Hi Klaus,

You coments in you last post focus on the human aspects of perceiving and sensing, echoed in 'we are perceiving'. I'm concerned this depends strongly on giving a lot of  ego status and reified priviledge to the idea of self. That is, it assumes and presumes that each of us is predominately a 'whole being'.

An alternative  perspective is that the reality seems to be that each of us is more like an evolutionary-developed organic robot  rather than the 'reified  individual person'. Much and perhaps all of our behaviour, thoughts and perceptions are routinised, habituated and fixated - and that refers to the few aspects of us that are not relatively hard wired. It seems,  from lots of perspectives, that the idea of an 'I' or a 'we' that is doing the perceiving or has agency is much an illusion - or rather a self -interested 'self-delusion' . 

I am wondering how you factor this in to theorising about ontology and epistemology? This is not an idle speculation. Much of the work of designers is aimed at manipulating users thinking and behaviours - it assumes that individuals, all of us, are substantially programmable and programmmed. If this is true, it is difficult to reconcile with a philosphical perspective that there really is an 'I' or a 'we'  that is/are perceiving or sensing

Best regards,

Terry
____________________

Curtin Research Fellow
Dept of Design
Curtin University
Perth, Western Australia
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Visiting Research Fellow
Institute for Entrepreneurship and Enterprise Development
Management School
Lancaster University
Lancaster, UK
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-----Original Message-----
From: klaus krippendorff
Sent: 12/05/2004 4:59 AM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: Theory-focused understanding of ontology & epistemology


i am simply arguing against the distinction between our perception and
something being perceived.  we are perceiving, and perception is embedded in
our sensory-motor coordination, not in sensing something.

klaus krippendorff
gregory bateson term professor for cybernetics, language, and culture
the annenberg school for communication
university of pennsylvania
3620 walnut street
philadelphia, pa 19104.6220
phone: 215.898.7051 (O); 215.545.9356 (H)
fax: 215.898.2024 (O); 215.545.9357 (H)
usa


-----Original Message-----
From: Filippo A. Salustri [mailto:[log in to unmask]]
Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2004 1:19 PM
To: klaus krippendorff
Cc: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: Theory-focused understanding of ontology & epistemology


Klaus et al, comments embedded below.

klaus krippendorff wrote:
> well, you hold on to the idea that the physics of things could explain
your
> perception.  you live in the objective/subjective distinction, privileging
> the objective and considering the subjective inferior, simplified,
> distorted, biased, etc. -- this is the approach of descartes.

I didn't say perceptions are "inferior", did I?  I didn't mean to give that
impression.  For me, perceptions are natural things resulting from natural
processes, and so are no more or less than any other natural thing or
process.  However, whatever "I" am is on one side of the perception barrier
and everything "I" perceive is on the other.  Everything "I" do or think or
feel is only perceived - I say "only" not to diminish perceptions but to
distinguish them from the things being perceived.  I have nothing but my
perceptions upon which to even believe that such things as perceptions
exist.

Indeed, I just thought of an analogy.  A magnet 'perceives' another magnet
only by the effect caused by the other on the one.  Which perception of the
other magnet is the 'right' one?  Ours or that of the one magnet?  (This
may suck as an analogy - and I apologise if it does - but it seems to work
for me).

> you asked what is a perception?  i suggest that it is what you see, what
you
> recognize.  if you recognize a duck then you would have had some
experiences
> with ducks.  and if you say you've seen a duck, then you have experiences
> with how ducks occur in language as well.  you managed to coordinate your
> perceptions, your languaging, and your actions vis-a-vis your history of
> experiences with ducks.  there are no ducks without you being able to
> distinguish them as such.  physics can say little about ducks, much less
> explain what it is that you are perceiving.

I'll buy the lack of ducks without me observing them, but not in the
quantum tree-falling-in-the-forest way.  I think that there *is* something
there, which we have come to regard as a duck.  But I have no way of
knowing what it really is.

Klaus, you seem to suggest that a perception is really the thing that
happens sort of after the sensory process of seeing, smelling, etc, and
before/during the conscious part of the whole perception thing.  Is that
right?  That's fine by me.  I just think that this part is also just a
natural process in our brains.  Do you think it is more (or less) than that?

> your trying to hold on to the belief in the existence of an
> observer-independent reality diminishes the appreciation of what humans
are,
> do, and construct.  it prevents you to see yourself, your own contribution
> to your own world.

On the contrary; since I've come to hold these beliefs, I feel much more
connected to the universe and feel much more driven to contribute, learn,
and do.  Your mileage may vary.  Vive la difference!

