Dear Klaus and Ken,

I hope you won't mind me stepping in here ... stepping in with
you, not between you, I hope.

It's agreed: the word theory has roots in the notion of a
"god's eye" view.  (Though Wikipedia only talks about the
etymology of theory deriving from the Greek 'theorein',
meaning 'to look at'?)

It is further agreed: theory construction is a human activity;
we don't get our theories from the gods.

So, as you point out, Klaus: theories can only be the result
of a human view of things, not a god's eye view; a human view
that necessarily involves human decided interests, relevances,
values, together with human motives, intentions, means, and
ends, etc. All of which lead to serious epistemological issues
and attendant difficulties in theory construction.

I take these epistemological difficulties to be all part of
the job of theory construction: a hard job because of these
kinds of difficulties.  But, including their identification
and proper treatment in the presentation of the theory being
worked on, as you seem to be asking for, Klaus, doesn't seem
to me to be practical.  Theories are, I think, best presented
in a clear concise form, uncluttered by other theory
construction scaffolding and artefacts etc.

However, I do agree that current practices in presenting
theories do give them an omni-ness that theories do not
deserve, and theory constructors do, all to often, like to
give the impression that their theories are received from the
god's.

So, to me, the issue here is, where should we put all this
author related stuff that is a inevitable part of any theory
construction?  It is not a part of the phenomenon that the
theory is about: its not a part of designing, in the case of
theories of designing.  It's meta to the phenomenon, but is
the fabric in which our theories are embroidered: an often
rough, poorly finished, and stained fabric, with many holes,
lose ends, and dangling threads, and much unevenness in the
weave.

To me, all this 'fabric of our theories' is a part of the
philosophy-of; a necessary part of the philosophy of design,
in the case of theories of designing.  Working out this fabric
involves, as you identify, Klaus, identifying, recognising,
accepting, and sorting out difficult epistemological issues.
This, I think, mostly involves a philosophical treatment,
which should be made explicit and provided together with any
presentation of the theory itself.

You say, Klaus, that you do not want to create this
philosophical discipline--the philosophy of design needed for
good theory of designing construction.  Yet, for me, you, more
than anybody, both identify and make clear the need for making
these (I would say philosophical) aspects of theory
construction explicit and open to view, discussion, and
argument, not just the resulting theory.  I don't think you
can do theory construction without doing some philosophical
work too, so I think we do need this philosophical discipline,
and to learn how to practice it well, and to present its
workings.

