Dear Ben,
Thanks for expanding on incommensurability in theory perspectives. I agree with you that theory depends on where one stands.
In the area of design thinking, however, I feel some cross-disciplinary triangulation is potentially possible. For example, if theory says that a particular human process happens by linguistic means, and the empirical evidence indicates that it is only the neurology associated with vision that is functioning when participants report that kind of thinking happens, then this points to potential problems with the linguistic theory.
In the case of emotion, neurology and sense of self, there is a similar triangulation. Where neurological processes associated with sense of self are damaged or missing
then this gives insights into how best to explain emotion and feeling perceptions in theory likely to comport well with models of physiology. Yes, as you suggest, these issues can be viewed separately and construed as answers to different forms of question. They can also, however, be brought together by deriving new theory that integrates the knowledge from multiple disciplines to provide a single broader multi-disciplinary answer to a single question. I feel this is likely to be more helpful in the longer term.
The underlying choice is whether one wants to keep disciplinary models of reality separate, or whether one wants to create theory and models of reality that draw on and integrate knowledge from multiple disciplines. I feel the choice between these two outlooks is mainly a political issue depending on personal investment, rather than being set in stone on epistemological or ontological grounds.
Best regards,
Terry
-----Original Message-----
From: Ben Matthews
Sent: 21/09/2005 3:14 PM
To: Terence Love; [log in to unmask]
Subject: RE: Language or pictures in design thinking? Physical evidence -From Chuck
Dear Terry,
Thanks for your note. I realise, while reading your post, that I've not been as clear as I would have liked about the purpose of my message. I was only trying to advise caution about where we as design researchers look for certain phenomena (i.e. don't try to find 'meaning' in a subject's head). That would be, in my view, a misunderstanding of the notion of 'meaning' as it is ordinarily used and understood. It is not a biological phenomenon in the first instance, but belongs to a network of social and linguistic practices. 'Meaning' and 'understanding' can not be reduced to private, cognitive events.
I wasn't trying to enter the 'language or pictures' debate on the language (or any other) side. I think it's important to realise that irrespective of the explanatory models (e.g. language vs. pictures) we prefer as theorists, we communicate our accounts and understandings of design research in language; our words are intended to say something meaningful about the world. It is at this level of representation that I was pitching my post. It is, I think, a logical truth that no amount of empirical work can clear up conceptual confusions—if the conceptual work isn't done first, we will be left with misinterpretations of what the results of good quality empirical research actually demonstrate.
I have a comment to make on something you said:
--SNIP
I think most people working in this area are very conscious that except in rare cases the biological substrates don't have a deterministic relationship to human action or thought. The relationship is much more complex and includes loops that involve individuals' sense of self and world (and memories). This indicates they are shaped by both physiology and meaning. Our analysis of both is 'at a distance'. On the physiology side, it's hard to relate physiology to human processes that result in action because of the lack of determinacy, and on the 'meaning' side, we can't trust our perceptions or models of underderstanding because of self-delusions at individual or group levels.
--SNIP
Again, I would advise caution here. I think we're talking about two very different modes of explanation, neither of which will ever 'meet in the middle', so to speak. To borrow Ryle's example, there are different answers to the question 'why did the glass break?' To say that it broke because it was brittle, or because it was hit by a ball, are actually answers to different questions. So to, I think are 'biological determinist' perspectives, and, for instance, appeals to an individual's 'sense of self'. These aren't, I think, working out the same problem from two different sides, but working out two importantly different problems.
Kind regards,
Ben
Ben Matthews
Assistant Professor
Mads Clausen Institute for Product Innovation
University of Southern Denmark
Grundtvigs Alle 150
Sønderborg 6400 Denmark
Ph +45 6550 1675
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