20
> =20
> =20
> =20
>> Date: Mon=2C 18 Oct 2010 14:02:31 -0400
>> From: [log in to unmask]
>> Subject: Re: Philosophical query to Bill&  Co.
>> To: [log in to unmask]
>> =20
>> Your proposal=2C like most=2C doesn't address the hard problem=2C the=20
>> subjective 'likeness' of consciousness. That what makes the problem=20
>> intractable enough so that it constitutes a problem for physicalists and=
> =20
>> which led McGinn to make his proposal. Faced with this sort explanation=20
>> you can always ask "But is it conscious". Subjective experiencing just=20
>> does not seem to coalesce with the objectivity of physical laws in any=20
>> way that we can experience. We might have a perfect account of behavior=20
>> that absolutely supervenes on physical laws and yet leaves consciousness=
> =20
>> dangling as a non-causal epiphenomenon. I see no reason to think that we=
> =20
>> are not epistemically bounded. On the other hand=2C the assumption of=20
>> physicalism has been so productive in getting rid of mysteries that it=20
>> is too soon to throw up one's hands as McGinn does.
>> =20
>> Don't see much of a connection between consciousness and religion=2C asid=
> e=20
>> from the fact that some religions talk about consciousness in a sense=20
>> that probably isn't the same as that used in contemporary philosophy.
>> =20
>> By what notion of necessary could physicalism be considered as necessary=
> =20
>> truth. A dualist world doesn't seem to be contradictory so it can't be a=
> =20
>> logical necessity. To treat it as a nomological necessity would beg the=20
>> question as the dualist is precisely claiming that there are things that=
> =20
>> do not obey physical laws.
>> =20
>> Can't saddle McGinn with the phrase epistemological blindspot=2C though i=
> t=20
>> seems to fit. More or less appropriated by me out of Roy Sorenson's=20
>> notion of logical blindspots. Then again=2C to be a bit pedantic=2C you=20
>> might not saddle Searle with property dualism which he explicitly denies=
> =20
>> in an article called=2C um=2C "Why I am not a Property Dualist."
>> =20
>> j
>> =20
>> =20
>> =20
>> =20
>> =20
>> On 10/18/10 12:44 PM=2C bill harris wrote:
>>> --_1c60c3d9-9ab6-44e2-a553-71db6da24463_
>>> Content-Type: text/plain=3B charset=3D"iso-8859-1"
>>> Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
>>>
>>>
>>> Hi John=3D2C
>>> =3D20
>>> I disagree with McGinn=3D2C and agree with Davidson that physicalism is=
>   a nec=3D
>>> essary truth.=3D20
>>> =3D20
>>> I also believe that Dennett's explanations are rather poor=3D2C thereby=
>   expos=3D
>>> ing himself to Mcginn's rhetorical flourish=3D2C "the epistemological b=
> lindsp=3D
>>> ot". After all=3D2C who among us doesn't understand that Philosophy is =
> an ag=3D
>>> on of the mind?=3D20
>>> =3D20
>>> I like Searle's 'property dualism' because it permits us to discuss QM =
> as a=3D
>>> physical process=3D3B the 'dual'=3D2C of course=3D2C referring to the f=
> act that =3D
>>> photons follow their own set of rules. So might the brain operate like =
> sort=3D
>>> of a Josephson Junction?
>>> =3D20
>>> Otherwise=3D2C to speak of 'consciousness' seems to be nothing more tha=
> n a re=3D
>>> ligious hangover. Or worse=3D2C it's a post -Rorty panic attack that's =
> meant =3D
>>> to save an entire field of study from the philosophical wastebin. 'Sort=
>   of =3D
>>> like the Rennaissance art historian who still insists that Michelangelo=
>   int=3D
>>> entionally used smudgy=3D2C smokey stuff in The Sistine. After all=3D2C=
>   reality=3D
>>> must conform to ideas consistent with those held dear within the profes=
> sio=3D
>>> n=3D2C yes?
>>> =3D20
>>> In any case=3D2C a phycalist explanation for consciousness might go som=
> ething=3D
>>> like this:
>>> The brain fires off electrical impulses that can easily be measured in =
> cycl=3D
>>> es/sec. These vary from place to place=3D2C by the way. Physical functi=
> on=3D2C =3D
>>> then=3D2C comes in intervals=3D2C-- much as film is made of discreet im=
> ages lia=3D
>>> soned together to be perceived as an illusory stream.
>>> =3D20
>>> Therefore=3D2C the brain gizmo that's responsible for outputting a cons=
> istent=3D
>>> flow of 'thought' might be said to be the consciousness-center...
>>> =3D20
>>> BH=3D20
>>>
>>> =3D20
>>> =3D20
>>> =3D20
>>>> Date: Mon=3D2C 18 Oct 2010 09:53:09 -0400
>>>> From: [log in to unmask]
>>>> Subject: Re: Philosophical query to Bill&  Co.
