Hi Bill,
I hate to disagree with your thesis, but you are stretching Deleuze’s
concept of becoming-animal in ways that I think do not do justice to his
intentions. Deleuze’s philosophy is often called a philosophy of immanence
because of his concern with the possibilities of becomings as they relate to
life or the body, rather than predetermined subjects and transcendent values
(Sotirin, 2005: 101) The concept of becoming was developed by Deleuze and
Guattari in order to help envision the definition of a world presented anew,
and as such it is a foundational concept in their work. Deleuze’s initial
understanding of the concept is drawn from Friedrich Nietzsche, with Deleuze
understanding ‘becoming as the continual production (or ‘return’) of
difference immanent within the constitution of events, whether physical or
otherwise. Becoming is the pure movement evident in changes between
particular events, whether physical or otherwise (Stagoll, 2005: 21). This
suggests that becoming is not an evolution in the sense of a descent or
progression (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 238), but rather represents ‘the
moment of arrest in the roll of the dice, is always open to, and traversed
by, becomings that are more than simple transformations of an existing
real.’ (Conley, 2001: 21)
For Deleuze, becoming has a number of manifestations each
representing different aspects and elements of becoming. For Deleuze, the
initial phase in becoming can be understood as a becoming-woman. The
expression ‘becoming-woman’ was first put forth in A Thousand Plateaus, the
second volume to the Anti-Oedipus subtitled ‘Capitalism and Schizophrenia.’
(Conley, 2001: 20) Deleuze’s emphasis on becoming-woman does not privilege
Man, instead it critiques man’s representation as the ‘molar’ paradigm of
identity and subjectivity, opposed to molecular subjectivity. Deleuze
opposes the notion of molecular to that of the ‘molar which he considers
transcendent, as opposed to the immanent of the molecular.’ (Flieger, 2001:
41)
Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of becoming-woman emerged from the
same post-1968 context as Hélène Cixous’s Newly Born Woman. Deleuze’s
becoming-woman shares with Cixous’s concept a commonality which undoes the
self-identical subject, thereby opening the self to metamorphoses and
becomings (Conley, 2001: 22). Much as Cixous had posited, Deleuze suggests
two sexes representing the psychic consequences of these differences.
However, he suggests that these differences cannot be reduced to those that
were identified by Freud (Conley, 2001: 25). Both philosophers also suggest
that bodies are neither natural nor essential, nor are they determined,
rather they are marked and as such are ‘situated’ within a context (Conley,
2001: 27).
As we mentioned above, becoming-woman does not have to do with being
a woman or being like a woman. Instead, Deleuze suggests that the concept of
becoming-woman is a key threshold for a line of flight that passes through
and beyond the binary distinctions that govern the teleological
understanding of life. Becoming-woman is the first threshold because it must
become molecular and function as a deterritorialization of the dominant
molar form (Sotirin, 2005: 102-3). Therefore, it is the very nature of a
becoming to be molecular rather than molar, that of an infinite number of
elements that remain connected rhizomatically without entering into a
regular, fixed pattern of organization (Bogue, 2003: 34). In order to
deterritorialize the molar with its majoritarian emphasis, one must first
deterritorialize oneself, and becoming-woman offers the first shift, one
which destabilizes the conventions of the molar (Flieger, 2001: 46). This
allows one to turn away from one’s present condition and in the case of
Blue, results in Julie’s beginning to turn away from the event and become
instead ‘an ongoing actualization of virtualities.’ (Conley, 2001: 35)
A second form of becoming involves becomings-animal which is neither
a dream nor a fantasy, but a real perfectly real. ‘Becoming animal does not
consist in playing animal or imitating animal, and the human being does not
really become an animal …what is real is the becoming itself.’ (Deleuze &
Guattari, 1987: 238) Instead, the element of becoming-animal implies the
adoption of characteristics that represent aspects of the animal, insect or
bird. Thus one adopts an aspect of ‘bee-ness’, or ‘bird-ness’. ‘You do not
become a barking molar dog, but by barking, if it is done with enough
feeling, with enough necessity and composition, you emit a molecular dog.’
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 275) As with becoming-woman, one becomes-animal
only molecularly (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 275).
A third form of becoming involves a becoming-music. Deleuze suggests
that all musical invention proceeds via such a becoming-other, ‘since music
is the deterritorialization of the refrain and deterritorialization is
itself fundamentally a process of becoming.’ (Bogue, 2003: 34) Because of
this music can be understood also as a form of becoming, and it is
‘inseparable’ from three specific forms of becoming, a becoming-woman, a
becoming-animal (Bogue, 2003: 34).
