chuck,
i see why you can't let it go. you have settled on one concept of language
that now speaks you. in fact you said it well:
Language is an abstract logical system that objectifies what it represents.
It is, of course, a looser logical system that allows you to
negotiate the meaning of its terms and rules. But to "language" at all is to
"withdraw into (an) abstract logical system"
volosinov called this the abstract/objectivist theory of language which is
codified by saussure and the logical positivists. i am attaching a table
comparing this with three other theories whereby i would not want to claim
that this is an exhaustive set, merely a heuristic to show the existence of
differences that are created by these distinctions. (the list prevented me
from doing so. if you want the table, i can send it individually. it
distinguishes between volosinov's two theories: abstract/objectivist,
individual/subjectivist and hermeneutic/interpretive and
constitutive/constructive)
to me, abstraction is not objectification, however.
objectification is making an object out of something that is not or could be
otherwise. for example, extracting a system called language from the
process of speaking and human communication, (which can be much more than
juggling representations, for example maintaining relationships, declaring
something to be such and such). unemployment and crime are examples of
objectification. people are employed or unemployed and they engage in
activities that the legal system of a country punishes. one can compute the
proportion of those who are unemployed, which is a number. when you say
unemployment causes crime, you have made the proportion into an object or a
cause that does certain things to another object called crime. abstractions
cannot cause anything except in the mind of someone. the same is true for
"fear itself." fear is someone's feeling that is part of the contruct that
something terrible could happen, for example, joe's fear of loosing his job.
to abstract that feeling out of someone's (or a whole population's) body and
ascribing independent existence and causal powers to it is objectification.
there is another feature of objectification and that is to deny the
constructedness of phenomena in question. for example, the statement "we
are at war" is not subject to simple truth conditions. someone can die,
someone can be verified as being killed, but to be at war requires a
declaration of war. bush did this but denies that he is the one who made it
so.
i while ago, i suggested that ken's writing was objectivist for stating what
IS the case, or which ARE the distinctions, as opposed to how he sees it and
the kind of distinctions he proposes for good reasons. IS-statements
objectify, but this is not a necessary property of speaking.
Why isn't consistency as valuable as completeness when being objective?
i never said that one is preferable to the other. i merely restated goedel
proof that logical systems cannot be both. as i am not sold to an
abstract/objectivist notion of language, i am less concerned with
consistency and completeness.
does this clarify my thinking on this matter?
klaus
Klaus,
I can't let it go. Language is an abstract logical
system that objectifies what it represents. It is, of
course, a looser logical system that allows you to
negotiate the meaning of its terms and rules. But to
"language" at all is to "withdraw into (an) abstract
logical system" of a sort in which we each negotiate
the meaning we individually take away from the
interaction of the objects we create. You taught me
that.
Why isn't consistency as valuable as completeness when
being objective? I know, from a cognitive perspective,
it is a victim of negotiation and shifts in stance but
so is completeness. Maybe that is that what you mean
when you say "neither". It is the "not necessarily"
object that I'm negotiating the meaning of. Actually,
you may have already answered this to some degree in
your second paragraph if I mull it out.
Best
Dr. Charles Burnette
234 South Third Street
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Tel: +215 629 1387
e-mail: [log in to unmask]
-----Original Message-----
From: PhD-Design - This list is for discussion of PhD
studies and
related research in Design
[mailto:[log in to unmask]]On Behalf
Of klaus krippendorff
Sent: Thursday, April 01, 2004 2:14 AM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: parts, wholes, reflection, etc.
as all abstractions are based on the omission of
details and particularly on
denying a voice to those being theorized, logic does
not escape that fate.
you mentioned that set theory is a system that can be
either incomplete and
consistent or complete and inconsistent. true. this
is goedel's theory and
is applicable to all logical systems of some
complexity. your's part/whole
logic will not excape that
i prefer not to develop and withdraw into abstract
logical systems.
instead, i like to listen to what is going on or try
to understand what it
means for me to participate in conversations.
participation implicates a
part/whole relationship but one that is continually
being negotiated,
thriving neither to completeness and not necessarily
consistency
klaus krippendorff
gregory bateson term professor for cybernetics,
language, and culture
the annenberg school for communication
university of pennsylvania
3620 walnut street
philadelphia, pa 19104.6220
phone: 215.898.7051 (O); 215.545.9356 (H)
fax: 215.898.2024 (O); 215.545.9357 (H)
usa
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