>>>> To: [log in to unmask]
>>>> =3D20
>>>> How to resolve the hard problem of consciousness given the assumption=
> =3D20
>>>> of physicalism remains an issue. There are those=3D2C like Colin McGin=
> n=3D2C =3D
>>> who=3D20
>>>> have argued that there is no actual duality but that we may in an=3D20
>>>> epistemic blindspot that does not allow us to understand the connectio=
> n=3D20
>>>> between consciousness and the physicalist world. Once saw Dennett give=
>   a=3D
>>> =3D20
>>>> lecture called something like "What it is Like to be a Bat=3D2C" claim=
> ing=3D20
>>>> resolution=3D2C on Thomas Nagel's home turf and was interested in how=
> =3D20
>>>> certain that almost everyone I spoke to seemed to think one or the oth=
> er=3D
>>> =3D20
>>>> scored a knockout but there was a strong lack of agreement about which=
> =3D20
>>>> was knocked out. For what it's worth=3D2C I don't see it as being reso=
> lved=3D
>>> =3D20
>>>> soon but my bet is physicalism based on its track record is resolving=
> =3D20
>>>> past conundrums. (Admittedly=3D2C haven't kept up with this stuff for =
> the=3D20
>>>> past decade or so. . .)
>>>> =3D20
>>>> j
>>>> =3D20
>>>> On 10/18/10 5:03 AM=3D2C Henry M. Taylor wrote:
>>>>> Has the Cartesian mind-body duality ever been resolved by philosophy?=
>   O=3D
>>> r =3D3D
>>>>> brain research=3D2C etc. ? I'm aware that this is a particularly occi=
> dent=3D
>>> al =3D3D
>>>>> question=3D2C as Eastern philosophies apparently know no such split .=
> ..
>>>>> Thanks for your thoughts!
>>>>>
>>>>> H=3D3D
>>>>>
>>>>> *
>>>>> *
>>>>> Film-Philosophy
>>>>> After hitting 'reply' please always delete the text of the message yo=
> u =3D
>>> are replying to
>>>>> To leave=3D2C send the message: leave film-philosophy to: jiscmail@ji=
> scma=3D
>>> il.ac.uk
>>>>> Or visit: http://www.jiscmail.ac.uk/lists/film-philosophy.html
>>>>> For technical help email: [log in to unmask] not the salon
>>>>> *
>>>>> Film-Philosophy online: http://www.film-philosophy.com
>>>>> Contact: [log in to unmask]
>>>>> **
>>>>>
>>>> =3D20
>>>> *
>>>> *
>>>> Film-Philosophy
>>>> After hitting 'reply' please always delete the text of the message you=
>   ar=3D
>>> e replying to
>>>> To leave=3D2C send the message: leave film-philosophy to: jiscmail@jis=
> cmail=3D
>>> .ac.uk
>>>> Or visit: http://www.jiscmail.ac.uk/lists/film-philosophy.html
>>>> For technical help email: [log in to unmask] not the salon
>>>> *
>>>> Film-Philosophy online: http://www.film-philosophy.com
>>>> Contact: [log in to unmask]
>>>> **
>>> =3D
>>>
>>> *
>>> *
>>> Film-Philosophy
>>> After hitting 'reply' please always delete the text of the message you =
> are replying to
>>> To leave=2C send the message: leave film-philosophy to: jiscmail@jiscma=
> il.ac.uk
>>> Or visit: http://www.jiscmail.ac.uk/lists/film-philosophy.html
>>> For technical help email: [log in to unmask] not the salon
>>> *
>>> Film-Philosophy online: http://www.film-philosophy.com
>>> Contact: [log in to unmask]
>>> **
>>>
>>> --_1c60c3d9-9ab6-44e2-a553-71db6da24463_
>>> Content-Type: text/html=3B charset=3D"iso-8859-1"
>>> Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
>>>
>>> <html>
>>> <head>
>>> <style><!--
>>> .hmmessage P
>>> {
>>> margin:0px=3D3B
>>> padding:0px
>>> }
>>> body.hmmessage
>>> {
>>> font-size: 10pt=3D3B
>>> font-family:Tahoma
>>> }
>>> --></style>
>>> </head>
>>> <body class=3D3D'hmmessage'>
>>> Hi John=3D2C<BR>
>>> &nbsp=3D3B<BR>
>>> I disagree with McGinn=3D2C and agree with Davidson that physicalism is=
>   a nec=3D
>>> essary truth.<BR>
>>> &nbsp=3D3B<BR>
>>> I also believe that Dennett's explanations are rather poor=3D2C thereby=
>   expos=3D
>>> ing himself to Mcginn's rhetorical flourish=3D2C "the epistemological b=
> lindsp=3D
>>> ot". After all=3D2C who among us doesn't understand that&nbsp=3D3B Phil=
> osophy i=3D
>>> s an agon of the mind?<BR>
>>> &nbsp=3D3B<BR>
>>> I&nbsp=3D3Blike Searle's 'property dualism' because it permits us to di=
> scuss =3D
>>> QM as a physical process=3D3B the 'dual'=3D2C of course=3D2C referring =
> to the fac=3D
>>> t that photons follow their own set of rules. So might the&nbsp=3D3Bbra=
> in ope=3D
>>> rate like sort of a Josephson Junction?<BR>
>>> &nbsp=3D3B<BR>
>>> Otherwise=3D2C&nbsp=3D3Bto speak of 'consciousness' seems to be nothing=
>   more th=3D
>>> an a religious hangover. Or worse=3D2C it's a post -Rorty panic attack =
> that's=3D
>>> meant to save an entire field of study from the philosophical wastebin.=
>   'S=3D
>>> ort of like the Rennaissance art historian&nbsp=3D3Bwho&nbsp=3D3Bstill =
> insists =3D
>>> that Michelangelo intentionally used smudgy=3D2C smokey stuff in The Si=
> stine.=3D
>>> After all=3D2C reality<U>must</U>conform to ideas consistent with those=
>   he=3D
>>> ld dear within the profession=3D2C yes?<BR>
>>> &nbsp=3D3B<BR>
>>> In any case=3D2C a phycalist explanation for consciousness might go som=
> ething=3D
>>> like this:<BR>
>>> The brain fires off electrical impulses that can easily be measured in =
> cycl=3D
>>> es/sec. These vary from place to place=3D2C by the way. Physical functi=
> on=3D2C =3D
>>> then=3D2C comes in intervals=3D2C-- much as film is made of discreet im=
> ages lia=3D
>>> soned together to be perceived as an illusory stream.<BR>
>>> &nbsp=3D3B<BR>
>>> Therefore=3D2C the brain gizmo that's responsible for outputting a cons=
> istent=3D
>>> flow of 'thought' might be said to be the consciousness-center...<BR>
