Re: Three motives for design -- reply to Klausnsenga,
yes, people may may tell all kinds of things in order to avoid embarrassing
questions. often, one can get to what motivated people by asking
non-embarrassing question. these difficulties do not justify the
alternative, however, projecting one's own theory of mentality onto others
without verification that it fits.
personally, i'd rather err after careful listening to people who might not
quite say what they are thinking (because they have to live with what they
say rather than what they think) than err by (self-assuredly) imposing a
theory onto others who are not granted the option to respond or object that
imposition. moreover, if people speak in knowing that they have to live
with what they say, their thinking doesn't really matter to anyone but
themselves.
keeping motivations manifest in communication with those who say they have
them, not just in the exclusive language of an external observer, is a way
to deal with humans as the social beings we are.
klaus
-----Original Message-----
From: Nsenga François-Xavier [mailto:[log in to unmask]]
Sent: Thursday, February 23, 2006 1:21 PM
To: Klaus Krippendorff; [log in to unmask]
Subject: RE : Three motives for design -- reply to Klaus
Dear Klaus,
You wrote:
"-- motives are what people say why they do what they
do. sometimes motives are asserted before engaging in an activity,
sometimes afterwards. but since they are always asserted to someone, they
cannot be separated from their social role, which psychological, mental,
or
cognitive explanations cannot grasp."
In this one and in some other of your posts earlier, it seems to me you -
and many others - give too much credence to "informers" and to what they
tell to "researchers" or enquirers. (Re: Ethnographic reserach approach,
methods = participation/observation, and equipments =questionnaires, etc. )
I rather tend to believe that, for different reasons and in different
circumstances, people do not always necessarily say what are their motives
in responding to questions, and in doing whatever else they do. Especially
when they are aksed and/or when they know they are being observed for whater
reason. Unless, perhaps, you refer only to the ideal of the judeo-xtian
ethos, in which it is a "sin" to tell lies...!
Indeed, and you confirm this yourself, the "social role" of any assertion
is so complex that it can be elucidated only in precise real social exchange
encounters (Assembly), and merely elusively reported through "psychological,
mental and cognitive explantations". However, to me, these "explanations"
are nothing else, not necessarily lies, but just approximate guessings by
the observer/enquirer!
Regards
François
Montréal
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