luke,
thanks for the citation.
you summarize them by saying: "You can't have the skill for tying your
shoelaces unless you have your hands on your shoelaces."
i disagree. you can have a skill but not use it at the moment. i would be
happier if you had said "you can't demonstrate the skill ..."
in any case
(1) you were writing
(2) the "unless" expresses a conditional ordering. since it is equally true
that there could be no such things as shoelaces unless you have hands and
the skill to tie them, .i would conclude that the practice of tying and the
recognition of something as shoelaces are learned together, define each
other mutually, one fitting the other.
(3) the one-way conditionality imposed on that practice reveals one's
epistemological commitments: objectivism or subjectivism, and in my
preference constructivism..
klaus
-----Original Message-----
From: PhD-Design - This list is for discussion of PhD studies and related
research in Design [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Luke
Feast
Sent: Wednesday, January 23, 2008 6:16 AM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Is all writing fiction?
Dear list members
Very interesting thread...
The discussion of whether all writing is fiction can be considered in
relation to the (paradoxical) question of whether we have practices for
making sense of entities as independent of those very practices.
"The being of entities does not lie in the activity of encountering, but the
encounter of entities is the phenomenal basis, and the sole basis, upon
which the being of entities can be grasped. Only the interpretation of the
encounter with entities can secure the being of entities, if at all. It must
be stated that the entity as an entity is 'in itself' and independent of any
apprehension of it; accordingly, the being of the entity is found only in
encounter and can be explained, made understandable, only from the
phenomenal exhibition and interpretation of the structure of encounter."
(Heidegger, 1985: 217)
According to Dreyfus and Spinosa (1999, 57), Heidegger would argue that,
although the practice-based structure of encounter that gives us access to
entities depends on us essentially, what we encounter only contingently
depends on this structure. Then both our everyday and our scientific
practices could be understood, not as constitutive practices, but as access
practices allowing "genuine theoretical discovering". (Heidegger
1962: 412)
You can't have the skill for tying your shoelaces unless you have your hands
on your shoelaces.
luke
Dreyfus, H.L. & Spinosa, C. (1999) "Copying with Things-in-Themselves: A
Practice-Phenomenological Argument for Realism", Inquiry 42, 49-78.
Heidegger, M., (1962
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