>>> &nbsp=3D3B<BR>
>>> BH&nbsp=3D3B<BR>
>>>
>>> &nbsp=3D3B<BR>
>>> &nbsp=3D3B<BR>
>>> &nbsp=3D3B<BR>
>>> &gt=3D3B Date: Mon=3D2C 18 Oct 2010 09:53:09 -0400<BR>&gt=3D3B From: jm=
> atturr@EAR=3D
>>> THLINK.NET<BR>&gt=3D3B Subject: Re: Philosophical query to Bill&amp=3D3=
> B Co.<B=3D
>>> R>&gt=3D3B To: [log in to unmask]<BR>&gt=3D3B<BR>&gt=3D3B H=
> ow to res=3D
>>> olve the hard problem of consciousness given the assumption<BR>&gt=3D3B=
>   of p=3D
>>> hysicalism remains an issue. There are those=3D2C like Colin McGinn=3D2=
> C who<B=3D
>>> R>&gt=3D3B have argued that there is no actual duality but that we may =
> in an =3D
>>> <BR>&gt=3D3B epistemic blindspot that does not allow us to understand t=
> he con=3D
>>> nection<BR>&gt=3D3B between consciousness and the physicalist world. On=
> ce sa=3D
>>> w Dennett give a<BR>&gt=3D3B lecture called something like "What it is =
> Like =3D
>>> to be a Bat=3D2C" claiming<BR>&gt=3D3B resolution=3D2C on Thomas Nagel'=
> s home tu=3D
>>> rf and was interested in how<BR>&gt=3D3B certain that almost everyone I=
>   spok=3D
>>> e to seemed to think one or the other<BR>&gt=3D3B scored a knockout but=
>   ther=3D
>>> e was a strong lack of agreement about which<BR>&gt=3D3B was knocked ou=
> t. Fo=3D
>>> r what it's worth=3D2C I don't see it as being resolved<BR>&gt=3D3B soo=
> n but m=3D
>>> y bet is physicalism based on its track record is resolving<BR>&gt=3D3B=
>   past=3D
>>> conundrums. (Admittedly=3D2C haven't kept up with this stuff for the<BR=
>> &gt=3D
>>> =3D3B past decade or so. . .)<BR>&gt=3D3B<BR>&gt=3D3B j<BR>&gt=3D3B<BR>=
> &gt=3D3B On =3D
>>> 10/18/10 5:03 AM=3D2C Henry M. Taylor wrote:<BR>&gt=3D3B&gt=3D3B Has th=
> e Cartesi=3D
>>> an mind-body duality ever been resolved by philosophy? Or =3D3D<BR>&gt=
> =3D3B&gt=3D
>>> =3D3B brain research=3D2C etc. ? I'm aware that this is a particularly =
> occident=3D
>>> al =3D3D<BR>&gt=3D3B&gt=3D3B question=3D2C as Eastern philosophies appa=
> rently know=3D
>>> no such split ...<BR>&gt=3D3B&gt=3D3B<BR>&gt=3D3B&gt=3D3B Thanks for yo=
> ur though=3D
>>> ts!<BR>&gt=3D3B&gt=3D3B<BR>&gt=3D3B&gt=3D3B H=3D3D<BR>&gt=3D3B&gt=3D3B<=
> BR>&gt=3D3B&gt=3D
>>> =3D3B *<BR>&gt=3D3B&gt=3D3B *<BR>&gt=3D3B&gt=3D3B Film-Philosophy<BR>&g=
> t=3D3B&gt=3D3B =3D
>>> After hitting 'reply' please always delete the text of the message you =
> are =3D
>>> replying to<BR>&gt=3D3B&gt=3D3B To leave=3D2C send the message: leave f=
> ilm-philo=3D
>>> sophy to: [log in to unmask]<BR>&gt=3D3B&gt=3D3B Or visit: http://=
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>>> cmail.ac.uk/lists/film-philosophy.html<BR>&gt=3D3B&gt=3D3B For technica=
> l help =3D
>>> email: [log in to unmask] not the salon<BR>&gt=3D3B&gt=3D3B *=
> <BR>&gt=3D
>>> =3D3B&gt=3D3B Film-Philosophy online: http://www.film-philosophy.com<BR=
>> &gt=3D3B=3D
>>> &gt=3D3B Contact: [log in to unmask]<BR>&gt=3D3B&gt=3D3B **<BR>=
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>>> gt=3D3B<BR>&gt=3D3B<BR>&gt=3D3B *<BR>&gt=3D3B *<BR>&gt=3D3B Film-Philos=
> ophy<BR>&gt=3D
>>> =3D3B After hitting 'reply' please always delete the text of the messag=
> e you =3D
>>> are replying to<BR>&gt=3D3B To leave=3D2C send the message: leave film-=
> philosop=3D
>>> hy to: [log in to unmask]<BR>&gt=3D3B Or visit: http://www.jiscmai=
> l.ac.u=3D
>>> k/lists/film-philosophy.html<BR>&gt=3D3B For technical help email: help=
> line@j=3D
>>> iscmail.ac.uk=3D2C not the salon<BR>&gt=3D3B *<BR>&gt=3D3B Film-Philoso=
> phy online=3D
>>> : http://www.film-philosophy.com<BR>&gt=3D3B Contact: editor@film-philo=
> sophy.=3D
>>> com<BR>&gt=3D3B **<BR><BR>  </body>
>>> </html>=3D
>>> *
>>> *
>>> Film-Philosophy Email Discussion Salon
>>> After hitting 'reply' please always delete the text of the message you =
> are replying to
>>> To leave=2C send the message: leave film-philosophy to: jiscmail@jiscma=
> il.ac.uk
>>> Or visit: http://www.jiscmail.ac.uk/lists/film-philosophy.html
>>> For technical help email: [log in to unmask] not the salon
>>> *
>>> Film-Philosophy online: http://www.film-philosophy.com
>>> Contact: [log in to unmask]
>>> **
>>>
>>> --_1c60c3d9-9ab6-44e2-a553-71db6da24463_--
>>>
>> =20
>> *
>> *
>> Film-Philosophy
>> After hitting 'reply' please always delete the text of the message you ar=
> e replying to
>> To leave=2C send the message: leave film-philosophy to: jiscmail@jiscmail=
> .ac.uk
>> Or visit: http://www.jiscmail.ac.uk/lists/film-philosophy.html
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>> *
>> Film-Philosophy online: http://www.film-philosophy.com
>> Contact: [log in to unmask]
>> **
>   		 	   		=
>
> *
> *
> Film-Philosophy
> After hitting 'reply' please always delete the text of the message you are replying to
> To leave, send the message: leave film-philosophy to: [log in to unmask]
> Or visit: http://www.jiscmail.ac.uk/lists/film-philosophy.html
> For technical help email: [log in to unmask], not the salon
> *
> Film-Philosophy online: http://www.film-philosophy.com
> Contact: [log in to unmask]
> **
>
> --_341ab46a-be72-498f-84e4-e6a4eb0468ec_
> Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1"
> Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
>
> <html>
> <head>
> <style><!--
> .hmmessage P
> {
> margin:0px=3B
> padding:0px
> }
> body.hmmessage
> {
> font-size: 10pt=3B
> font-family:Tahoma
> }
> --></style>
> </head>
> <body class=3D'hmmessage'>
> Hi John=2C and thanks for your reply.<BR>
