chuck, since you repeated your declaration of your interest from off line
communications, i am copying my reply:
i understand your intent to conceive of intention as a causal manager of
thought.
your intention effectively distinguishes one part of the brain, which is
causally managed, from another part, which does the managing. (this issue
has been dealt with in the self-organization literature. you might recall
an early ashby paper, which you probably read). then you (at least i) would
be lead to ask what causes the intentions to be what they are and you would
probably come to a homunculus-like construction of the brain.
i suggested that causal arguments and mentalistic concepts do not help to
shed light on design the way i see it. i agree with michael, the two of us
do come from different explanatory traditions, which is not to say that we
probably deep down agree on what design is if we see it happening (without
the pollution of reifying abstractions).
klaus
-----Original Message-----
From: Charles Burnette [mailto:[log in to unmask]]
Sent: Sunday, January 09, 2005 2:48 PM
To: Klaus Krippendorff; [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: Design and intention
Klaus, Rosan et al
On 1/9/05 2:13 PM, "Klaus Krippendorff" <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
> the meaning of communication is not determinable by the communicator (the
> intentional fallacy).
>
> a designer can make a proposal but if nobody reads it as a proposal, it
did
> not propose (or specify) anything.
I think the point here is not that the proposal has no effect - just not the
linear classically causal effect that may have been intended. If a proposal
is ignored that to me qualifies as an effect (that is even measurable).
I am interested in intention as a causal manager of thought which requires a
capacity to act to effect change. That change may be interpreted in a
variety of ways without negating its causal origin.
chuck
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