short reply to fil:
nature doesn't have variables, doesn't know variables, isn't governed by
variables. nature does what it does. variables are descriptive devices,
especially useful in mathematical formulations. they are features of
language not of an undescribed nature.
you speak of ideas as if they were entities that are divorced from their
embodiments in someone and unobservable in its effects by someone else.
designers may have ideas or whatever you want to call them. unless they
become visible or noticeable by others, we cannot know them, use them, or
talk about them. under these conditions they can have no effect. a
designer's idea must be communicated in the form of drawings, explanations,
or behavior, for example by creating something new, doing something better,
in any case making a difference.
as an adult, you most likely are unaware, as everybody else, of how your
behavior as a child got organized around what your parents told you to do,
the kinds of toys they gave you to play with, what they encouraged you to
say and how. much of this took place before you had an experience of that
you were thinking, that there was a language that you were speaking. what
you say now of how you use language is said after you grew up in language
and learned what to be aware of when using language (and by implication what
you may not be aware of when using language but other people, other cultures
may well highlight).
i am not denying individual creativity in the use of language (and design).
but the causality you express: thinking first and then encountering
problems of expression speaks the ideology of western idealism, not the way
we have grown up to be who we claim we are.
klaus
-----Original Message-----
From: PhD-Design - This list is for discussion of PhD studies and
related research in Design [mailto:[log in to unmask]]On Behalf
Of Filippo A. Salustri
Sent: Monday, January 16, 2006 8:16 AM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: Automata and redefinition of design practice (was: Robotic
thought)
I'm with Chuck on this one.
My own experience is that communicating my ideas is often (tho not
always) a matter of finding the right language to map what I'm thinking
into some thing that lets others know what I'm thinking. That is, my
idea doesn't *always* change as a result of the act of using language to
communicate.
This suggests to me that while language is one of many ways of providing
my mind with input about which it can 'think', the idea that results
isn't necessarily a language construct. Language might be necessary,
but I don't think it's sufficient.
As for emotions, my reading of recent work on brain/mind studies is that
neurobiologists distinguish between emotion and feeling, where one is a
physical phenomenon, and the other is a psychological one (I'm not sure
I remember which is which, but that's just a naming problem). One is
the raw reaction of the brain to inputs, the other is the result of
those perceptions working their way through the many layers of filtering
and processing that the brain seems to do automatically before we become
"conscious" of something. The key here is that these things (feelings &
emotions) seem to be how we perceive our own brains' processing of
inputs. Our brains seem to lack the capacity to be aware of all this
processing and still keep us conscious of the usual survival-oriented
things.
And the best models we have of brain function these days is that they do
use 'variables' of some sort, tho not necessarily the crisp, math-like
ones that most people think of when they think of the word 'variable'.
Maybe that'll change some day to something entirely different. But
until it does, I'm happy to work with what we (think we) know. It seems
to be working out pretty well for us. :-)
Cheers.
Fil
Charles Burnette wrote:
> On 1/15/06 1:13 PM, "Klaus Krippendorff" <[log in to unmask]>
> wrote:
>
>
>>i think you overvalue models of emotion and feelings in processes of
design.
>>surely emotions and feelings are essential in human responsiveness to
>>anything, especially in the evaluation of alternatives. but what this
>>assertion misses is the ability to create spaces of possibilities without
>>variables. in my analysis these spaces are created largely in language,
>>which is a social phenomenon, not in a notion of cognition as an
>>individualistic phenomenon. in language we have metaphors, generative
>>vocabularies, and we test them out in conversation and dialogue, not in
any
>>one individual's head.
>
>
> On what evidence do you assert an ability to create spaces of
possibilities
> without variables? Especially if "these spaces are created largely in
> language" which is the means by which variables are identified and
> ultimately defined.
>
> I totally disagree with your last sentence and agree with Terry (I assume)
> that language is tested out in the head of an individual - and their
> interpretation of it is thrust out, so to speak, into social communication
> to determine (and often change) the meanings that others take away from a
> conversation - every bit as much as the individual's interpretation of
> meaning might be ratified or changed by the social response their
expression
> engenders.
>
> Also, in support of Terry's position, Pinker (1997:373) suggests that
> emotions motivate purposeful thought ³We have emotions because we cannot
> pursue all goals at once. The emotions are mechanisms that set the brain's
> highest level goals. Once triggered by a propitious moment, an emotion
> triggers the cascade of goals and subgoals that we call thinking and
> actingBecause the goals and means are woven into a multiply nested
control
> structure of sub-goals within sub-goals within sub-goals, no sharp line
> divides thinking from feeling...." I submit that emotionally triggered
> feelings are essential operators in design.
>
> I enjoy a lively (social) conversation but cherish my individual rights of
> interpretation.
>
> Looking forward to your reply.
> Chuck
--
Prof. Filippo A. Salustri, Ph.D., P.Eng.
Department of Mechanical and Industrial Engineering
Ryerson University Tel: 416/979-5000 x7749
350 Victoria St. Fax: 416/979-5265
Toronto, ON email: [log in to unmask]
M5B 2K3 Canada http://deseng.ryerson.ca/~fil/
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