Dear Fil,
I hope you won't mind me jumping in here, but, I would say,
with all due respect, that it is you who seems to be wont to
use categoricals, not Johann, or at least, not just Johann.
You say, in your reply to Klaus [PhD-Design: 5 not-so-easy
pieces ..., Wed, 25 May 2005] that:
"Science assumes there's an objective reality of some
sort and that we can come to understand that reality
at least in some very weird way."
I would say that what you should say here is that For You,
science assumes there's an objective reality, but it is being
categorical, and categorically wrong, to say that Science
assumes this. Some scientists might assume this, true. But
this does not safely allow you, or these scientists, to say
that Science assumes an objective reality. Science is not a
single unified social activity for which such a claim can be
made, not without being categorical.
Further on, in your (same) reply to Klaus you say that:
"Saying that y = Fx is universally true for ever and everyone
is not something science says. Science says: *as near as we
can tell*, y = Fx."
But here you are being rather slippery, I think, or perhaps I
should say, fishy. In this (admittedly toy) example, the
equation x = F(y) is our theory--to go back to the way Klaus
put it [I'm not sure why you changed this in your reply?].
Now you say that this is to be understood as saying, in
science, that x = F(y) as near as we can tell. But what is it
you want us to understand from this? Is it that
(1) x is, as near as we can tell, the same as F(y),
or is it that
(2) x = F(y) for all the cases we have seen, and can perhaps
imagine?
In case (1) we must re-interpret the mathematical equality
relation, "=", to mean a (non-mathematical) relation of "is as
near as we can tell the same as," whatever this can mean.
In case (2) the "=" remains the usual universally true
(mathematical) equality relation, but you qualify this
mathematical statement (equation, in this case) by saying that
as a formal statement it may not always be true about the
world (or universe).
In case (1), we do not have, I would say, a theory; we have
some kind of ill-conditioned informal observation or hypothesis.
In case (2), we have a theory, but not a formal one, nor a
well expressed one: it's hard, perhaps even impossible, to
know when it is or might be false. Newton's laws of motion
form a theory of motion; one that can be expressed using a set
of well known mathematical expressions. Now, as you will no
doubt hasten to tell me, we can tell that this theory of
motion does not give good explanations for all the kinds of
motions we can observe in our universe. But, this does not
change the fact that these mathematical expressions state
universal relations: you would have to say they are
universally false relations. Nor does calling Newton's theory
of motion wrong or false, help much, since in many engineering
situations, as you well know, it is a more than adequate,
albeit wrong, theory to use.
All this is just a way of saying what I suspect most
scientists and others think, that scientific theories can and
do offer the basis for good ways of explaining
(de-mystifying) and understanding our world, but to do this,
they do not have to bear any necessary relation with any
presumed objective world "out there." Nor, to be useful, do
they always have to offer the most widely true explanation.
Scientific theories are devices built in the doing of science;
they are artefacts of science: artefacts of the languaging we
do when we do science.
But I guess I do not see Science like you do; which is
what makes this good fun, and may be even useful: perhaps
even scientifically useful--a bit like trying to hold
on tight to a slippery fish really.
Best regards,
Tim
Donostia / San Sebastián
==================================================
At 15:20 -0400 25/05/2005, Filippo Salustri wrote:
>Klaus et all,
>
>Klaus Krippendorff wrote:
>>[...]
>>to your point (2). i am not saying that we "cannot" state (or construct
>>theories) of the form "x = F (y)", meaning that x is in a definite (known or
>>objectively describable) relationship to y. we can, and we often do. but
>>claiming such a statement to be true entails that it is true for everyone,
>>for all times, and from all perspectives, especially including god's. such
>>statements have the rhetorical advantage (and theorists in science do take
>>advantage of this form) that its proponents cannot be held responsible for
>>their truths provided they have gathered their data carefully (gathering
>>data means that they existed before being found and independent of the
>>theorist). such statements imply privileged access to reality and are for
>>lack of a better word dogmatic.
>
>That's not how I understand (scientific) theories. Here's how I see it:
>
>Science assumes there's an objective reality of some sort and that we
>can come to understand that reality at least in some very weird way.
>
>We start with a purely abstract logic. I would hazard to say that here,
>we *can* say that it *is* such and such, cuz we're making it up as we go
>and it's not tied to our senses/perceptions.
>
>We then find a mapping between the formal system and some observations.
> Scientists will readily admit that observations are just that -
>they're not really reality. If they find that they can make predictions
>of observations that they haven't already carried out by manipulating
>the formal system and interpretting the manipulations via the mapping,
>then they *suppose* that they have a *model* of some aspect of reality.
> If enough people beat mercilessly upon the theory without finding
>inconsistencies - either formal or observational - then eventually we
>invoke the same argument that even animals use to learn from their
>enviornment - inductive inference.
>
>Saying that y = Fx is universally true for ever and everyone is not
>something science says. Science says: *as near as we can tell*, y = Fx.
> There may be some scientists who believe they've found absolute truth,
>but they'd be wrong because that's not what science admits to.
>
>Now, most people will leave out alot of the in-between steps I've
>suggested here, especially since theories are so large and complex these
>days that developing them from "first principles" would be madness. But
>they're still doing these things. They also tend to leave out the *as
>far as we can tell* part, but that doesn't mean they're "dogmatic".