Cheers.
Fil

> klaus krippendorff
> gregory bateson term professor for cybernetics, language, and culture
> the annenberg school for communication
> university of pennsylvania
> 3620 walnut street
> philadelphia, pa 19104.6220
> phone: 215.898.7051 (O); 215.545.9356 (H)
> fax: 215.898.2024 (O); 215.545.9357 (H)
> usa
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Filippo A. Salustri [mailto:[log in to unmask]]
> Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 4:59 PM
> To: klaus krippendorff
> Cc: [log in to unmask]
> Subject: Re: Theory-focused understanding of ontology & epistemology
>
>
> Klaus et al,
>
> While I can accept what you say about models and, for e.g. maps, I worry
> about the bit at the end about perceptions.
>
> What is a perception?  I take it to be a physical process of light (or
> sound, or whatever) being detected by my brain from its sensor (eyes,
> ears,...) and then doing something with it that "I" am not aware of.
> Eventually, "I" recognise the result of that process as something.  I am
> not sure that anyone knows what happens between the receipt of the
external
> input and "my" recognition of it.
>
> Since everything I base my existence on is based purely on perceptions
> (what exactly is "I"?), then I can say that (a) I can never know anything
> objectively, including whether or not there is anything objective, or (b)
> there is something objective and I can perceive it subjectively.  The
> perception itself may have an objective component, but if it does, I can
> only perceive it subjectively.  So tho I can live with "perceptions" being
> "real" (objective), I cannot know them for sure cuz I condemned to have
> access to only the subjective interpretations of those perceptions - cuz I
> don't have access to what the perceptions "really" are - I'm not conscious
> of my own brain's functioning.
>
> I choose to believe that option (b) makes the most sense.  I guess you
> could say I take it as an article of faith (although I prefer 'axiom' :-)
>
> Going back to the model thing, a model of a thing is a subjective
> equivalent of the thing although its objective reality might be quite
> different.  To alter an aphorism slightly, if it looks like a duck and
> quacks like a duck, then it's a model of a duck. :-)
>
> Cheers.
> Fil
>
> klaus krippendorff wrote:
>
>>fil
>>you can decide whether a model is a model of something else only if you
>
> know
>
>>what the model models independent of the model you are judging for its
>>perfection.
>>suppose you are given a roadmap and find your way from A to B (without
>>difficulty), then you could say that the map has informed your action.
>
> but
>
>>A, B, and the map are perceived and (successfully) acted upon.  neither
>
> lets
>
>>you conclude anything about objective reality (nor about subjective
>>reality).
>>you say you "prefer" ... to see the model as "a subjective interpretation
>
> of
>
>>an objective reality."  this is paramount to saying that you prefer the
>>illusion of being able to access the objective reality without your
>
> senses.
>
>>think about the roadmap example:  all you have access to is your
>
> perceptions
>
>>and actions.  i would prefer not to diminish them by considering them
>>subjective (as opposed to objective).
>>
>>klaus krippendorff
>>gregory bateson term professor for cybernetics, language, and culture
>>the annenberg school for communication
>>university of pennsylvania
>>3620 walnut street
>>philadelphia, pa 19104.6220
>>phone: 215.898.7051 (O); 215.545.9356 (H)
>>fax: 215.898.2024 (O); 215.545.9357 (H)
>>usa
>>
>>
>>-----Original Message-----
>>From: Filippo Salustri [mailto:[log in to unmask]]
>>Sent: Monday, May 03, 2004 7:28 PM
>>To: klaus krippendorff
>>Cc: [log in to unmask]
>>Subject: Re: Theory-focused understanding of ontology & epistemology
>>
>>
>>Klaus,
>>
>>While I see your point, I prefer to look at it differently.  That is,
>>the model is a result of our perceptions, which I take to be a
>>subjective interpretation of an objective reality.  When I say 'no model
>>is perfect', I mean more precisely that no model is a perfect
>>representation of the modelled thing - if it were, then it would
>>identical (in our subjective perception) to the thing itself.  And
>>although it still wouldn't (necessarily) be identical to the thing
>>itself in objective reality, we wouldn't be able to tell.
>>
>>Cheers.
>>Fil
>>
>>klaus krippendorff wrote:
>>
>>
>>>by saying "no model is perfect" you have not moved out of the box of
>>>representationalism, of seeing things in terms of objectivity and
