Dear Lubomir
You point out that the concept of affordance is related to materialist
thinking - but only if one wishes it so. Gibson allows a directness in
the experience of things that is a directness of experience, not a
directness of things. Giving oneself over to/finding oneself
expereincing directly, does not make the thing any more real than a
phenomenological apprehension. Indeed, they might usefully be treated as
the same.
My left field email (earlier) was a pediction we would end up here.
cheers
keith russell
OZ Australia
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Lubomir wrote, in part:
Let me mention that the concept of affordance is at disciplinary
level (including multi- or inter- in this reading). In this regard,
the concept of affordance can not serve for resolving the fundamental
question of philosophy. By the way, the concept of affordance is
related to materialist thinking. The very idea that the material
world affords implies that there is a material world that affords the
realm of ideas. Extreme idealism claims that the idea has controls
matter.
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