Best regards,

Tim
Donostia / San Sebastián
The Basque Country

====================================================

At 21:40 -0500 29/11/2005, Klaus Krippendorff wrote:
>dear ken,
>
>the point we discussed before and on which we seem not to agree can be
>exemplified in the disconnect between stated belief and action.  you said,
>and i agree:
>
>"Even though the word theory is rooted in an earlier word meaning the "god's
>eye" view, theory construction is a human activity."
>
>yes, theory construction is a human activity.  theories are also
>propositional in construction, i.e., they consist of propositions meant to
>be either true or false (and when statistics is involved in
>probabilistically so).  propositions of the kind "A is contained in B," "A
>correlates with B," "A is the cause of B," or "A interacts with B" can be
>put to a test and if the evidence warrants, be taken as a theory of the
>relationship between A and B.  propositions occur in language and their
>testing occurs in a language game called validation.
>
>the problem is that in theories, so conceived, the acts of constructing
>them, of designing the conditions for generating relevant evidence, as well
>as the interests of their proponents do not appear in their statement, are
>ignored in favor of that god's eye view, a superior view indeed, a view from
>nowhere or everywhere.  the propositional forms that theorists use to state
>their theories hides their creators, makes their proponents invisible, which
>has the dubious advantage of avoiding accountability (and putting reality,
>the data, in the position of the arbiter of their truths).
>
>you say, correctly, that theory construction is a human activity.  of course
>it is, but if you believe that, should i not expect that theorists say why
>and how they designed them the way they did and what they wish to accomplish
>with their publication (like all designers should ultimately do).  i see a
>disconnect between SAYING THAT theories are human creations, and STATING
>theories in a form that claims to represent reality "the way it is" --
>without acknowledging there invention.
>
>this is why i prefer gibson's affordances to functions in understanding
>artifacts,
>why i prefer that theoreticians admit designing their method of generating
>the needed data to claiming to have found supporting evidence for a theory,
>and why i am more interested in epistemology than in the construction of an
>observerless ontology.
>
>when you say that my effort to "redesign design" IS a "philosophy of
>design," you state a proposition that categorizes my efforts -- without my
>consent.  my webster dictionary suggests that a philosophy of X is a
>philosophy, a discipline related to X but different from X.  as i said, i do
>not wish to create that philosophical discipline and i find the god's eye
>view of the world not merely epistemologically problematic but simply
>unethical.
>
>klaus
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: PhD-Design - This list is for discussion of PhD studies and
>related research in Design [mailto:[log in to unmask]]On Behalf
>Of Ken Friedman
>Sent: Tuesday, November 29, 2005 9:04 AM
>To: [log in to unmask]
>Subject: Re: Philosophy of Design -- Short Response to Klaus
>
>
>Dear Klaus,
>
>Thanks for this thoughtful reply. You raise here a couple of basic
>position questions that we have debated before.  I may be able to
>offer a more satisfactory answer than I have apparently given in the
>past. Without imagining that I can convert you to my position, I hope
>to explain my position more clearly so that you may understand why I
>see things as I do and how.
>
>What I will say now is brief: I do not believe that we only gain an
>overview at the price of removing ourselves from the ground we are
>surveying. We are part of the ground in many cases, and any overview
>or survey must explicitly acknowledge our location and position
>within the view. This is the basis of many hermeneutical modes of
>inquiry, and it is the basis of such perspectives as the Mead-Blumer
>tradition of symbolic interactionism or the realist versions of
>social constructivism exemplified by Berger and Luckmann or Searle.
>Theory does not emerge in a vacuum. Even though the word theory is
>rooted in an earlier word meaning the "god's eye" view, theory
>construction is a human activity.
>
>Answering you seriously will take time. This requires time I do not
>have now. Beyond this, I do not want to fragment an interesting
>current thread. Instead, I will give this a few weeks of thought,
>write a careful answer, and return to you with my answer in the New
>Year.
>
>Our conversations are always informative and productive. You set a
>high standard of inquiry, and I want to give this the attention it
>deserves. Even though I may be wrong, I hope to be wrong in an
>interesting and productive way. That takes time.
>
>Warm wishes,
>
>Ken
>
>--
>
>Klaus Krippendorff wrote:
>
>dear ken,
>
>i cannot help if you read as a philosophy of design what i had
>intended to be a recursive conception of informed design, and i would
>not want to argue with you about your right to interpret differently
>what you read. but i would ask you to explore and say why you do
>that. you see myself disagreeing with you about the possibility of
>construction a "theoretical overview" of a field, which the prefix
>"meta" encourages. this is far from so. you can do that. others have
>done that, and i understand that this is what you have in mind when
>you go from "design of design" to "metadesign" and to a "philosophy
>of design" as if they were (almost) the same. also when you and terry
>attempt to map various sub fields of design. yes, it can be done but
>at the costs of removing yourself from the ground that you are
>surveying and this is why metaphysics is not physics and physics is
>not nature.
>
>i hope you realize that the "overview" that you equate with "meta-"
>is part of the metaphor of "knowing is seeing," which privileges the
>god's eye view of detached, physically removed, and vastly superior
>observers. i have suggested frequently that this observer role (of
>scientific re-search) is incompatible with design, which to my
>understanding is an activity that entails involvement with real
>people, encourages change, employs creativity, and invokes
>innovation. your conception of a philosophy of design is, as my
>dictionary definition says "a different but related discipline that
>critically examines," and, in jerry diethelm's post, claims to be
>foundational to design. i agree with those who suspect such master
>narratives to be efforts of logical empire building.
>
>instead, i prefer to understand design as an informed social practice
>-- it can be understood without going outside it, above it, beyond
>it, and then claiming "objectivity" to what still is nothing more
>than understanding.
>
>cheers
>
>klaus