chuck,
come on.
what are you trying to say?

sure, when i speak of theories of causation, i speak of what scientists say
they construct, physicists in particular. i never said that "causes are
predictive." causes are explanatory constructs to shed light on happenings,
which when linked by physical necessity are called consequences. within
this explanatory framework causes and consequences define each other.. you
can't call something a consequence without a cause and visa versa.

i said that causal "theories are tested" by predictions. prediction does
not mean forecasting. pre-diction means before you know it by observation.
it can go forwards, backwards and sideways in time. the reason for testing
causal theories by predictions has to do with their generalization to yet
unobserved phenomena. natural scientists want to prevent their theories
from being spurious explanations.

what i am trying to get across is that we should be aware of what particular
explanatory schemes are capable of explaining and what their limitations
are. not distinguishing between different kinds of explanations, settling
on one and generalizing it by metaphorical extension to everything is
intellectually impoverishing the discourse.

you argue against the need for causal theories to be predictive, you give
the example of holding someone responsible for having caused an accident. i
am disappointed that you used this example because it followed terry's apt
distinction between physical causation and what he called blaming. there is
a difference between pulling the trigger of a gun and the trajectory of the
bullet. why someone pulls the gun is explained by action theory. why the
bullet flies the way it does and eventually hits the ground and the impact
it has there is subject to physical laws. by not distinguishing between
human-centered and mechanism-centered explanation we either treat humans as
mechanisms, which is the error that i see many natural scientists are
getting into, or we assign anthropomorphism to the universe, as evident in
religious opposition to the theory of evolution. neither is acceptable to
me personally.

i see not contradiction between dawkins progression:
< physical universe - before - darwinian multitudes - before - designed
multiverse,
each comes to us due to incompatible explanatory frameworks. dawkins
recognized the difference. we should too.

klaus




-----Original Message-----
From: Charles Burnette User [mailto:[log in to unmask]]
Sent: Thursday, January 06, 2005 2:34 PM
To: Klaus Krippendorff; [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: Nature and nurture in education [was Re: talent]


Klaus:

In being clear you seem to be stuck in the world of physical causality (for
which you provide a good scientific rationale). Your insistence that causal
theories must be predictive as evidenced by repeated trials and "causal
theories are strictly limited to describe a mechanical universe without
purposes, without choices". underline the point. (The without purpose,
without choices describes natural selection, contradicting your progressive
schema of physical- evolution- design which I agree with except for your
limits on causal reasoning) Your position surprises me because you often
speak of social causation and do not seem to deny the existence of causal
reasoning in design.

I do not agree that causes must be predictive to be explanatory. For
example: The statement "that man caused this accident" says nothing about
the future behavior of the man but it does explain the situation.

I prefer to stay with a broader view of causality that is open to all
actions that have consequences. This allows intentions and complex
situations to be causes and "designs" to be "consequences" or even
"products".


Chuck