>>>subjectivity, the principle polarity of cartesianism
>>>
>>>klaus krippendorff
>>>gregory bateson term professor for cybernetics, language, and culture
>>>the annenberg school for communication
>>>university of pennsylvania
>>>3620 walnut street
>>>philadelphia, pa 19104.6220
>>>phone: 215.898.7051 (O); 215.545.9356 (H)
>>>fax: 215.898.2024 (O); 215.545.9357 (H)
>>>usa
>>>
>>>
>>>-----Original Message-----
>>>From: PhD-Design - This list is for discussion of PhD studies and
>>>related research in Design [mailto:[log in to unmask]]On Behalf
>>>Of Filippo A. Salustri
>>>Sent: Friday, April 23, 2004 5:12 PM
>>>To: [log in to unmask]
>>>Subject: Re: Theory-focused understanding of ontology & epistemology
>>>
>>>
>>>Klaus,
>>>
>>>Maybe I'm misunderstanding you, but as I read your note I can't help but
>>>think that it's not as bad as all that.
>>>
>>>You wrote "...knowledge as a representation of what is known outside the
>>>knower..."  I would say that knowledge is not a representation of what is
>>>known - it *is* what is known.  And what is known (knowledge) is a model
>>
>>(a
>>
>>
>>>representation) of what is outside the knower (assuming there's anything
>>>there at all).
>>>
>>>No model is perfect, by definition.  A perfect model is the modelled
thing
>>>and is no longer a model.  You can substitute 'representation' for
'model'
>>>here.
>>>
>>>A bad representation shouldn't be dismissed when found to be inaccurate.
>>>It may still be useful in certain restricted circumstances (e.g.
Newtonian
>>>v. Einsteinian mechanics).  A representation so bad that it must be
>>>replaced is also useful in guiding the search for a better
>>
>>representation -
>>
>>
>>>i.e. learning from our mistakes.
>>>
>>>Seeing "outside the box", as far as I can tell, is mostly recognising
that
>>>the "natural constraints" (your words) are in fact not constraints at
>>
>>all -
>>
>>
>>>something done by knowing about the constraints and acting on that
>>>knowledge - which itself requires models (Oy Vay!)
>>>
>>>In other words, I see ontologies as one way of *promoting* thinking in
new
>>>ways, by giving people an apparatus to structure one's thinking.  One can
>>>then examine that structure - thanks to the ontology - and look for
>>>different ways of doing things.  Without the structure, one's thinking
>>>begins to look like an amorphous blob, which is far more difficult to
>>>reason about.
>>>
>>>Indeed, I think 'flashes of inspiration' are really just our brains
>>
>>working
>>
>>
>>>unconsciously on a problem and suddenly finding the way to fit the
>>
>>problem,
>>
>>
>>>jigsaw-like, into the existing 'model' we have about the problem's
>>
>>domain -
>>
>>
>>>or, of course, the brain suddenly rearranging the model to suit the
>>>problem.  I visualise it as one of my son's baby toys: a box with various
>>>shaped holes, through which blocks can pass only if oriented properly.
>>
>>The
>>
>>
>>>box is our brain, the blocks are the problem.  When we find the right
>>>orientation, the 'problem' block falls through into 'brain' box and the
>>>lightbulb goes on over our heads.  DING!
>>>
>>>.... hmph; and now, back to grading exams.
>>>
>>>Cheers.
>>>Fil
>>>
>>>klaus krippendorff wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>sorry, i am in a rush right now but i feel obligated to at least try
>>>>
>>>>if you conceptualize knowledge as a representation of what is known
>>>
>>>outside
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>the knower, then you are led to the conception of the brain as a kind of
>>>
>>>map
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>making device, which can be accurate or inaccurate.  if accurate then
you
>>>>are led to consider the map an objective representation of reality.  if
>>>
>>>you
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>find that map inaccurate, then you dismiss it as a subjective
>>>>representation.  you blame the brain, interference from emotions, mental
>>>>deficiencies, etc for it.
>>>>
>>>>the fascinating areas of being human reside in our ability to engage the
>>>>world in our own conceptions, for example, by designing something new,
>>>>ignoring the constraints that people thought were natural, thinking out
>
> of
>
>>>>the box.  the notion of knowledge as a representation and the attendant
>>>>construction of an ontology that everyone is to represent accurately
>>>
>>>leaves
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>little space for inventing realities to dwell in them
>>>>
>>>>i could also talk about the oppressive use of ontologies, which are