Deleuze encourages us to consider just exactly what the art of music
deals with;
what content is indissociable from sound expression? He suggests this is a
difficult question to answer and yet he suggests that it is still something:
‘a child dies, a child plays, a woman is born, a woman dies, a bird arrives
a bird flies off. We wish to say that these are not accidental themes in
music (even if it is possible to multiply examples), much less imitative
exercises; they are something essential.’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 299)
The question can be raised, why is music so often concerned with death?
‘Well on one level Deleuze is aware of the danger inherent in any line that
escapes, in any line of flight or creative deterritorialization: the danger
of veering towards destruction, toward abolition.’ (Buchanan, 2004:184) In
essence the becoming-music suggests a deterritorialization of not only the
refrain, but of life itself. By becoming music we become deterritorialized,
molecularized, we interact with other milieus, whether they be animal,
cosmos, or a circle of property personal enough to keep us safe from an
event. We lose not only our conception of music as a thing, but by
destabilizing the very essence of the molar in music, music is reduced to
something open to the cosmos, something which destabilizes our expectations
and reorients ourselves towards becoming-something else, something
previously unrealized.
However, because becoming is part of positive ontology your
association of it with the monstrous is contrary to Deleuze’s intentions as
I understand them. If anything, I think we might think of the horror genre’s
monster as a 'becoming-anomalous', as Anna Powell suggests in her recent
monograph "Deleuze and the Horror Film."
Gregg Redner
University of Western Ontario
________________________________________
From: Film-Philosophy Salon [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On
Behalf Of bill harris
Sent: Wednesday, August 20, 2008 9:40 PM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: Horror question
I'm not amazed that Amerikan Horror films have found an audience elsewhere.
Monsters are all about what the becoming-animal can do; and what has
recently been done to other human beings on the western side of Asia:
Auschwitz, The Gulag, Dresden, whatever. They likewise present a picture to
Europeans what Americans are all about, as smart non-Americans everywhere
nominally connect the commodity dot. Abu-Gharib and Exorcist are ostensibly
made in the USA.
I also confess to liking the rather extended metaphor of the exploiters of
human labor being nothing but Freddies with chainsaws. However, the truth is
simply that Hollywood has always tried to turn the working class against
itself. My faves, by the way, are all those westerns where the lone,
reformed gunman saves an entire town of peaceful (liberal?) burgers from the
bad guys.
Therefore, the more plausible narrative would be that frightfilm functions
to creates fear among the exploited of each other. The horror genre drips
fascism from every pore.
Comparing philosophies of Jodoworsky v. Godard reminds me of the story of
the woman who went into a bar and bet any man that she could pee higher up
the wall than he. When a taker went outside, unzipped, and left a mark some
two feet up, she exclaimed, "No hands!!"
In any case, taste aside, Jodo's work is rather expressive, to say the
least. Yet when asked what philosophy his films might contain, the f-word is
his normal reply. Kindly then, explain what profundities we might be
missing.
On the other hand, Godard is at least much clearer by intent. Godard par
Godard is literally a text that tries to answer the major question, "What is
cinema?" His work is to find what possible avenues film might take.
If philosophical cinema ("European" in Peck's word) is one of questions,
then is it possible for film to question itself within the context of its
own creation? Modernism, regrettably, remains basically out of touch for the
filmic--with many exceptions, of course, such as Jado's compatriot Ruiz and
Godard.
BH
----- Original Message -----
From: Hans Heydebreck
To: [log in to unmask]
Sent: Tuesday, August 19, 2008 8:27 PM
Subject: Re: Horror question
> I'm
> left with the feeling that ... there is such a thing as the
> horror film.
>
> Henry
I´m amazed that horror films are held in such a low esteem here.
Of course, locating something that´s inside films (monsters) has advantages
over questioning an unreliable, anonymous audience.
But, in my opinion, genuine horror films are more than anything else
themedriven. They deal with threats posed to identity and life (in general
and in a more narrow sense, life as the opposite of death, the value of
life), in particular life in the modern age and the human condition (what
sets us apart from animals or machines).
Needless to say, that makes the genre hard to separate from other genres,
especially science fiction dystopias or psychothrillers.
It´s strange that many previous posts seem to miss the idea of most horror
films: they are at the same time graphic and abstract. Yes, we see someone
playing with his chainsaw, but it´s more about an abstract concept (a
degenerated form of capitalism) than anything else.
I believe, horror films very often rely upon fantastic creatures, because it
allows them to operate with figures that aren´t to be mistaken as a
realistic character, but as a single idea or a single trait.
If I remember correctly, Robin Wood wrote that a monster threatens the
status quo, I´d say a monster questions the status quo, which deservedly
sounds more philosophical.
"It´s paint!" "No, it´s holy blood!"
... From Santa Sangre, a horror film that is IMHO more philosophical than
Godard could ever be.
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