>
>The desire to make a theory independent of the theorist in science
>arises from a desire to eliminate all biases that might be introduced by
>the theorist. Since science presumes there's an objective reality, then
>removing the theorist is just an attempt to reach the ideal of an actual
>description of that reality.
>
>Whether we ever achieve it is not the point. We're able to do much more
>with science because of this detachment than we could otherwise. And no
>one's suggested anything better yet.
>
>>
>>i would prefer that we become accustomed to a different language game, one
>>in which we explicate our conceptual framework, say what we wanted to see
>>happening, spell out the principles, and heuristics we are using, and
>>demonstrate that could make real what we wanted to see. this is more
>>humble, maintains accountability for what was created, and thus embeds what
>>is created in the interactions among people (collaborators, beneficiaries,
>>and opponents). personally, it is also closer to design.
>
>But logic can do this too. And if logic, than science and math too.
>There are belief logics, action logics, context logics, preference
>logics, and a million other variations. And even when a logician uses a
>construct like, say Ka(p) - that agent a *knows* proposition p - there's
>no commitment made to the meaning of K. Logic lets us be quite crisp
>about what we are treating rationally and what is to be treated by other
>means (e.g. philosophy).
>
>In other words, Klaus, there are formal systems that can treat pretty
>much anything you mentioned above. Perhaps not to the depth of detail
>we would like, but there's lots of people working on that. I have
>little doubt we'll see some very impressive results in the next 10-20 years.
>
>One of logic's great problems is that people don't realise just how rich
>logic can be.
>
>And every logic is just a language.
>
>This is a long (sorry) way of saying that, there *is* a way of saying
>y=Fx and yet still account for all the nuances and details that Klaus
>identifies as things requiring a different approach to the language game.
>
>>designing experiments, for example, could be conceived of not to settle
>>truth claims but to demonstrate ones ability to create data, observing all
>>the customary precautions, that would support one's contentions. others may
>>be more clever in demonstrating the same, and opponents might be more
>>creative experimenter and demonstrate something more interesting or
>>valuable.
>
>This is why science tends to *appear* "dogmatic". In this case,
>"skeptical" would be a better word. Different experiments testing the
>same hypothesis are used all the time to validate scientific theories.
>Different experiments by different experimenters, meant to wash out any
>effects of the experiment itself or the experimenters themselves.
>
>If all the data "created" this way still says F=ma, then the scientific
>community is far more comfortable accepting it.
>
>>
>>as it is, freud is not held responsible for his invention of the
>>unconscious, the stories of childhood determination of adult problems and
>>setting in motion the emergence of a huge industry around psychoanalytic
>>theory.
>
>I'm not sure I understand this. If we did not hold him responsible for
>some of these things, then why do we still associate him so strongly
>with them?
>
>>
>>in your point (3), i think you are stuck with the idea of truth and being
>>right as opposed to wrong. speaking that way always gets you back to a
>>representational notion of truth, and the cartesian idea of knowledge being
>>a mapping of real features in the mind (or the russellian notion in
>>language). you speak of celestial theories. these are perhaps favoring
>>your view as we have little chance at touching the stars or changing the
>>relationship between the earth and the sun, but conceptually this is
>>precisely what we have done.
>>[...]
>
>Sorry, I side with Ken on this: having the Earth go around the Sun and
>so on is *better* than Ptolemy or anyone else's theories because, as
>near as we can figure, this is in fact the *right answer*. As it
>happens, systems like GPS and many telecom satellite networks would not
>work if we used epicycles or other models of the solar system that are
>just plain wrong.
>
>I believe the tendency to prefer global solutions to locally sufficient
>ones is a function of our evolution. Those of our ancestors who had
>more integrated and universal understandings of how things worked around
>them - even if it was just distinguishing jaguars from panthers - were
>able to survive better. Think of two cavemen. One knows that
>foul-smelling red berries are to be avoided. The other knows that all
>foul-smelling berries are to be avoided. I'd wager natural selection
>will quickly dispose of the former.
>
>>
>>i think your example of trusting a doctor who believes in modern medicine is
>>easily discounted. i have personal experiences and know of other stories
>>where a highly recommended doctor after spending 4-digit $ figures for
>>examination came to the diagnosis that an operation would be necessary and
>>then i went to a chiropractor who fixed the problem for $35.- not everyone
>>is the same as theories allege. medicine is a craft, physics should be seen
>>as one as well -- but we should get back to design, not abstract theory.
>
>This is a matter of statistics. A chiropractor will be able to help
>*some* people. And *some* doctors are not particularly good at their
>job. Eventually, the case you describe is bound to occur. This does
>not invalidate modern medicine or even cast doubt on the scientific
>background that gives rise to it.
>
>
>Cheers.
>Fil
>--
>Filippo A. Salustri, Ph.D., P.Eng.
>Department of Mechanical and Industrial Engineering
>Ryerson University
>350 Victoria St, Toronto, ON, M5B 2K3, Canada
>Tel: 416/979-5000 ext 7749
>Fax: 416/979-5265
>Email: [log in to unmask]
>http://deed.ryerson.ca/~fil/
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