>>>>constructed by someone, but then imposed on others who are asked to
>>>
>>>compare
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>their knowledge to it, denying the constructedness of ontology.
>>>>
>>>>klaus krippendorff
>>>>gregory bateson term professor for cybernetics, language, and culture
>>>>the annenberg school for communication
>>>>university of pennsylvania
>>>>3620 walnut street
>>>>philadelphia, pa 19104.6220
>>>>phone: 215.898.7051 (O); 215.545.9356 (H)
>>>>fax: 215.898.2024 (O); 215.545.9357 (H)
>>>>usa
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>-----Original Message-----
>>>>From: Eduardo Corte-Real [mailto:[log in to unmask]]
>>>>Sent: Thursday, April 22, 2004 9:01 PM
>>>>To: [log in to unmask]; [log in to unmask]
>>>>Cc: Eduardo Corte-Real
>>>>Subject: Re: Theory-focused understanding of ontolog & epistemology
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>Dear Klaus:
>>>>
>>>>You wrote:
>>>>
>>>>"what i think you do not realize, and if you do, you should at least
>
> admit
>
>>>>it, that by locating epistemology in the relationship between real world
>>>>objects and theories about these real world objects you identify
yourself
>>>>with the cartesian paradigm with the kind of representationalism that
>>>>philosophers have tried to get out of since vico, which has been
>>>
>>>recognized
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>as a failure in conceptions of perception since gibson, etc. etc.
>>>>your need for an ontology is the logical consequence of adopting this
>>>
>>>view.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>it has nothing to do with how objects are.
>>>>i found the conception of humans that this view entails dispicable, and
>>>
>>>the
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>notion of epistemology eroded to simple representationalism."
>>>>
>>>>I fail to see the relation between dispicable conceptions of humans and
>>>>the erosion of epistemology 'till simple representationalism.
>>>>Could you please elaborate on that?
>>>>
>>>>Until now I only trusted two guys about knowledge:
Jean-Auguste-Dominique
>>>>Ingres and Thomas Mann. Were they simple representationalists? Were they
>>>>dispicably viewing humans? I'm worried. Could you or old Giambattista or
>>>>old Gibson ease my uncomfortable comfort about representation.
>>>>I remember Hans Castorp lost in the snow and fog with no linearity as
>>>>reference for time and space as much as I remember Nicolo Paganini's
>>>>portrait so lost on that same linearity. Their lost faces call upon the
>>>>ancient Egiptian priests that could calculate the limitis of fields
>>>>submerged by the Nil river. By making present the flooded places for
>>>>agriculture during the flood, outside the blurness of the flood, on
their
>>>>minds, they invented immagination which the Greeks came to call "Ideai".
>>>>
>>>>If you could explain me the human dispicability of eroding epistemology
>
> to
>
>>>>anything that one's like, specially to simple representationalism, I
>
> swear
>
>>>>to God that I'll stop smoking, drinking and dreaming about eating a
whole
>>>>truffle.
>>>>
>>>>Best,
>>>>
>>>>Eduardo
>>>
>>>
>>>--
>>>Prof. Filippo A. Salustri, Ph.D., P.Eng.
>>>Department of Mechanical and Industrial Engineering
>>>Ryerson University                         Tel: 416/979-5000 x7749
>>>350 Victoria St.                           Fax: 416/979-5265
>>>Toronto, ON                                email: [log in to unmask]
>>>M5B 2K3  Canada                            http://deed.ryerson.ca/~fil/
>>>
>>
>>
>>--
>>Filippo A. Salustri, Ph.D., P.Eng.
>>Department of Mechanical and Industrial Engineering
>>Ryerson University
>>350 Victoria St, Toronto, ON, M5B 2K3, Canada
>>Tel: 416/979-5000 ext 7749
>>Fax: 416/979-5265
>>Email: [log in to unmask]
>>http://deed.ryerson.ca/~fil/
>
>
> --
> Prof. Filippo A. Salustri, Ph.D., P.Eng.
> Department of Mechanical and Industrial Engineering
> Ryerson University                         Tel: 416/979-5000 x7749
> 350 Victoria St.                           Fax: 416/979-5265
> Toronto, ON                                email: [log in to unmask]
> M5B 2K3  Canada                            http://deed.ryerson.ca/~fil/
>

--
Prof. Filippo A. Salustri, Ph.D., P.Eng.
Department of Mechanical and Industrial Engineering
Ryerson University                         Tel: 416/979-5000 x7749
350 Victoria St.                           Fax: 416/979-5265
Toronto, ON                                email: [log in to unmask]
M5B 2K3  Canada                            http://deed.ryerson.ca/~fil/