> &nbsp=3B<BR>
> Chalmers labeled his query "The Hard Problem" because his experience as a s=
> tudent in neuro-sci<BR>revealed a set of problems that his discipline&nbsp=
> =3Bcould not answer. Whereas 'soft problems' were solvable in theory in ter=
> ms of understood properties=2C the hards=2C by definition were not. hence=
> =2C 'property dualism'=2C but with a twist:<BR>
> &nbsp=3B<BR>
> Both he and McGinn developed the idea that these 'hards' were inherantly un=
> solvable. Mcginn's labeling of this was called 'mysterianism'. The epistemo=
> logical blind spot=2C so to speak=2C is what we're hard-wired not to see.<B=
> R>
> &nbsp=3B<BR>
> I disagree=3B yet with the proviso=2C of course=2C that these two aren't tr=
> ying to bootlleg Heisenberg into the discussion=2C at which point I might b=
> ecome interested. Otherwise=2C I'm afraid what we have is The Book of Job r=
> edux=3B my answer to which would be that I was right all along in preferrin=
> g to read neuro-sci rather than indulging in The Great Consciousness Debate=
> .<BR>
> &nbsp=3B<BR>
> In short=2C I believe that Dennett is right. All of this is one=2C big defl=
> ationary exercise=2C and consciousness is just a fancy word for what we don=
> 't know. This is why i like Rorty=2C too.<BR>
> &nbsp=3B<BR>
> My personal pov is that=2C although I love philosophy=2C the consciousness =
> thing rather obnoxiously intrudes upon the conceptual space of an establish=
> ed science. It's simply foolish for philosophers to inform biology that 'ce=
> rtain' problems cannot be solved=3B or either incredably pompous to add=2C =
> 'by the criterion we philosophers set in terms of our own intellectual need=
> s'.<BR>
> &nbsp=3B<BR>
> Theories that insist that we'll never know exist to keep the subject alive =
> within Philosophy departments so that philosophers might remain employed by=
>   provoking nineteen years olds who would find the Biology 'too hard' and bo=
> ring' in equal measure. 'We'll never know' is a great excuse for not lookin=
> g.<BR>
> &nbsp=3B<BR>
> Indeed=2C Searle's article claimed that he wasn't a property dualist. Yet n=
> o where in the article does he offer up a working definition of 'property'.=
>   I claim that he is.<BR>
> &nbsp=3B<BR>
> Now to return to Chalmers=2C I agree that all hard problems in science are =
> defined as those in which new properties remain to be discovered. Therefore=
> =2C&nbsp=3BI believe that hard and soft adequately define a duality of rese=
> arch strategies=2C Chalmers' extreme pessimism not withstanding. Perhaps so=
> me of&nbsp=3Byou might remember Kuhn's notion of 'paradigm' in this regard.=
> <BR>
> &nbsp=3B<BR>
> 'Property dualism' seems to adequately serve as an umbrella-term for the pr=
> esent state of biological state of affairs. What we don't know about brainw=
> ork refers to an undiscovered property or two=2C for which Nobel Prizes eag=
> erly await.<BR>
> &nbsp=3B<BR>
> To say then=2C&nbsp=3Blike Searle=2C that 'in the end it's all material' i=
> s to belabor what we've assumed all along since the days of Aristotle. Migh=
> t I therefore suggest that 'materialism' when employed in this sense is as =
> deflationary as that used by Engels and Lenin?<BR>
> &nbsp=3B<BR>
> In short=2C scientists enjoy going with a certain=2C distinct term that sum=
> s up how they believe that things are=2C and where they want to go. For exa=
> mple=2C "The Copenhagen solution". In this sense=2C neurosci status is "pro=
> perty-dualistic"=2C whether the philosophers like it or not.<BR>
>
> &nbsp=3B<BR>
> &nbsp=3B<BR>
> &nbsp=3B<BR>
> &nbsp=3B<BR>
> &gt=3B Date: Mon=2C 18 Oct 2010 14:02:31 -0400<BR>&gt=3B From: jmatturr@EAR=
> THLINK.NET<BR>&gt=3B Subject: Re: Philosophical query to Bill&amp=3B Co.<B=
> R>&gt=3B To: [log in to unmask]<BR>&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B Your propo=
> sal=2C like most=2C doesn't address the hard problem=2C the<BR>&gt=3B subj=
> ective 'likeness' of consciousness. That what makes the problem<BR>&gt=3B =
> intractable enough so that it constitutes a problem for physicalists and<B=
> R>&gt=3B which led McGinn to make his proposal. Faced with this sort explan=
> ation<BR>&gt=3B you can always ask "But is it conscious". Subjective exper=
> iencing just<BR>&gt=3B does not seem to coalesce with the objectivity of p=
> hysical laws in any<BR>&gt=3B way that we can experience. We might have a =
> perfect account of behavior<BR>&gt=3B that absolutely supervenes on physic=
> al laws and yet leaves consciousness<BR>&gt=3B dangling as a non-causal ep=
> iphenomenon. I see no reason to think that we<BR>&gt=3B are not epistemica=
> lly bounded. On the other hand=2C the assumption of<BR>&gt=3B physicalism =
> has been so productive in getting rid of mysteries that it<BR>&gt=3B is to=
> o soon to throw up one's hands as McGinn does.<BR>&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B Don't s=
> ee much of a connection between consciousness and religion=2C aside<BR>&gt=
> =3B from the fact that some religions talk about consciousness in a sense<=
> BR>&gt=3B that probably isn't the same as that used in contemporary philoso=
> phy.<BR>&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B By what notion of necessary could physicalism be =
> considered as necessary<BR>&gt=3B truth. A dualist world doesn't seem to b=
> e contradictory so it can't be a<BR>&gt=3B logical necessity. To treat it =
