>
> In my view there are no such things as essences in cognition only
> interpretations, meanings, understandings and beliefs regarding
> "objects of cognition". These are neural networks that are usually
> recognizable in thought through referential entities (words, images,
> etc.) that are themselves networks of associated information that
> have become understood through use. We can understand a statement
> such as "the essence of the idea" only by interpreting what we think
> is most important about the idea- usually in some context.
That's fine. Personally i accept the neuro-network model as one model
of the brain, but i have to suspect that brain modeling doesn't
actually provide a firm basis for argument yet. One exercise that i
have most of my students in upper levels and graduate school is to
phenomonologically investigate the methods in which they resolve a
heuristic problem, the modes of thought they use, and it is always
surprising the variation in modes that people use, even after years
and years of education that seems to promote one mode over others.
>
> Also I wrote:
>>>
>>> Human beings apply and interpret nominative entities however they
>>> recognize or choose them. Relationships reguire entities (whether
>>> signed or not) to relate.
>>
> jeremy replied:
>>
>> actually no, they don't require any other entity, they are the
>> entities, their may or may not be anything other than the
>> relationships, but there are the relationships.
>
> Relations can exist as nominal entities (For example the signs +
> and - or the words "before" and "after" are relations not
> relationships) A relationship requires a relation to have arguments.
> That does not mean that a relationship can not be given a
> referential tag and treated as a nominal object. It will simply be
> a complex object.
>
i agree we can assign names to anything, but that's not really what
i'm saying. Actually i find the whole nominalization arguments to be
pretty moot as all it ends up being to me is a series of social
conventions. I'm saying that the way that we come to know and what we
can assume exists are relations between our being and relations.
and actually there are plenty of things in the world without
nominalization, and according to old wittgenstein there are even more
things that we shouldn't nominalize, yet do.
granted there are a variety of perspectives and arguments one can take
here, but I think that if we assume 'the object' or 'the thing', I
think the analysis will be generally bifurcated with subject/object
binarity, so I tend to argue that we should resist the 'object' and
prefer the systems of relations, which then collapses the division in
preference to accept that relations, as processes, exist, and anything
that they exist between is also just a system of relation. 'the
object' as such... is absent or merely a misapprehension.
now what does taking such a perspective provide us in terms of the
possibility of a theory of creativity. It allows for more complex
analysis of the ways in which we relate and generate new relations
(which i'd argue is creativity) . Then the way to do that is to
enter into the system of relations, ethnographically or
semiologically, interpret them and redescribe them. I'd tend to not
accept the idea that we can 'objectively' define creativity, but i do
thing that once we have explored enough territory, we can likely find
a way to generalize a pragmatic operationalization that we can measure
and test against limited sets of populations, though always being wary
of the problem of translation with that pragmatic operationalization
of creativity.
> Best wishes to all.
> Chuck
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