On 2/10/05 6:55 PM, "Terence Love" <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
> Although these (cognitive blackbox) models are theory-wise detached in
physical representation from
> the subject (humans and their functioning), they currently offer a parallel
> representation to the physiological knowledge that has reasonable correlation
> between the input and output relations of the model and of the real situations
> - thus offering some value in prediction and in heuristics for planning and
> design using this material (e.g. in advertising).
Although I agree with you that knowledge of neurobiology offers a good basis
to test theories that purport to represent thought, but I think you overlook
the fact that all neurobiological evidence has to be interpreted (usually
through language) in order for us to grasp what it is about. Kosslyn for
example, posits all kinds of mental subsystems in order to interpret the
physical evidence that he has and folks like Edelmann and Damasio can say a
lot about brain function but not much about purposeful thought that
addresses a particular situation without referring to behavioral evidence.
Bastick needs a construct of emotional sets to represent his evidence but
then he is winging it. My view is that we must interpret both
neurobiological evidence and evidence of how we use language in order to
build a theory of designing. The test is ultimately in the utility of the
interpretation. The black box will be full of words. Their operational
structure will have to be teased out by correlating what we know about how
the box is made with how it seems to deploy words and other evidence of
behavior. We will never "know" what is in the mind any other way.
Klaus said ..."claims that a model
would give you insights about what is inside the box. this is the
fundamental mistake that some cognitive scientists make when claiming that
they could say something about how the human brain works."
I think that damns them unduly. To me they are simply interpreting how they
assume the mind to work based on what they take as evidence of their ideas
about it. How they choose their evidence and reason with it is what is
important. As Terry points out it must not violate neurobiological evidence.
But, interpretation of cognitive experience is what theories of thinking are
about. Again, it is the Utility of the theory that is important and the
cognitive linguists seem to have gotten further toward a useful theory of
thinking than the rest of us.
Best to all,
Chuck
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