> as a nomological necessity would beg the<BR>&gt=3B question as the dualist=
>   is precisely claiming that there are things that<BR>&gt=3B do not obey ph=
> ysical laws.<BR>&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B Can't saddle McGinn with the phrase epist=
> emological blindspot=2C though it<BR>&gt=3B seems to fit. More or less app=
> ropriated by me out of Roy Sorenson's<BR>&gt=3B notion of logical blindspo=
> ts. Then again=2C to be a bit pedantic=2C you<BR>&gt=3B might not saddle S=
> earle with property dualism which he explicitly denies<BR>&gt=3B in an art=
> icle called=2C um=2C "Why I am not a Property Dualist."<BR>&gt=3B<BR>&gt=
> =3B j<BR>&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B On 1=
> 0/18/10 12:44 PM=2C bill harris wrote:<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B --_1c60c3d9-9ab6-44=
> e2-a553-71db6da24463_<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B Content-Type: text/plain=3B charset=
> =3D"iso-8859-1"<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printabl=
> e<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B Hi John=3D2C<BR>&gt=3B=
>   &gt=3B =3D20<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B I disagree with McGinn=3D2C and agree with D=
> avidson that physicalism is a nec=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B essary truth.=3D20<BR=
>> &gt=3B&gt=3B =3D20<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B I also believe that Dennett's explana=
> tions are rather poor=3D2C thereby expos=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B ing himself to=
>   Mcginn's rhetorical flourish=3D2C "the epistemological blindsp=3D<BR>&gt=
> =3B&gt=3B ot". After all=3D2C who among us doesn't understand that Philoso=
> phy is an ag=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B on of the mind?=3D20<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B =3D2=
> 0<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B I like Searle's 'property dualism' because it permits us=
>   to discuss QM as a=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B physical process=3D3B the 'dual'=3D=
> 2C of course=3D2C referring to the fact that =3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B photons f=
> ollow their own set of rules. So might the brain operate like sort=3D<BR>&g=
> t=3B&gt=3B of a Josephson Junction?<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B =3D20<BR>&gt=3B&gt=
> =3B Otherwise=3D2C to speak of 'consciousness' seems to be nothing more tha=
> n a re=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B ligious hangover. Or worse=3D2C it's a post -Ror=
> ty panic attack that's meant =3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B to save an entire field o=
> f study from the philosophical wastebin. 'Sort of =3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B like=
>   the Rennaissance art historian who still insists that Michelangelo int=3D<=
> BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B entionally used smudgy=3D2C smokey stuff in The Sistine. A=
> fter all=3D2C reality=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B must conform to ideas consistent =
> with those held dear within the professio=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B n=3D2C yes?<B=
> R>&gt=3B&gt=3B =3D20<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B In any case=3D2C a phycalist explana=
> tion for consciousness might go something=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B like this:<BR=
>> &gt=3B&gt=3B The brain fires off electrical impulses that can easily be m=
> easured in cycl=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B es/sec. These vary from place to place=
> =3D2C by the way. Physical function=3D2C =3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B then=3D2C com=
> es in intervals=3D2C-- much as film is made of discreet images lia=3D<BR>&g=
> t=3B&gt=3B soned together to be perceived as an illusory stream.<BR>&gt=3B=
>   &gt=3B =3D20<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B Therefore=3D2C the brain gizmo that's respon=
> sible for outputting a consistent=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B flow of 'thought' mig=
> ht be said to be the consciousness-center...<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B =3D20<BR>&gt=
> =3B&gt=3B BH=3D20<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B =3D20<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B=
>   =3D20<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B =3D20<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B Date: Mon=3D2C 18 Oct =
> 2010 09:53:09 -0400<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B From: [log in to unmask]<BR>=
> &gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B Subject: Re: Philosophical query to Bill&amp=3B Co.<BR>=
> &gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B To: [log in to unmask]<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=
> =3B =3D20<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B How to resolve the hard problem of conscio=
> usness given the assumption=3D20<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B of physicalism rema=
> ins an issue. There are those=3D2C like Colin McGinn=3D2C =3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=
> =3B who=3D20<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B have argued that there is no actual dua=
