chuck,
i responded to your ONLINE characterizations of intentions as causal
managers. you said it off line as well, but i deemed it important enough to
respond to what you said online.
the paper by ashby is "principles of the self-organizing system" and it
appeared in a volume edited by von foerster and zopf (1962) titled
"principles of self-organizing systems." it contains many fascinating
ideas. most are superseded, however, by the concept of autopoiesis and
subsequent work on self-organization.
incidentally the theory of autopoiesis suggests that no autopoietic system,
and that includes the human biology, can be instructed (determined,
informed, or caused) from its outside. it means that short of destroying a
human being by physical force (i.e., by a physical cause), there is no way
to cause people think the way they think, much less to have causal
explanations for perceptions and the like.
klaus
-----Original Message-----
From: Charles Burnette [mailto:[log in to unmask]]
Sent: Sunday, January 09, 2005 6:58 PM
To: Klaus Krippendorff; Michael A R Biggs; Ken Friedman; Wolfgang Jonas;
[log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: Design and intention
Klaus:
I really wanted not to disrupt the current developments on the list but
since you responded on list I feel the need to reply.
On 1/9/05 3:06 PM, "Klaus Krippendorff" <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
> your intention effectively distinguishes one part of the brain, which is
> causally managed, from another part, which does the managing.
You are absolutely right here! My theory holds that intention manages what
is attended to in order to reach the goals of intention. No problem.
you might recall
> an early ashby paper, which you probably read).
From your class in cybernetics? I would like to read it again and make my
own response. Could you reference it for me?
then you (at least i) would
> be lead to ask what causes the intentions to be what they are and you
> probably would come to a homunculus-like construction of the brain.
Way off! (and even a little offensive) My construction is entirely based on
the "information" (neural potentials) in the brain and the way I theorize
that they are organized and interact in thought.
Also the "intentional fallacy" you and Michael have referenced concerns the
idea that an authors intention should not be the basis for literary judgment
of their work. I do not think it is relevant to what I am saying as the last
public post indicated (ie causal effects have many interpretations).
Let's stay offlist.
Chuck
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