Dear Terry,
I agree with you that trying to get at any thinking that goes on in
some designing, via external observables--behaviour, sketches, models,
notes, etc--is not going to work. But, what is going to work?
Also, does a theory of designing need to be a theory of the thinking,
feeling, creating, deciding, judging in designing: does a theory of
designing need to be a theory of design thinking? You're own example
of counting being a uniform observable behaviour with individually
different internal goings on, thinking, (I take it you mean) suggests
that a theory of design thinking is going to be difficult to develop,
not least for the difficulties of testing it. And, it's not just the
science needed here that looks challenging, the philosophy looks
worrying too, not to say hopeless. If each designer thinks
differently when doing the same designing (like in counting), then all
this variation in design thinking must be counted as normal variation
by our theory of design (thinking). It's not normal plus some
statistical variation (noise), each and every different thinking is
true design thinking: all of it, the thinking of designers past,
present, and future. But we cannot know what different thinkings
future designers will do, so how do we develop a theory that can count
them all in as normal, and count as out that which is not normal
because it's somehow not designing?
Theories should demystify and explain. Any theory of design thinking
looks to me like it's going to have an impossible job to offer
demystified explanations of designing when the thinking that is
supposed to be the demystified and explained target of the theory is
so shrouded and unknowable.
My question was rhetorical: I think that a theory of designing does
not have to be a theory of design thinking; I think it can be a theory
about the structure and organisation of the external observable and
identifiable aspects of designing, about the process of designing.
Furthermore, I think such theories of designing are best constructed
in abstraction of the agents doing the designing, and, in particular,
any and all thinking these agents may do.
One way of developing such a theory of designing (as a processes) is
using Newell's Knowledge Level and his concept of knowledge that goes
with this--knowledge is a capacity for rational action. Rational
action can be observed, characterised, classified, identified, even
quantified. From observations of rational action we can infer the
possession of knowledge, the capacity for the rational action
observed. (This is the basis of all Knowledge Engineering methods and
practices today.)
Building a Knowledge Level theory of designing necessarily involves
inventing some theoretical concepts that may not, in and of
themselves, be easily observable, but which together can be used to
offer useful demystifying explanatory accounts of designing, of why it
happens the way it does. A Knowledge Level theory of designing says
what kinds of knowledge is necessarily and sufficiently needed to do
designing, the roles these kinds of knowledge play in the design
process, and the way they relate, combine, interact, and inter-play.
What a Knowledge Level theory of designing will _not_ and cannot do,
is say anything about the cognitive goings on in any designing agent:
it cannot be a theory of design thinking.
I have worked on this kind of thing, and have claimed that Knowledge
Level theories of designing could be useful for offering theoretical
support for the development of knowledge based design support systems.
They are not simple to develop--nothing interesting is--but they are
possible to develop in practice, and can offer at least some kinds of
demystifying explanation and understanding of designing.
Best regards,
Tim
Donostia / San Sebastián
The Basque Country
======================================================================
At 07:32 +0800 29/3/07, Terence Love wrote:
>Dear Klaus and all,
>
>I agree.
>
>I feel that one of the roadblocks in building coherent design theory and a
>sound discipline of design research has been the peculiar focus on
>attempting to use external things to try explain internal human activities
>such as feelings, creativity, thinking, deciding, judgement etc.
>
>It simply doesn't work. Its like trying to explain the way the motor in a
>power drill is constructed by looking at drilled holes. Even worse, it is
>like trying to develop a model of humanity with our complex of human
>functioning, thinking, feeling, illusions, delusions, hidden knowledge,
>motivations and all those fuzzy human internal functions that are dictated
>by our biological evolution - by looking at holes drilled by power drills.
>Silly.
>
>The obsession with wicked and ill-defined design problems has a similar lack
>of connection with design thinking. To attempt to use wicked problems as
>the basis for a theory of design thinking is epistemological dodgy -
>regardless of the emotional feelings that designers may have that they feel
>that design thinking is represented by wicked problems. We all have 'common
>sense' simplifications and naiveties but those are no basis for
>epistemologically sound theory .
>
>It makes perfect sense for a DESIGNER to be interested in classifying types
>of problems. A designer's primary interest is trying to solve them. It
>makes good sense for someone trying to invent automated design methods to
>classify design problems. Their aim is to use physical knowledge of the
>external world to predict and identify design solutions to difficult design
>briefs. The terms wicked, ill-defined, variation, routine etc are simply
>classifications to make process identification and automation easier.
>
>To try to use wicked or other problem classifications as the basis for
>theorising about human internal feeling-driven design thinking behaviours is
>epistemologically incoherent. Daft.
>
>Best regards,
>
>Terry
>
>===
>Dr. Terence Love
>Tel/Fax: +61 (0)8 9305 7629
>Mobile: 0434975 848
>[log in to unmask]
>===
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: PhD-Design - This list is for discussion of PhD studies and related
>research in Design [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Klaus
>Krippendorff
>Sent: Thursday, 29 March 2007 12:32 AM
>To: [log in to unmask]
>Subject: Re: wicked problems
>
>"ill-defined" is a category from inside the problem solving paradigm.
>it signifies being closed to other ways of thinking of conceptualizing
>design.
>klaus krippendorff
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: PhD-Design - This list is for discussion of PhD studies and related
>research in Design [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Gordon
>Rowland
>Sent: Wednesday, March 28, 2007 11:08 AM
>To: [log in to unmask]
>Subject: wicked problems
>
>For related early work, also see the following. Reitman referred to these
>sorts of problems as ill-defined.
>
>Reitman, R. R. (1965). Cognition and thought: An information processing
>approach. NY: John Wiley & Sons.
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