> lity but that we may in an=3D20<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B epistemic blindspot =
> that does not allow us to understand the connection=3D20<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&g=
> t=3B between consciousness and the physicalist world. Once saw Dennett give=
>   a=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B =3D20<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B lecture called somethin=
> g like "What it is Like to be a Bat=3D2C" claiming=3D20<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=
> =3B resolution=3D2C on Thomas Nagel's home turf and was interested in how=
> =3D20<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B certain that almost everyone I spoke to seemed=
>   to think one or the other=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B =3D20<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B=
>   scored a knockout but there was a strong lack of agreement about which=3D2=
> 0<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B was knocked out. For what it's worth=3D2C I don't =
> see it as being resolved=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B =3D20<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B s=
> oon but my bet is physicalism based on its track record is resolving=3D20<B=
> R>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B past conundrums. (Admittedly=3D2C haven't kept up wit=
> h this stuff for the=3D20<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B past decade or so. . .)<BR=
>> &gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B =3D20<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B j<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B =
> =3D20<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B On 10/18/10 5:03 AM=3D2C Henry M. Taylor wrote=
> :<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B Has the Cartesian mind-body duality ever bee=
> n resolved by philosophy? O=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B r =3D3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=
> =3B&gt=3B brain research=3D2C etc. ? I'm aware that this is a particularly =
> occident=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B al =3D3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B question=
> =3D2C as Eastern philosophies apparently know no such split ...<BR>&gt=3B&=
> gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B Thanks for your thoughts!<BR=
>> &gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B H=3D3D<BR>&gt=3B&g=
> t=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B *<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=
> =3B *<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B Film-Philosophy<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B&g=
> t=3B After hitting 'reply' please always delete the text of the message you=
>   =3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B are replying to<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B To leave=
> =3D2C send the message: leave film-philosophy to: jiscmail@jiscma=3D<BR>&gt=
> =3B&gt=3B il.ac.uk<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B Or visit: http://www.jiscm=
> ail.ac.uk/lists/film-philosophy.html<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B For techn=
> ical help email: [log in to unmask] not the salon<BR>&gt=3B&gt=
> =3B&gt=3B&gt=3B *<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B Film-Philosophy online: http=
> ://www.film-philosophy.com<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B Contact: editor@fil=
> m-philosophy.com<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B **<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=
> =3B<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B =3D20<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B *<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&=
> gt=3B *<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B Film-Philosophy<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B After=
>   hitting 'reply' please always delete the text of the message you ar=3D<BR>=
> &gt=3B&gt=3B e replying to<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B To leave=3D2C send the m=
> essage: leave film-philosophy to: jiscmail@jiscmail=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B .ac=
> .uk<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B Or visit: http://www.jiscmail.ac.uk/lists/film-p=
> hilosophy.html<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B For technical help email: helpline@ji=
> scmail.ac.uk=3D2C not the salon<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B *<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&g=
> t=3B Film-Philosophy online: http://www.film-philosophy.com<BR>&gt=3B&gt=
> =3B&gt=3B Contact: [log in to unmask]<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&gt=3B **<BR>=
> &gt=3B&gt=3B =3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B *<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B *<BR=
>> &gt=3B&gt=3B Film-Philosophy<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B After hitting 'reply' pleas=
> e always delete the text of the message you are replying to<BR>&gt=3B&gt=
> =3B To leave=2C send the message: leave film-philosophy to: jiscmail@jiscma=
> il.ac.uk<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B Or visit: http://www.jiscmail.ac.uk/lists/film-ph=
> ilosophy.html<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B For technical help email: [log in to unmask]
