Thank you for you well developed response, but I'm still unclear about its
analytical function. I think I need clear examples of the usefulness of
these distinctions is film scholarship. I could say that Norman's knife is a
phalic symbol and I could say that it is a symbol of patriarchal aggression,
the law of the father, a symbol of woman's castration, or a symbol of
Norman's dead father. Since symbolic images are essentially overdetermined
and could mean many things simultaneously, where do we draw the line.
Feminist analysis has even argued that woman is a sign, that the image of a
woman is not merely an index of woman, but always a sign representing a
whole battery of meanings and implications.
I would need to see in very specific terms how your distinctions
between index/sign/icon/symbol might help develop a meaningful argument.
Hasn't deconstructionist thinking put an end to these philosophical
distinctions. Ron
----- Original Message -----
From: "Nathan Andersen" <[log in to unmask]>
To: <[log in to unmask]>
Sent: Tuesday, May 18, 2004 11:12 PM
Subject: Re: Symbol and Index
> Dear Ron T.,
>
> You wrote:
>
> "I'm not sure what value these definitions have because they can be so
arbitraily applied to anything. ... my question really is: what difference
does it make whether something is a symbol/sign/index?"
>
> I think that this is a good question -- a version of which comes up in
almost every philosophy class I teach. I think, also, that there is a good
response.
>
> The first thing to notice (as R.G. Collingwood argues, to my mind
convincingly, in Essay on Philosophical Method) is that philosophical
distinctions do not (usually) carve up the world into discrete objects, but
offer a distinct perspective from which to look at a given object or entity
or idea. In other words, if the distinction between symbol/sign/ and index
is a philosophical distinction, then the same thing can be a symbol, sign or
index. But it means something different to say of an image of a bloody
knife that it is a phallic symbol, a sign of death, or an index of a real
knife.
>
> The thing to ask, then, is does this distinction make sense? Is it clear
what it means to say that something is a symbol of x, a sign of y and an
icon of z? If the distinction can be made clear in terms of fairly obvious
instances, and if it is also clear in terms of such instances what it would
mean to say that the same thing is a symbol of something, a sign of
something else, and an icon of a third thing, then we are working with a
good and clear distinction.
>
> Then the question is, when dealing with tougher cases, just whether a case
can be made for applying one of these terms to a particular object. Of
course anyone can CLAIM that for any object that it is a symbol of Y or an
icon of Z, but can they give good and convincing reasons why it ought to be
taken as such? (They could point, for example, to the consistent usage of X
in similar contexts throughout the film or throughout films of the same
genre, or throughout films of the same "auteur's" work, etc. They could
argue that taking something as a symbol of Y helps to clarify other things
that would otherwise seem confusing or superfluous, etc. Part of making the
case for calling something a symbol of Y is to show that it helps with our
making sense of the film as a whole to suppose it is.)
>
> Any such set of reasons can be disputed, but not refuted unless claims to
the contrary are also accompanied by convincing reasons, that (1) exhibit an
understanding of the meaning of the terms, (2) address public facts about
the film AND (3) address the apparently convincing reasons that were given
by the first person. The point here is that any claim about a film is
subject to debate, but the debate has to operate on the basis of a shared
understanding of the terms of debate (hence the need for clarity of
distinctions -- and of course the distinctions themselves could be subject
to debate on the same basis). And once a group of thinkers are working with
a more or less well understood set of distinctions there can be better or
worse reasons given for applying them in a particular way to any given case.
>
> This may sound as though it is all relative, if by this is meant that the
argument could in principle never stop. But in practice there really are
better and worse arguments, and usually reasonable people will cease to
insist on things when they've seen a better argument. Of course, sometimes
there are equally compelling arguments for contrary views -- but usually
these aren't contradictory views, just views that reveal different things
about a film from differing perspectives. If there were genuine cases of
contradictions, it would be reasonable for a critic to withhold judgement --
or to assume that the contradiction is "deliberate" and holds a key to some
"deeper" meaning of the film. I have to say, I find nothing about this
process that is viciously problematic.
>
> Yours in discourse,
>
> Nate
>
> --
> Nathan Andersen, Ph.D.
> Assistant Professor of Philosophy
> Director, International Cinema at Eckerd College
> Collegium of Letters
> Eckerd College
> 4200 54th Ave. S. Phone: (727) 864-7551
> St. Petersburg, FL 33712 Fax: (727) 864-8354
> U.S.A. E-mail: [log in to unmask]
>
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