> ac.uk=2C not the salon<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B *<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B Film-Philosophy =
> online: http://www.film-philosophy.com<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B Contact: editor@fil=
> m-philosophy.com<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B **<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B --_1=
> c60c3d9-9ab6-44e2-a553-71db6da24463_<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B Content-Type: text/ht=
> ml=3B charset=3D"iso-8859-1"<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B Content-Transfer-Encoding: qu=
> oted-printable<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&lt=3Bhtml&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B=
>   &gt=3B&lt=3Bhead&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&lt=3Bstyle&gt=3B&lt=3B!--<BR>&gt=
> =3B&gt=3B .hmmessage P<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B {<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B margin:0px=3D3B=
> <BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B padding:0px<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B }<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B body.hmme=
> ssage<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B {<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B font-size: 10pt=3D3B<BR>&gt=3B&g=
> t=3B font-family:Tahoma<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B }<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B --&gt=3B&lt=3B/=
> style&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&lt=3B/head&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&lt=3Bbody =
> class=3D3D'hmmessage'&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B Hi John=3D2C&lt=3BBR&gt=3B<BR>=
> &gt=3B&gt=3B&amp=3Bnbsp=3D3B&lt=3BBR&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B I disagree wi=
> th McGinn=3D2C and agree with Davidson that physicalism is a nec=3D<BR>&gt=
> =3B&gt=3B essary truth.&lt=3BBR&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&amp=3Bnbsp=3D3B&lt=
> =3BBR&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B I also believe that Dennett's explanations are=
>   rather poor=3D2C thereby expos=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B ing himself to Mcginn's=
>   rhetorical flourish=3D2C "the epistemological blindsp=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B =
> ot". After all=3D2C who among us doesn't understand that&amp=3Bnbsp=3D3B Ph=
> ilosophy i=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B s an agon of the mind?&lt=3BBR&gt=3B<BR>&gt=
> =3B&gt=3B&amp=3Bnbsp=3D3B&lt=3BBR&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B I&amp=3Bnbsp=3D3=
> Blike Searle's 'property dualism' because it permits us to discuss =3D<BR>&=
> gt=3B&gt=3B QM as a physical process=3D3B the 'dual'=3D2C of course=3D2C r=
> eferring to the fac=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B t that photons follow their own set=
>   of rules. So might the&amp=3Bnbsp=3D3Bbrain ope=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B rate l=
> ike sort of a Josephson Junction?&lt=3BBR&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&amp=3Bnbs=
> p=3D3B&lt=3BBR&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B Otherwise=3D2C&amp=3Bnbsp=3D3Bto spea=
> k of 'consciousness' seems to be nothing more th=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B an a r=
> eligious hangover. Or worse=3D2C it's a post -Rorty panic attack that's=3D<=
> BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B meant to save an entire field of study from the philosophi=
> cal wastebin. 'S=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B ort of like the Rennaissance art histo=
> rian&amp=3Bnbsp=3D3Bwho&amp=3Bnbsp=3D3Bstill insists =3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B t=
> hat Michelangelo intentionally used smudgy=3D2C smokey stuff in The Sistine=
> .=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B After all=3D2C reality&lt=3BU&gt=3Bmust&lt=3B/U&gt=3B=
> conform to ideas consistent with those he=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B ld dear withi=
> n the profession=3D2C yes?&lt=3BBR&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&amp=3Bnbsp=3D3B&=
> lt=3BBR&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B In any case=3D2C a phycalist explanation for=
>   consciousness might go something=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B like this:&lt=3BBR&gt=
> =3B<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B The brain fires off electrical impulses that can easil=
> y be measured in cycl=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B es/sec. These vary from place to =
> place=3D2C by the way. Physical function=3D2C =3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B then=3D2=
> C comes in intervals=3D2C-- much as film is made of discreet images lia=3D<=
> BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B soned together to be perceived as an illusory stream.&lt=
> =3BBR&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&amp=3Bnbsp=3D3B&lt=3BBR&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B&gt=
> =3B Therefore=3D2C the brain gizmo that's responsible for outputting a cons=
> istent=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B flow of 'thought' might be said to be the consci=
> ousness-center...&lt=3BBR&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&amp=3Bnbsp=3D3B&lt=3BBR&g=
> t=3B<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B BH&amp=3Bnbsp=3D3B&lt=3BBR&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B<BR>=
> &gt=3B&gt=3B&amp=3Bnbsp=3D3B&lt=3BBR&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&amp=3Bnbsp=
> =3D3B&lt=3BBR&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&amp=3Bnbsp=3D3B&lt=3BBR&gt=3B<BR>&gt=
> =3B&gt=3B&amp=3Bgt=3D3B Date: Mon=3D2C 18 Oct 2010 09:53:09 -0400&lt=3BBR=
> &gt=3B&amp=3Bgt=3D3B From: jmatturr@EAR=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B THLINK.NET&lt=
> =3BBR&gt=3B&amp=3Bgt=3D3B Subject: Re: Philosophical query to Bill&amp=3Bam=
> p=3D3B Co.&lt=3BB=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B R&gt=3B&amp=3Bgt=3D3B To: FILM-PHILOS=
> [log in to unmask]&lt=3BBR&gt=3B&amp=3Bgt=3D3B&lt=3BBR&gt=3B&amp=3Bgt=3D3B=
>   How to res=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B olve the hard problem of consciousness give=
> n the assumption&lt=3BBR&gt=3B&amp=3Bgt=3D3B of p=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B hysic=
> alism remains an issue. There are those=3D2C like Colin McGinn=3D2C who&lt=
> =3BB=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B R&gt=3B&amp=3Bgt=3D3B have argued that there is no=
>   actual duality but that we may in an =3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B&lt=3BBR&gt=3B&a=
> mp=3Bgt=3D3B epistemic blindspot that does not allow us to understand the c=
> on=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B nection&lt=3BBR&gt=3B&amp=3Bgt=3D3B between consciou=
> sness and the physicalist world. Once sa=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B w Dennett give=
>   a&lt=3BBR&gt=3B&amp=3Bgt=3D3B lecture called something like "What it is Li=
> ke =3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B to be a Bat=3D2C" claiming&lt=3BBR&gt=3B&amp=3Bgt=
> =3D3B resolution=3D2C on Thomas Nagel's home tu=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B rf and =
> was interested in how&lt=3BBR&gt=3B&amp=3Bgt=3D3B certain that almost every=
> one I spok=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B e to seemed to think one or the other&lt=3BB=
> R&gt=3B&amp=3Bgt=3D3B scored a knockout but ther=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B e was =
> a strong lack of agreement about which&lt=3BBR&gt=3B&amp=3Bgt=3D3B was knoc=
> ked out. Fo=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B r what it's worth=3D2C I don't see it as be=
> ing resolved&lt=3BBR&gt=3B&amp=3Bgt=3D3B soon but m=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B y b=
> et is physicalism based on its track record is resolving&lt=3BBR&gt=3B&amp=
> =3Bgt=3D3B past=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B conundrums. (Admittedly=3D2C haven't ke=
> pt up with this stuff for the&lt=3BBR&gt=3B&amp=3Bgt=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B =
> =3D3B past decade or so. . .)&lt=3BBR&gt=3B&amp=3Bgt=3D3B&lt=3BBR&gt=3B&amp=
> =3Bgt=3D3B j&lt=3BBR&gt=3B&amp=3Bgt=3D3B&lt=3BBR&gt=3B&amp=3Bgt=3D3B On =3D=
> <BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B 10/18/10 5:03 AM=3D2C Henry M. Taylor wrote:&lt=3BBR&gt=
> =3B&amp=3Bgt=3D3B&amp=3Bgt=3D3B Has the Cartesi=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B an mind=
> -body duality ever been resolved by philosophy? Or =3D3D&lt=3BBR&gt=3B&amp=
> =3Bgt=3D3B&amp=3Bgt=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B =3D3B brain research=3D2C etc. ? I'=
> m aware that this is a particularly occident=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B al =3D3D&l=
> t=3BBR&gt=3B&amp=3Bgt=3D3B&amp=3Bgt=3D3B question=3D2C as Eastern philosoph=
> ies apparently know=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B no such split ...&lt=3BBR&gt=3B&amp=
> =3Bgt=3D3B&amp=3Bgt=3D3B&lt=3BBR&gt=3B&amp=3Bgt=3D3B&amp=3Bgt=3D3B Thanks f=
> or your though=3D<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B ts!&lt=3BBR&gt=3B&amp=3Bgt=3D3B&amp=3Bgt=
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> =3Bgt=3D3B&amp=3Bgt=3D3B Film-Philosophy&lt=3BBR&gt=3B&amp=3Bgt=3D3B&amp=3B=
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>   [log in to unmask]<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B **<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B<BR=
>> &gt=3B&gt=3B --_1c60c3d9-9ab6-44e2-a553-71db6da24463_--<BR>&gt=3B&gt=3B<=
> BR>&gt=3B<BR>&gt=3B *<BR>&gt=3B *<BR>&gt=3B Film-Philosophy<BR>&gt=3B Afte=
> r hitting 'reply' please always delete the text of the message you are repl=
> ying to<BR>&gt=3B To leave=2C send the message: leave film-philosophy to: j=
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> ac.uk=2C not the salon<BR>&gt=3B *<BR>&gt=3B Film-Philosophy online: http:/=
> /www.film-philosophy.com<BR>&gt=3B Contact: [log in to unmask]<BR>&=
> gt=3B **<BR><BR>  		 	   		</body>
> </html>=
> *
> *
> Film-Philosophy Email Discussion Salon
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> To leave, send the message: leave film-philosophy to: [log in to unmask]
> Or visit: http://www.jiscmail.ac.uk/lists/film-philosophy.html
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> *
> Film-Philosophy online: http://www.film-philosophy.com
> Contact: [log in to unmask]
> **
>
> --_341ab46a-be72-498f-84e4-e6a4eb0468ec_--
>

*
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